Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 3.13

[1] "Upon these pretensions, therefore, and causes, men of Lacedaemon and confederates, we have revolted, the which are both clear enough for the hearers to judge upon, that we had reason for it, and weighty enough to affright, and compel us to take some course for our own safety, which we would have done before, when before the war we sent ambassadors to you about our revolt, but could not because you would not then admit us into your league. And now when the Boeotians invited us to it, we presently obeyed. Wherein we thought we made a double revolt, one from the Grecians, in ceasing to do them mischief with the Athenians and helping to set them free, and another from the Athenians, in breaking first and not staying to be destroyed by them hereafter.

[2] But this revolt of ours hath been sooner than was fit and before we were provided for it. For which cause also the confederates ought so much the sooner to admit us into the league and send us the speedier aid, thereby the better at once both to defend those you ought to defend and to annoy your enemies.

[3] Whereof there was never better opportunity than at present.

[4] For the Athenians being both with the sickness and their great expenses consumed and their navy divided, part upon your own coasts and part upon ours, it is not likely they should have many galleys to spare in case you again this summer invade them both by sea and land, but that they should either be unable to resist the invasion of your fleet or be forced to come off from both our coasts.

[5] And let not any man conceive that you shall herein at your own danger defend the territory of another. For though Lesbos seem remote, the profit of it will be near you. For the war will not be, as a man would think, in Attica but there from whence cometh the profit to Attica.

[6] This profit is the revenue they have from the confederates, which, if they subdue us, will still be greater. For neither will any other revolt; and all that is ours will accrue unto them, and we shall be worse handled besides than those that were under them before.

[7] But aiding us with diligence, you shall both add to your league a city that hath a great navy, the thing you most stand in need of, and also easily overthrow the Athenians by subduction of their confederates because everyone will then be more confident to come in, and you shall avoid the imputation of not assisting such as revolt unto you. And if it appear that your endeavour is to make them free, your strength in this war will be much the more confirmed.

[1] Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, are the grounds and the reasons of our revolt; clear enough to convince our hearers of the fairness of our conduct, and sufficient to alarm ourselves, and to make us turn to some means of safety. This we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you on the subject while the peace yet lasted, but were baulked by your refusing to receive us; and now, upon the Boeotians inviting us, we at once responded to the call, and decided upon a twofold revolt, from the Hellenes and from the Athenians, not to aid the latter in harming the former, but to join in their liberation, and not to allow the Athenians in the end to destroy us, but to act in time against them.

[2] Our revolt, however has taken place prematurely and without preparation—a fact which makes it all the more incumbent on you to receive us into alliance and to send us speedy relief, in order to show that you support your friends, and at the same time do harm to your enemies.

[3] You have an opportunity such as you never had before. Disease and expenditure have wasted the Athenians: their ships are either cruising round your coasts, or engaged in blockading us;

[4] and it is not probable that they will have any to spare, if you invade them a second time this summer by sea and land; but they will either offer no resistance to your vessels, or withdraw from both our shores.

[5] Nor must it be thought that this is a case of putting yourselves into danger for a country which is not yours. Lesbos may appear far off, but when help is wanted she will be found near enough. It is not in Attica that the war will be decided, as some imagine, but in the countries by which Attica is supported;

[6] and the Athenian revenue is drawn from the allies, and will become still larger if they reduce us; as not only will no other state revolt, but our resources will be added to theirs, and we shall be treated worse than those that were enslaved before.

[7] But if you will frankly support us, you will add to your side a state that has a large navy, which is your great want; you will smooth the way to the overthrow of the Athenians by depriving them of their allies, who will be greatly encouraged to come over; and you will free yourselves from the imputation made against you, of not supporting insurrection. In short, only show yourselves as liberators, and you may count upon having the advantage in the war.

„Das sind die Gründe und Ursachen, ihr Lakedämonier
und ihr Bundesgenossen, die uns zum Abfall bewogen, einleuchtend
genug, um Jeden, der uns anhört, zu überzeugen, daß wir recht
gethan haben, und triftig genug, um unsere Besorgnis; zu wecken und
uns zur eigenen Sicherstellung aufzufordern. Und das wollten wir
damals schon, als wir noch mitten im Frieden des Abfalls wegen
Gesandte zu euch schickten; da ihr uns aber abwieset, so blieb unsere
Absicht unerfüllt. Jetzt aber sind wir der Aufforderung der Böotier
allsogleich gefolgt und wir denken, daß es mit unserem Abfall seine
zwei Seiten hat: von den hellenischen Bundesgenossen trennen wir
uns, um nicht im Bündniß mit den Athenern ihnen Unrecht zu thun,
sondern um an ihrer Befreiung mitzuhelfen, und von den Athenern
fallen wir ab, um nicht in nächster Zukunft durch sie zu Grunde
gerichtet zu werden, sondern ihnen selbst zuvorzukommen. Unser Abfall
ist aber etwas schnell und unvorbereitet eingetreten, und um so mehr
müßt ihr uns als Bundesgenossen aufnehmen und uns schleunigst
Hülfe senden, damit ihr euch als Männer zeiget, die helfen, wo es
Noth thut, und gleichzeitig auch dem Feinde zu schaden wissen.. Dazu
aber ist jetzt ein so günstiger Zeitpunkt, wie früher nie. Die Athener
sind durch die Seuche wie durch Geldausgaben zu Grunde gerichtet;
von ihren Schiffen befindet sich ein Theil in euren Gewässern, und ein
Theil ist gegen uns aufgestellt; sie können also unmöglich eine
hinreichende Zahl von Schiffen haben, wenn ihr noch in diesem Sommer
mit der Flotte und dem Landheere einen zweiten Einfall macht,
sondern entweder können sie sich der angreifenden Schiffe nicht erwehren,
oder sie müssen die ihrigen von beiden Punkten wegziehen. Denke
aber Keiner, daß er dabei eines fremden Landes wegen sein eigenes
der Gefahr preisgebe. Wer glaubt, daß Lesbos allzuweit entfernt sei,
der wird schon sehen, daß es in seiner Nähe Nutzen gewähre. Denn
der Krieg wird nicht in Attika geführt werden, wie vielleicht Einer
glauben könnte, sondern da, wo Attika seinen Nutzen her zieht. Ihre
Geldeinkünfte aber kommen von ihren Bundesgenossen, und diese
werden noch größer sein, wenn sie uns erst unterjocht haben; denn ein
Anderer wird dann nicht mehr abzufallen wagen, und die Einkünfte
von uns kommen hinzu; trotzdem aber würden wir dann mehr zu ¹ .
leiden haben, als die vor uns unterworfenen. Wenn ihr uns aber<
kräftig zu Hülfe kommt, so werdet ihr einen Staat gewinnen, der eine
bedeutende Seemacht hat, woran es euch gerade fehlt, und der Athener
werdet ihr um so leichter Herr werden, da ihr die Bundesgenossen von
ihnen abzieht; denn jeder Andere wird sich euch mit viel größerem
Vertrauen zuwenden, und des Vorwurfs, der aus euch lastet, daß ihr
den zum Abfalle Bereiten nicht zu Hülfe kommt, werdet ihr ledig.
Tretet ihr aber als Befreier auf, so wird in eurer Hand die stärkere
Kriegskraft sein."

XIII. «Telles ont été, Lacédémoniens et alliés, les raisons et les causes de notre défection ; elles prouvent clairement pour ceux qui nous entendent que nous avons agi à propos ; elles justifient nos craintes et les précaut ions prises en vue de notre sécurité. Depuis longtemps déjà nous avions formé ce dessein, lorsque nous avons envoyé vers vous, avant même la rupture de la paix, pour traiter de cette défection ; mais vous nous avez arrêtés alors, en refusant de nous accueillir. Sollicités aujourd’hui par les Béotiens, nous avons répondu sans délai à leur appel. Cette défection avait à nos yeux un double caractère : nous nous séparions des Grecs pour ne pas contribuer à leurs maux par notre union avec les Athéniens, et pour coopérer au contraire à leur affranchissement ; des Athéniens, afin de les prévenir et de n’être pas écrasés par eux dans la suite. Toutefois, nous avons rompu prématurément et sans préparatifs ; ce doit être pour vous une raison de plus de nous admettre à votre alliance, et de nous envoyer de prompts secours : vous montrerez par-là que vous savez secourir ceux qui le méritent, et en même temps vous nuirez à vos ennemis. Jamais occasion ne fut plus favorable : les Athéniens sont écrasés par la maladie et par les frais de la guerre ; leur flotte est occupée, partie contre vous, partie contre nous-mêmes ; il est donc vraisemblable qu’il leur restera peu de vaisseaux disponibles, si, dans le cours de cet été, vous faites une seconde invasion par terre et par mer à la fois : ou bien ils ne pourront résister à votre attaque par mer, ou bien ils retireront leurs flottes de votre pays et du nôtre.

« N’allez pas croire qu’il s’agit de courir des dangers tout personnels, en faveur d’une contrée étrangère : tel croit Lesbos fort éloignée, qui en retirera des avantages prochains ; car ce n’est pas dans l’Attique que sera, comme quelques-uns le pensent, le siége de la guerre ; c’est dans les contrées d’où l’Attique tire ses ressources. Les Athéniens tirent leurs revenus de leurs alliés ; ils les accroîtront encore s’ils nous soumettent ; car personne n’osera plus se détacher d'eux : nos ressources s’ajouteront aux leurs, et nous serons plus durement traités que les peuples les premiers asservis. Mais si vous vous empressez de nous donner un secours efficace, vous ajouterez à votre puissance une ville qui possède une marine considérable (ce dont vous avez surtout besoin) ; vous abattrez plus aisément les Athéniens, en leur enlevant leurs alliés ; car chacun alors se rangera plus hardiment à votre parti ; vous échapperez au reproche qu’on vous fait de ne pas secourir ceux qui se détachent d’Athènes ; enfin, si vous vous attribuez le rôle de libérateurs, votre triomphe en sera plus certain.

« Telles ont été les raisons et les causes de notre défection. Elles prouvent clairement à qui veut les entendre que nous n’avons pas agi sans des motifs suffisants ; elles justifient nos défiances et nos mesures de sûreté. Du reste il y a longtemps que notre résolution était formée. La paix durait encore, lorsque nous envoyâmes auprès de vous pour traiter de notre défection ; mais nous fûmes arrêtés par votre refus. Aujourd’hui, sollicités par les Béotiens, nous avons répondu avec joie à leur appel. Nous avons cru devoir nous séparer à la fois et des Grecs ¹ , pour ne pas coopérer plus longtemps à leur oppression par notre alliance avec Athènes, mais pour aider au contraire à leur affranchissement ; et des Athéniens, pour les prévenir et ne pas être anéantis par eux dans la suite.

« Il est vrai que notre défection s’est opérée brusquement et sans préparatifs : raison de plus pour nous recevoir dans votre alliance et nous envoyer un prompt secours. Par là vous ferez voir que vous savez protéger ceux qui le méritent, et en même temps causer du dommage à vos ennemis. Jamais l’occasion ne fut plus belle. Les Athéniens sont aux abois par suite de l’épidémie et des dépenses toujours croissantes. Leurs vaisseaux sont les uns occupés dans vos parages, les autres destinés à agir contre nous. Il n’est donc pas à croire qu’il leur en reste beaucoup de disponibles, si dès cet été vous faites une nouvelle invasion par mer et par terre. Dans ce cas, de deux choses l’une : ou ils ne pourront soutenir votre agression, ou ils évacueront votre pays et le nôtre.

« Au surplus, ne vous figurez pas que vous allez courir des dangers personnels en faveur d’une terre étrangère. Tel qui croit Lesbos fort éloignée, en recueillera un avantage prochain ; car ce n’est pas l’Attique, ainsi qu’on le pense, qui sera le théâtre de cette guerre, mais les pays d’où les Athéniens tirent leurs revenus. Or c’est de leurs alliés que proviennent leurs richesses ; elles s’augmenteront encore s’ils nous subjuguent ; car nul ne fera plus défection et nos tributs iront grossir ceux qu’ils perçoivent. Notre condition sera même plus triste que celle de leurs anciens sujets. Si, au contraire, vous nous secourez avec zèle, vous y gagnerez ce qui vous manque le plus, une marine puissante ; vous abattrez plus facilement les Athéniens en leur enlevant leurs alliés, car chacun passera plus hardiment de votre côté ; enfin vous échapperez au reproche qu’on vous fait de ne pas soutenir ceux qui secouent le joug. En apparaissant comme des libérateurs, vous vous assurerez une victoire définitive.

[1] "Such were the motives and reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, which led us to revolt, and they are clear enough to convince all who hear them that we had good grounds for our action, and cogent enough to alarm us and impel us to seek some means of safety. This we long ago wished to do while you were still at peace, when we sent envoys to you suggesting that we should revolt, but were prevented from doing so because you would not receive us. But now, when the Boeotians invited ¹ us we responded promptly. It was our intention to make at once a double withdrawal—from the Hellenes ² and thus aid in liberating them instead of joining the Athenians to do them wrong; and from the Athenians, and thus destroy them first instead of being ourselves destroyed by them afterwards.

[2] Our revolt, however, has been made prematurely and without preparation; wherefore it is the more incumbent upon you to receive us as allies and quickly send us aid, in order that all men may see that you protect those whom you ought to protect and at the same time harm your enemies. And it is an opportunity such as never has been before.

[3] For the Athenians have been ruined by pestilence as well as by heavy expenses. Part of their fleet is cruising about your coasts, ³ part is arrayed against us; so that it is not likely that they have any ships to spare if you attack them this coming summer a second time, by sea as well as by land;

[4] but they will either not resist you when you sail against them, or else they will have to withdraw their fleets both from our waters and from yours. And let no one think that he will be incurring a risk of his own for the country of another.

[5] For though Lesbos seems to him to be a long way off, the help she will bring him will be close at hand. For the war will not be in Attica, ⁴ as some think, but in those countries from which Athens derives its support. The revenues of Athens come from her allies, and they will be still greater if they shall subdue us;

[6] for not only will no one else revolt, but our resources will be added to hers, and we should be treated with greater rigour ⁵ than those who have long been slaves.

[7] But if you give us your hearty support, you will add to your league a state that has a large navy, a thing of which you still stand most in need, and you will find it easier to overthrow the Athenians by gradually drawing their allies away from them—for every one will be emboldened to come over to your side—and you will free yourselves of the reproach under which you have heretofore laboured, of refusing ⁶ to aid those who revolt from the Athenians. But if you openly play the part of liberators, ⁷ the more certain will be your victory in the war.

[1] "It was on such grounds and with such reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, that we revolted; sufficiently clear ones for those who hear them to judge that we acted rightly; and sufficiently strong ones to alarm us, and make us betake ourselves to some means of safety: which indeed we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you, while the peace yet lasted, on the subject of our revolting, but were prevented by your not receiving us into alliance. But now, when the Boeotians invited us, we immediately listened to their proposals; and thought that we should withdraw ourselves in a twofold manner; front the Greeks, so as not to join in injuring them in company with the Athenians, but to join in giving them liberty;

[2] and from the Athenians, so as not to be ruined by them ourselves after the rest, but to be beforehand in acting [against them ¹ Our revolt, however, has taken place prematurely, and without due preparations; for which reason also it is the more incumbent on you to receive us as allies, and send us succour speedily;

[3] that you may be seen both assisting those whom you ought, and at the same time hurting your enemies. And there is an opportunity for doing that, such as there never was before; for the Athenians have been wasted both by disease and pecuniary expenditure; and their ships are either cruising round your coasts, or stationed against us;

[4] so that it is not likely they should have any to spare, if in the course of this summer you should invade them a second time both by sea and land; but they will either offer no resistance to your naval attack, or withdraw their forces from both our shores.

[5] And let no one deem that he would thus be incurring peril to himself in defence of another man's country. For whoever thinks Lesbos far off, will find it close at hand for assisting him. For it is not in Attica that the war will be decided, as men imagine, but in that quarter from which Attica derives its succours.

[6] Now their revenue is drawn from their allies; and it will be still greater, if they subdue us; for no one else will revolt, and our resources will be added to theirs; and we should be treated worse than those who were enslaved before [they revolted].

[7] But if you will give us hearty assistance, you will both add to your league a state that has a large navy, of which you especially stand in need, and will the more easily overthrow the Athenians, by depriving them of their allies, (for every one will then join you more boldly,) and will escape the charge you have incurred of not assisting those who revolt. If, however, you show yourselves as liberators, you will find your advantage in the war more certain.

[1] « Tales igitur, Lacedaemonii ac socii, rationes et causas quum haberemus, defecimus, quae satis et manifestae sunt auditoribus, ut cognoscere possint, nos merito fecisse, et validae, ut metum conciperemus et ad aliquod salutis nostrae praesidium nos converteremus, atque id volumus quidem jam multo tempore, quum rebus adhuc pacatis legatos ad vos misimus, qui de defectione vobiscum agerent; sed quia vos recipere nos noluistis, impediti sumus; nunc vero, ubi Boeoti nos excitarunt, confestim obtemperavimus, du-plicemque defectionem nos facturos existimabamus, unam quidem a Graecis, ne una cum Atheniensibus ipsos maleficiis afficeremus, sed una in libertatem vindicaremus; alteram vero ab Atheniensibus, ne nos ipsi postea ab illis profligaremur, sed hoc prius illis faceremus.

[2] Nostra tamen defectio subito facta est et imparata; quo etiam magis oportet vos nobis in societatem receptis auxilium quam celerrime mittere, ut appareat, vos et illis succurrere, quibus est succurrendum, et simul hostibus nocere.

[3] Opportunitas autem qualis nunquam ante. £tenim et morbo attriti sunt Athenienses et pecuniarum impensis, et naves ipsorum partim quidem circa vestram regionem, parlim vero contra nos sunt constitutae;

[4] quare non verisimile est, eos navium abunde habituros, si vos hac aestate cum navalibus pedestribusque copiis simul iterum irruptionem faciatis , sed aut vos contra se cum infesta classe venientes propulsare non poterunt, aut ab utrisque discedent.

[5] Neque vero quispiam existimet, se domesticum periculum pro alieni agri defensione subiturum. Cui enim Lesbos proeul abesse videtur, haec tamen utilitatem ei ex propinquo praebebit. Nec enim, quemadmodum quis existimat, bellum in Attica terra geretur, sed in ea, unde Attica utilitatem percipit.

[6] Est autem illi pecuniarum proventus a sociis, et longe major erit, si in suam potestatem nos redegerint; nam nec alius deficiet, et res nostrae illis accedent; et acerbiora mala pateremur, quam illi, qui jam ante iis serviebant.

[7] Sed si vos alacriter succurratis, quum civitatem vobis adjungetis, quae magnam classem habet, cujus in primis vos indigetis, tum etiam Atheniensium imperium facilius evertetis, subtrahentes eorum socios (quilibet enim se vobis confidentius adjunget), et sinistram opinionem vitabitis, quam sustinebatis, quod illis, qui deficiunt, opera non feratis. Sed si manifestum sit, illos a vobis in libertatem vindicari, victoriam belli certiorem habebitis.

[1] Wenn es bisher bei den Rednern an dieser Stätte fast allgemeiner Brauch geworden, den Mann zu rühmen, der mit der Bestattung diese Rede verband, weil an dem Grabe gefallener Krieger ein ehrendes Wort sich zieme, so würde ich es für hinreichend gehalten haben, dass man Helden der That mit einer festlichen Handlung ehre, — wie das denn der Staat durch die Bestattung gethan hat, deren Zeugen ihr so eben gewesen — und würde die Verherrlichung so vieler Männer nicht einem Einzelnen und der zufälligen Wirkung seines Vortrags anheimgegeben haben.

« Queste sono, o Spartani ed alleati, le cause della uostra ribellione, e i motivi di nostre coadoglienzo {sufficienti a chiarir chi gli ascolti dell’onestà del nostro operare , e bastevole a sbigottir noi, ed a rivolgerci a qualche partito di sicurezza ; noi che ciò meditavamo di fare è già buona pezza, quando durante la pace vi spedimmo legati intorno alla ribellione : se non che ne fummo impediti dal vostro rifiuto. Ora però all’invito dei Beozii abbiamo prontamente aderito, e reputiamo che doppiamente ci ribelleremo ; primo, da’Greci per non ci unire cogli Ateniesi a danneggiarli, anzi concorrer con voi a liberarli; secondo , dagli Ateniesi per prevenirli, affinchè noi stessi non restiamo alla fine oppressi da loro. Ma la nostra ribellione fu troppo sollecita e sfornita dei necessari apparecchi : il perchè tanto meglio dovete riceverci nell’alleanza , e spedirci proti tarnente soccorso, acciò mostriate di aiutare quelli che aiutar si conviene, e ad un’ora stessa danneggiate i vostri nemici. L’opportunità non fu mai più bella : sono gli Ateniesi rifiniti dalla pestilenza e dalle spese ; le loro navi, parte sono attorno al vostro territorio, parte sono schierate contro» di noi : cosicché ge in questa stessa estate voi gli assaltiate un’altra volta per mare e per terra, non è da credere che essi abbiano navi di soverchio ; ma o non potranno resistere alle nostre flotte, o si ritireranno dal Peloponneso e da Lesbo. Nè sia tra voi chi pensi di affrontare un pericolo tutto suo per un paese straniero : perocché cui sembra Lesbo troppo lontana, sappia che ella gli procaccierà vantaggi dappresso ; perchè la guerra non si farà nell’Attica, come taluno avvisa, ma là onde i vantaggi dell'Attica derivano. In fatti hanno gli Ateniesi dagli alleati le loro rendite di denaro, le quali diverranno anche maggiori qualora soggioghino noi ; avvegnaché niun altro oserà allora ribellarsi, e là coleranno anche le nostre ricchezze, e più duri ceppi soffriremo dei fatti schiavi di prima. Ma aiutandoci

Voi prontamente , vi aggiuilgerete una città fornita di gran flotta, di cui principalmente abbisognate, e più di leggieri fiaccherete gli Ateniesi, sottraendo loro gli alleati, ciascuno dei quali più animosamente ricorrerà a voi. Così sfuggirete la taccia che avete di non soccorrere quei che si staccano dagli Ateniesi ; e mostrandovi solleciti della loro libertà potrete meglio confidare della vittoria di questa guerra.