Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 3.11

[1] "It is true that if we were now in liberty all, we might be the better assured that they would forbear to innovate; but since they have under them the greatest part already, in all likelihood they will take it ill to deal on equal terms with us alone and, the rest yielding, to let us only stand up as their equals. Especially when by how much they are become stronger by the subjection of their confederates, by so much the more are we become desolate.

[2] But the equality of mutual fear is the only band of faith in leagues.

[3] For he that hath the will to transgress, yet when he hath not the odds of strength, will abstain from coming on. Now the reason why they have left us yet free is no other but that they may have a fair colour to lay upon their domination over the rest and because it hath seemed unto them more expedient to take us in by policy than by force.

[4] For therein they made use of us for an argument that having equal vote with them we would never have followed them to the wars if those against whom they led us had not done the injury:

[5] and thereby also they brought the stronger against the weaker and, reserving the strongest to the last, made them the weaker by removing the rest. Whereas if they had begun with us, when the confederates had had both their own strength and a side to adhere to, they had never subdued them so easily.

[6] Likewise our navy kept them in some fear, lest united and added to yours or to any other, it might have created them some danger.

[7] Partly also we escaped by our observance toward their commons and most eminent men from time to time.

[8] But yet we still thought we could not do so long, considering the examples they have showed us in the rest, if this war should not have fallen out.

[1] Had we all been still independent, we could have had more faith in their not attempting any change; but the greater number being their subjects, while they were treating us as equals, they would naturally chafe under this solitary instance of independence as contrasted with the submission of the majority; particularly as they daily grew more powerful, and we more destitute.

[2] Now the only sure basis of an alliance is for each party to be equally afraid of the other: he who would like to encroach is then deterred by the reflection that he will not have odds in his favour.

[3] Again, if we were left independent, it was only because they thought they saw their way to empire more clearly by specious language and by the paths of policy than by those of force.

[4] Not only were we useful as evidence that powers who had votes, like themselves, would not, surely, join them in their expeditions, against their will, without the party attacked being in the wrong; but the same system also enabled them to lead the stronger states against the weaker first, and so to leave the former to the last, stripped of their natural allies, and less capable of resistance.

[5] But if they had begun with us, while all the states still had their resources under their own control, and there was a center to rally round, the work of subjugation would have been found less easy.

[6] Besides this, our navy gave them some apprehension: it was always possible that it might unite with you or with some other power, and become dangerous to Athens .

[7] The court which we paid to their commons and its leaders for the time being, also helped us to maintain our independence.

[8] However, we did not expect to be able to do so much longer, if this war had not broken out, from the examples that we had had of their conduct to the rest.

„Wären wir Alle jetzt noch unabhängig, so dürften wir
wohl mehr darauf vertrauen, daß sie an keine Aenderung des
Verhältnisses dächten. Da sie aber bereits die Mehrzahl-sich unterworfen
haben, mit uns aber wie mit ihres Gleichen verkehren müssen, so
wird es ihrem Stolze natürlich um so empfindlicher sein, daß wir
allein sogar jetzt noch auf gleichem Rechte mit ihnen stehen, nachdem
bereits die Mehrzahl sich ihnen untergeordnet Hai, und das um so
mehr, je mächtiger sie selbst dadurch geworden und je vereinsamter wir
sind. Die Furcht aber, den Gegner gleich stark zu finden, ist das
einzige feste Band der Bundesgenossenschaft; denn wenn sich auch Einer
noch so gern überheben möchte, so läßt er sich doch durch den Gedanken
zurückhalten, daß er nicht mit überlegener Kraft angreifen kann. Daß
uns aber die Unabhängigkeit gelassen wurde, hat keinen andern Grund,
als daß es ihnen zur Gewinnung der Oberherrschast förderlicher schien,
bei Vermehrung ihrer Macht immer nur mit einem scheinbaren
Rechtsgruude und mehr mit Staatsklugheit vorzugehen als mit Gewalt.
Zugleich hatten sie so auch einen Beweisgruud für die Gerechtigkeit
ihrer Sache, da sie sagen konnten, daß Bundesgenossen mit gleichem
Stimmrecht wohl nicht wider ihren Willen mit ihnen zu Felde
ziehen würden, wenn der von ihnen angegriffene Feind nicht im
Unrecht wäre. Zugleich aber auch sind sie zuerst mit Hülfe der
Stär keren gegen die Schwächeren vorgegangen und haben sich die andern ¹
bis znletzt aufgespart, um dann an ihnen schwächere Gegner zu finden
als die übrige ihnen bereits unterworfene Macht. Hätten sie aber den
Anfang mit uns gemacht, zur Zeit da Alle noch ihre unabhängige
Macht besaßen und Jeder wußte, auf welche Seite er zu treten habe,
so wäre es mit dem Unterwerfen nicht so leicht gegangen. Außerdem
war es auch unsere Flotte, was sie scheuten, denn hätte sich diese mit
euch oder einem Andern in voller Schiffszahl vereinigt, so konnte sie
gefährlich werden. Zum Theil blieben wir auch deßhalb verschont,
weil wir sowohl ihrem Gemeinwesen gegenüber als auch gegen ihre
ersten Staatsmänner 9) uns immersort dienstbeflissen zeigten. Wir
hätten uns aber wohl nicht mehr lange aufrecht erhalten können, wäre
nicht der jetzige Krieg ausgebrochen; das ließ sich am Beispiele der
Andern abnehmen." ,

XI. « Si nous étions demeurés tous indépendants, nous aurions eu plus de garanties contre leurs entreprises ambitieuses ; mais, du moment où ils tenaient la plupart des alliés sous leur main et n’avaient con- servé qu'avec nous des rapports d’égalité, il était naturel, surtout en présence de la soumission générale, qu'ils supportassent plus impatiemment cette égalité que seuls nous avions gardée ; d’autant mieux qu’ils se surpassaient eux-mêmes en puissance, tandis que nous devenions plus isolés que jamais. Une crainte égale et réciproque est la seule garantie d’une alliance ¹ ; car celui qui serait tentéd’y commettre quelque infraction, en est détourné par la considération qu’il ne peut attaquer avec des forces supérieures. Si nous sommes restés indépendants, la seule raison en est qu’ils ont cru devoir s’emparer de l’empire et de la direction des affaires bien moins par la force que sous des prétextes spécieux, et par l’intrigue. D’ailleurs, ils nous citaient en exemple, et alléguaient que des peuples indépendants n’auraient pas volontairement pris part à leurs expéditions si ceux qu’ils attaquaient n'eussent été coupables. En même temps c’étaient les plus forts qu’ils entraînaient tout d’abord contre les plus faibles, les réservant euxmêmes pour les derniers, bien assurés de trouver chez eux moins de résistance quand ils auraient autour d’eux soumis tout le reste. S'ils avaient, au contraire, commencé par nous, quand tous les autres peuples avaient encore et leurs propres forces et un point d’appui, il n’eût pas été aussi facile de nous asservir. Notre marine aussi les inquiétait : ils craignaient qu'un jour elle ne se réunît tout entière soit à vous, soit à quelque autre peuple, et ne devînt pour eux un sérieux danger. Enfin, nous ne nous maintenions que par nos soins obséquieux envers la multitude et les chefs qui se succédaient. Et cependant, instruits par les exemples d’autrui, nous sentions bien que nous ne pouvions tenir longtemps, si la guerre présente ne fût survenue.

« Si nous avions tous conservé l’indépendance, nous aurions été moins en butte à leurs entreprises. Mais, comme ils tenaient déjà sous le joug/ la majeure partie des alliés, et que nous étions les seuls avec lesquels ils marchaient encore de pair, il était naturel qu’au milieu de la soumission générale, ils vissent de mauvais œil notre égalité exceptionnelle, d’autant plus que leurs forees croissaient en proportion de notre isolement. Or une crainte réciproque est Tunique garant de toute alliance, parce que celui des deux associés qui pourrait avoir quelque velléité agressive est contenu par la pensée qu’il n’est pas le plus fort.

« Si jusqu’à ce jour ils nous ont laissé l’indépendance, c’était pour se ménager un argument spécieux, et parce qu’ils espéraient arriver plus aisément à leurs fins par la ruse que par la violence. Ils n’étaient pas fâchés de pouvoir dire, en nous montrant, que jamais des alliés leurs égaux ne les eussent aidés contre des peuples qu’ils n’auraient pas jugés coupables. En même temps ils poussaient les plus forts contre les plus faibles, afin d’avoir meilleur marché de ceux qui resteraient les derniers, lorsque autour d’eux tout serait soumis. Si au contraire ils eussent débuté par nous, quand les autres alliés possédaient encore leurs forces et avaient de plus un point d’appui, il leur eût été moins facile de nous réduire. D’ailleurs ils n’étaient pas sans inquiétude au sujet de notre marine ; ils craignaient qu’un jour elle ne se réunît à la vôtre ou à toute autre et ne devînt pour eux un danger.

« Pour nous maintenir, nous avons dû prodiguer toute sorte de flatterie à leur multitude et à ses chefs sans cesse renouvelés. Et cependant, à juger par l’exemple d’autrui, nous sentions que cela ne pouvait durer longtemps, si la guerre actuelle ne fût survenue.

[1] "Again if we had all remained independent we should have had better assurance that they would make no violent change in our status; having, however, the majority under their hands, while still associating with us on an equal footing, they would naturally find it more irksome that our state alone still maintained its equality as compared with the majority that had already yielded, especially since they were becoming more powerful in proportion as we became more isolated.

[2] Indeed it is only the fear that arises from equality of power that constitutes a firm basis for an alliance; for he that would transgress is deterred by the feeling that he has no superiority wherewith to make an attack.

[3] And we were left independent for no other reason than because they clearly saw that with a view to empire they must get control of affairs by fair-seeming words and by attacks of policy rather than of force.

[4] For, on the one hand, they had as evidence in their favour that surely those who have an equal voice with themselves would never have taken part in their campaigns had not those whom they attacked been guilty of some wrong; and on the other hand, they also brought the united strength of the strongest states against the less powerful first, and leaving the former to the last they counted upon finding them weaker when all the rest had been removed from around them.

[5] But if they had begun with us, while the whole body of allies were not only still strong in their own strength, but also had a leader to rally to, they would not have got the mastery so easily.

[6] Besides, our navy caused them some fear, lest it should some day be augmented by being united either with yours or another's and thus become a menace to themselves.

[7] To some extent also we owe our salvation to the court we paid to the Athenian people and to the political leaders of the day.

[8] But we could not have expected to be able to survive for long, if we may judge by their conduct toward the other allies, unless this war had broken out.

[1] "If indeed we had all been still independent, they might have been better trusted by us not to attempt any innovation: but having the majority subject to them, while they associated with us on terms of equality; and comparing the submission of the greater part with our alone being treated as equals, they would naturally brook it the worse; especially as they were themselves growing more powerful than ever, and we more destitute. But equality of fear is the only sure basis of an alliance;

[2] for then the party that wishes to commit any offence is deterred by the knowledge that he would not attempt it with any advantage on his side.

[3] Again, we were left independent for no other reason than inasmuch as their schemes of empire appeared attainable by specious language, and encroachment in the way of policy rather than of force.

[4] For at the same time they used us as evidence that such as had equal votes with themselves, at any rate, would not join them in their enterprises against their will; [and therefore not at all,] unless those they attacked were in the wrong: and by the same system they also led the stronger states with them against the weaker ones first, and by leaving the more powerful until the last they were sure to find them less so, when all the rest had been stripped away from them.

[5] But if they had begun with us, while all of them still had their power, and a centre round which to take their stand, they would not have subdued them so easily.

[6] Our fleet, too, caused them a degree of fear, lest by uniting together, and joining either you or any other power, it might some time bring them into danger.

[7] And again, to a certain extent we preserved ourselves by paying court to their commons, and to those who from time to time took the lead of them.

[8] We did not, however, expect to be long able to do so, if this war had not broken out; looking to the examples they had given in their dealings with the rest.

[1] « Quod si jam omnes adhuc liberi nostrique juris essemus, certior nobis fides esset, non eos novi quidquam molituros esse; quum vero plerosque sociorum subegerint, nobiscum autem mquo adhuc jure vivant, consentaneum erat eos indignius esse laturos, quod nunc quoque, quamvis major pars jam illis cedat, nos soli aequum jus retinemus, idque tanto magis, quo magis ipsorum potentia aucta est et nostra solitudo.

[2] Sed mutui metus aequalitas societatem sola facit fidelem; qui enim aliquid praeter jus facere vult, eo quod viribus non firmior impetum facturus esset, absterretur.

[3] Ac liberi relicti sumus nulla afia de causa, nisi quatenus ad imperium quaerendum, et specioso verborum praetextu, et consilii aggressione potius, quam armorum videbantur ipsis res obtineri posse.

[4] Simul enim hoc etiam testimonii argumento utebantor, socios, qui idem jus suffragii ferendi haberent, ad eandem militiam cum ipsis nunquam invitos profecturos fuisse, nisi illi, quibus bellum inferrent, aliquod peccatum commisissent ; eadem autem opera etiam potentissimos contra infirmiores primum secum adducebant, et futurum erat, ut illos quum ad extremum reservassent, reliquis ab omni parte detractis, imbecilliores haberent.

[5] Si contra a nobis initium duxissent, quoniam universi suas domesticas vires adhuc habebant, et alios, apud quos consistere poterant, haud ita facile socios subegissent.

[6] Atque classis nostra metum aliquem ipsis incutiebat, ne forte in unum coacta aut vobis aut alicui alii adjuncta periculum iis crearet.

[7] Partim vero etiam eo, quod eorum populum et eos qui quoque tempore reipublicae principes erant, observabamus, praeter reliquos liberi relinquebamur.

[8] Nec tamen diu hoc videbamur efficere posse, nisi hoc bellum confiatum esset, exemplis edocti eorum, quae reliquis acciderunt.

[1] Wenn es bisher bei den Rednern an dieser Stätte fast allgemeiner Brauch geworden, den Mann zu rühmen, der mit der Bestattung diese Rede verband, weil an dem Grabe gefallener Krieger ein ehrendes Wort sich zieme, so würde ich es für hinreichend gehalten haben, dass man Helden der That mit einer festlichen Handlung ehre, — wie das denn der Staat durch die Bestattung gethan hat, deren Zeugen ihr so eben gewesen — und würde die Verherrlichung so vieler Männer nicht einem Einzelnen und der zufälligen Wirkung seines Vortrags anheimgegeben haben.

et Che se'tutti godessimo ancor veramente della nostra politica independenza , più sicuramente sarebbero essi da noi creduti non ordir novità : ma da poiché soggettati i più, usano con noi dentro ai termini del giusto , e riscuotendo gli ossequi di quasi tutti , noi soli restiamo a gareggiar con loro , doveano a buon dritto sopportar ciò più adiratamente, specialmente in quanto che essi divenivano più potenti, e noi più deserti. Or la bilancia del timore è l' unica guarentigia per l' alleanza ; perciocché chi voglia punto trasgredire ad essa , si rimuove dall’offendere altrui al non vedersi in nulla da più. Nè per altra cagione noi siam rimasti independenti, se non in quanto si pareva loto che per aggiugnere all9 impero volevasi occupare la cosa pubblica col buon garbo di parole , e coll’assalto , direm così, di astuzie , piuttosto che di violenza. Posciachè a testimoniare la loro causa allegavano non esser possibile che noi aventi ugual diritto con essi al suffragio , unissimo, nostro mal grado , con loro le armi nostre , se i popoli contro cui andavano non fossero rei di qualche ingiustizia. E così da primo conducevan seco i più polenti contro i men forti t e lasciando quelli da ultimo per trovarli più deboli , tolti di mezzo tutti gli altri : che se avessero incominciato da noi, quando tutti avevan non solo le proprie forze, ma ancora a chi appoggiarsi, non li avrebbon potuti per egual modo soggiogare. Di più dava loro non poco timore la nostra flotta che per avventura riunitasi in aggiunta alla vostra o a qualche altra , non li mettesse in pericolo. In parte ancora dovemmo il nostro scampo ai buoni uffici usati col loro Comune e con quei che di mano in mauo vi presedevano : ma nondimeno, prendendo ad esempio l’accaduto agli altri, non credevamo poter durare a lungo , se non insorgeva questa guerra.