Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 1.140

[1] "Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion not to give way to the Peloponnesians (notwithstanding I know that men have not the same passions in the war itself which they have when they are incited to it but change their opinions with the events), but also I see that I must now advise the same things or very near to what I have before delivered. And I require of you with whom my counsel shall take place that if we miscarry in aught, you will either make the best of it, as decreed by common consent, or if we prosper, not to attribute it to your own wisdom only. For it falleth out with the events of actions, no less than with the purposes of man, to proceed with uncertainty, which is also the cause that when anything happeneth contrary to our expectation, we use to lay the fault on fortune.

[2] That the Lacedaemonians, both formerly and especially now, take counsel how to do us mischief is a thing manifest. For whereas it is said [in the articles] that in our mutual controversies we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in the meantime either side hold what they possess, they never yet sought any such trial themselves nor will accept of the same offered by us. They will clear themselves of their accusations by war rather than by words, and come hither no more now to expostulate but to command.

[3] For they command us to arise from before Potidaea and to restore the Aeginetae to the liberty of their own laws and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans.

[4] And they that come last command us to restore all the Grecians to their liberty. Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle by not abrogating the act concerning Megara (yet this by them is pretended most, and that for the abrogation of it war shall stay), nor retain a scruple in your minds as if a small matter moved you to the war.

[5] For even this small matter containeth the trial and constancy of your resolution. Wherein if you give them way, you shall hereafter be commanded a greater matter as men that for fear will obey them likewise in that. But by a stiff denial you shall teach them plainly to come to you hereafter on terms of more equality.

[1] ‘There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything, and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I know that the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded to make war, is not always retained in action; that as circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same, almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to those of you, who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the course of things is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is why we usually blame chance for whatever does not happen as we expected.

[2] Now it was clear before, that Lacedaemon entertained designs against us; it is still more clear now. The treaty provides that we shall mutually submit our differences to legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep what we have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never yet made us any such offer, never yet would accept from us any such offer; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be settled by war instead of by negotiation; and in the end we find them here dropping the tone of expostulation and adopting that of command.

[3] They order us to raise the siege of Potidaea , to let Aegina be independent, to revoke the Megara decree; and they conclude with an ultimatum warning us to leave the Hellenes independent.

[4] I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, which appears in front of their complaints, and the revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight cause.

[5] Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals.

„Bei meiner Meinung, ihr Athenischen Männer, daß wir
den Peloponnesiern nicht nachgeben dürfen, bleibe ich immer noch
stehen, wenn ich auch wohl weiß, daß die Menschen in der
Ausführung und bei der That sich nicht mehr so eifrig zeigen, wie am
Anfang, wo sie sich leicht zum Krieg bereden lassen, sondern in ihren
Ansichten wehcseln, wie das Glück grade fällt. Trotzdem weiß ich
aber auch jetzt nichts Anderes zu rathen, und ich ermähne diejenigen
unter euch, welche mir Recht geben, daß sie bei den gemeinsamen
Beschlüssen fest ausharren, wenn uns auch einmal ein Unglück trifft, und
es nicht ihrer Klugheit zuzuschreiben, wenn uns das Glück wohl will;
denn es ist bekannt, daß man aus den Gang der Dinge eben so wenig
sicher rechnen kann, wie auf die Gesinnung der Menschen, und wir
pflegen ja darum auch das Schicksal anzuklagen, wenn etwas ganz
Unerwartetes und Unerwünschtes sich ereignet. Daß uns die
Lakedämonier gern alles Böse anthun möchten, war schon längst offenbar,
und es ist dies jetzt wahrhaftig noch mehr. Es war ausgesprochen
worden ^), daß bei vorkommenden Zwistigkeiten die Sache vor ein
Schiedsgericht gebracht und dessen Entscheidung angenommen werden
müsse, und daß jede von beiden Parteien im Besitz dessen verbleiben
solle, was sie hat; aber sie haben noch nie ein Schiedsgericht verlangt,
und wenn wir es verlangen, sind sie nicht daraus eingegangen; denn
sie wollen die Zwistigkeiten lieber durch Kampf entshceiden, als durch
Unterhandlungen beilegen, und jetzt treten sie schon geradezu als
Befehlende auf und nicht als Beschwerde führend. Denn sie befehlen uns
von Potidäa abzulassen, Aegina freizugeben und den Beschluß wegen
der Megarer zurückzunehmen, und endlich kommen gar diese und
verlangen, daß wir den Hellenen ihre Selbständigkeit lassen sollen.
Glaube aber ja Keiner, daß wir uns einer Kleinigkeit wegen in
Krieg einlassen, wenn wir den Megarensischen Beschluß nicht
zurücknehmen, obgleich jene geradezu hervorheben, daß es nicht zum Kriege
kommen dürfe, wenn derselbe zurückgenommen werde. Und lasset ja
Nichts von dem Skrupel in euch sitzen, als ob ihr geringfügiger Ur- ^{1 2 3}
jache willen den Krieg herbeiführtet; denn an dieser Kleinigkeit wird
sich zeigen, ob eure Grundsätze fest wurzeln und die Probe bestehen
werden. Gebt ihr ihnen hierin nach, so werden sie euch allsogleich
etwas noch viel Härteres ausladen, weil es scheinen wird, als hättet
ihr euch aus Furcht gefügt; weist ihr sie aber mit Festigkeit zurück,
so zeigt ihr ihnen damit, daß sie euch künftig mehr als ihres Gleichen
zu behandeln haben 2^)."

CXL. « Athéniens, mon opinion n’a pas changé : nous ne devons pas céder aux Péloponnésiens. L’ardeur avec laquelle on se détermine à la guerre ne persiste pas, je le sais, quand il faut agir ; el les pensées des hommes tournent au gré des événements. Néanmoins je sens qu’aujourd’hui encore il me faut persévérer à vous donner les mêmes conseils ; je crois juste que ceux d’entre vous qui les auront adoptés soutiennent les résolutions prises en commun, même si tout ne réussit pas au gré de nos espérances ; sinon, qu’ils ne viennent point, en cas de succès, l’attribuer après coup à leur propre sagesse ; — car il peut se faire qu’il y ait inconséquence dans la marche des événements, tout aussi bien que dans les pensées des hommes ; et c’est pour cela que nous avons coutume d’accuser la fortune, toutes les fois qu’un événement imprévu vient tromper notre attente.

« Les dispositions hostiles des Lacédémoniens contre nous étaient évidentes auparavant ; elles le sont encore plus aujourd’hui. Car, bien que les traités portent que les différends réciproques seront réglés à l’amiable, chacun de nous restant provisoirement nanti de ce qu’il a entre les mains, ils n’ont jamais voulu ni réclamer l’arbitrage, ni l’accepter lorsque nous l’avons offert ; ils aiment mieux dans leurs réclamations en appeler aux armes qu’à la justice ; et déjà ce sont des ordres, ce ne sont plus des plaintes qu’ils vous apportent. Ils nous ordonnent de lever le siége de Potidée, de rendre l’indépendance à Égine, et de rapporter le décret contre les Mégariens. Enfin voilà leurs derniers députés qui viennent nous enjoindre de laisser la liberté à tous les Grecs. Ils proclament bien haut que, le décret ¹ rapporté, il n’y aura pas de guerre ; mais n’allez pas, pour cela, vous imaginer qu’en refusant de le rapporter nous ferions la guerre pour bien peu de chose. Il ne faut pas qu’un jour, regardant en arrière, vous trouviez en vous le regret d’avoir fait la guerre pour un motif futile : dans ce peu de chose, il y a l’affer- missement de votre puissance et l’épreuve de votre fermeté. Si vous leur cédez, bientôt ils vous feront des injonctions plus rigoureuses, dans l’espoir que, par crainte, vous obéirez encore. En tenant ferme, au contraire, vous leur montrerez clairement que le mieux est d’agir avec vous sur le pied de l’égalité.

« Je persiste toujours dans la pensée qu’il ne faut pas céder aux Péloponésiens, quoique je sache que les hommes ne mettent pas à poursuivre la guerre la même ardeur qu’à la décréter, et que leurs opinions varient au gré des circonstances. Je suis donc obligé de vous répéter encore une fois les mêmes conseils; et j’espère que ceux de vous que j’aurai persuadés, maintiendront, en cas de revers, nos résolutions communes, à moins qu’en cas de succès ils ne s’abstiennent de s’en attribuer la gloire. Les événements, ainsi que les pensées de l’homme, ne suivent pas toujours une marche rationnelle; c’est pour cela que nous imputons à la fortune tous les mécomptes qu’il nous arrive d’éprouver.

« Le mauvais vouloir dont les Lacédémoniens nous ont précédemment donné des preuves est plus évident aujourd’hui que jamais. Bien que le traité porte qu’on réglera les différends à l’amiable, chacun demeurant en possession de ses droits, ils n’ont point encore demandé d’arbitrage, et ils refusent celui que nous offrons; ils préfèrent vider la querelle parles armes et nous apportent, non plus des réclamations, mais des ordres. Ils nous enjoignent de lever le siège de Potidée, de rendre à Égine son indépendance, de retirer le décret relatif à Mégare ; enfin leurs derniers ambassadeurs nous somment de laisser les Grecs indépendants.

« N'allez pas vous imaginer que, si nous faisons la guerre, ce sera pour une cause aussi légère que le maintien du décret contre Mégare, ce qui est leur éternel refrain, et qu’il suffirait de rapporter ce décret pour éviter une rupture. Ne conservez pas l’arrière-pensée d’avoir pris les armes pour si peu. Cette prétention, minime en apparence, n’est au fond qu’un moyen de vous sonder et de reconnaître vos dispositions. Si vous cédez aujourd’hui, demain vous recevrez quelque injonction plus forte; car ils attribueront votre condescendance à la peur; tandis qu’en tenant ferme, vous leur ferez clairement entendre qu’ils doivent traiter avec vous d'égal à. égal.

[1] " I hold, men of Athens, to the same judgment as always, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are not as a rule moved by the same spirit when they are actually engaged in war as when they are being persuaded to undertake it, but change their judgments in accordance with events. And now also I see that I must give you the same or nearly the same advice as in the past, and I demand that those of you who are persuaded by what I shall say shall support the common decisions, even if we should in any way fail, or else, in case of success, claim no share in the good judgment shown. For it is just as possible for the course of events to move perversely as for the plans of men; and it is for that very reason that we commonly lay upon fortune the blame for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations.

[2] "As for the Lacedaemonians, it was perfectly clear before that they were plotting against us, and it is now clearer than ever. For whereas it was expressly stipulated that we should submit our differences to arbitration, each side meanwhile keeping what it had, they have never yet asked for arbitration themselves nor do they accept it now when we make the offer. What they want is to redress their grievances by war rather than by discussion, and they are here dictating already and no longer expostulating.

[3] For they order us to raise the siege of Potidaea, restore the independence of Aegina, and rescind the Megarian decree; and these men that are just come boldly proclaim that we must give all the Hellenes also their independence.

[4] But let no one of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifling matter, if we should refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—the thing they especially insist upon, saying that there will be no war if it is rescinded—and do not let there remain in your minds any self-reproach that it was a small matter for which you went to war.

[5] For this trifling thing involves nothing less than the vindication and proof of your political conviction. If you yield this point to them you will immediately be ordered to yield another and greater one, as having conceded this first point through fear; whereas by a downright refusal you will give them clearly to understand that they must be more disposed to deal with you on terms of equality.

[1] "I always adhere to the same opinion, Athenians, that we should make no concessions to the Lacedaemonians; although I know that men are not persuaded to go to war, and act when engaged in it, with the same temper; but that, according to results, they also change their views. Still I see that the same advice, or nearly the same, must be given by me now as before; and I claim from those of you who are being persuaded to war, that you will support the common resolutions, should we ever meet with any reverse; or not, on the other hand, to lay any claim to intelligence, if successful. For it frequently happens that the results of measures proceed no less incomprehensibly than the counsels of man; and therefore we are accustomed to regard fortune as the author of all things that turn out contrary to our expectation.

[2] Now the Lacedaemonians were both evidently plotting against us before, and now especially are doing so. For whereas it is expressed in the treaty, that we should give and accept judicial decisions of our differences, and each side [in the mean time] keep what we have; they have neither themselves hitherto asked for such a decision, nor do they accept it when we offer it; but wish our complaints to be settled by war rather than by words; and are now come dictating, and no longer expostulating.

[3] For they command us to raise the siege of Potidaea, and to leave Aegina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the Megareans; while these last envoys that have come charge us also to leave the Greeks independent.

[4] But let none of you think that we should be going to war for a trifle, if we did not rescind the decree respecting the Megareans, which they principally put forward, [saying,] that if it were rescinded, the war would not take place: nor leave in your minds any room for self-accusation hereafter, as though you had gone to war for a trivial thing.

[5] For this trifle ¹ involves the whole confirmation, as well as trial, of your purpose. If you yield to these demands, you will soon also be ordered to do something greater, as having in this instance obeyed through fear: but by resolutely refusing you would prove clearly to them that they must treat with you more on an equal footing.

[1] « In eadem sententia, Athenienses, semper permaneo, Peloponnesiis non esse cedendum,, quam vis sciam, homines non eodem animi impetu adduci, ut bellum gerant, atque in ipso opere versari, sed pro variis rerum eventis sententias etiam mutare. Video autem etiam nunc similia et paria mihi suadenda esse, et ab iis inter vos, quibus haec probantur, jure meo exigo, ut iis quae publice decreta fuerint, etiam si qua forte in re offendamus, opem ferant, aut si nes feliciter succedat, ne velint prudentiae laudis participes esse. Usu enim venire solet, ut rerum eventus aeque sint fallaces, atque hominum cogitationes; quamobrem etiam, si quid praeter rationem accidit, fortunam solemus accusare.

[2] Lacedaemonios autem cum ante manifestum erat insidiari nobis, tum vel maxime nunc. Quum enim constitutum esset, ut de rebus controversis judicio vicissim inter nos disceptaretur, et utrique ea retineremus quae tenemus, tamen nec ipsi adhuc postularunt judicium, neque a nobis oblatum accipiunt, sed armis, quam verbis, crimina dilui malunt, et adsunt jam, ut imperent, nec amplius , ut expostulent.

[3] Imperant enim ut a Polidaem obsidione recedamus, et AEginam suie legibus vivere sinamus, et decreturo de Megarensibus rescindamus; quinetiam, qui postremi huc venerunt, praecipiunt, ut Graecos suis legibus vivere permittamus.

[4] Nemo tamen vestrum existimet, bellum de re levi nos suscepturos, si decretum de Megarensibus factum non rescindamus, quod illi maximo jactant si rescindatur, bellum nullum fore; ne ve in animis vestris criminationem hanc relinquatis, quasi levi de causa bellum susccperilis.

[5] Nam levis haec res omne documentum vestrae constantiae et animi experimentum continet. Quibus si concedetis, etiam aliud quid majus protinus imperabitur, quasi metu perculsi hac quoque in re morem gessissetis; sed si fortiter responderitis, planum ipsis feceritis , ut ex aequo vobiscum potius agant.

[1] Diesen Grundsätzen, die wir von unsern Vätern überkommen und selber stets bewährt erfunden haben, lasst uns nicht ungetreu werden und nicht binnen weniger Stunden über so viel Menschenleben und Eigenthum, über Staatenglück und Ehre einen übereilten Beschluss fassen, sondern uns Zeit nehmen. Wir haben den Vortheil der Macht, um nichts zu versäumen. Nach Athen also sendet wegen Potidäas und wegen der Beschwerden der Bundesgenossen, besonders da sie eine gerichtliche Entscheidung nicht ablehnen. Wer diese anbietet, den hat man kein Recht als bereits Verurtheilten anzugreifen. Aber zugleich rüstet euch auch zum Kriege. Dies ist das Beste, was ihr beschliessen könnt, und wird bei dem Feind am meisten Eindruck machen.

« Ateniesi, io sono sempre fermo nel mio primo proposito di non cedere ai Peloponnesi. E benché io sappia che l'ardore concepito dall’ uomo all' invito di guerra, ei non lo mantiene ove si venga ai fatti, e che cangia pensiero secondo gli avvenimenti ; nulladimeno penso dovervi dare anche adesso consigli somiglianti e non punto differenti da quei d‘ allora. E prego quei tra voi che sicno per concorrere nella mia senteuza (poniamo pur ci toccasse qualche sinistro), a sostenere le risoluzioni prese io comune, e non appropriarsi il vanto di sagace accorgimento se l’esito sarà felice. Poiché pur troppo addiviene che i fortunevoli casi degli affari camminano per vie incomprensibili , egualmente che le cogitazioni degli uomini : il perchè siamo usati ad incolpar la fortuna per ogni strano accidente che ci sorprenda. Ma i Lacedemoni mostravansi chiaramente anche di prima rivolti ad insidiarci, ed ora più che mai. È detto negli accordi che, insorgendo qualche differenza, si renda e si offra scambievolmente ragione, e che da entrambi si ritengano i luoghi di che siamo in possesso : tuttavia essi non han voluto mai chieder ragione, nè esibita da noi accettarla. Vogliono che le querele si decidano colle armi piuttosto che coi ragionari ; e vengono qua^ oggimai non più facendo amichevoli rimostranze, ma comandando imperiosamente. Ci ordinano di ritiraroi da Potidea , lasciare libera Egina, cassare il decreto dei Megaresi ; e questi ultimi venuti ci aggiungono di rilasciar nelle loro leggi anche i Greci. Or nissuno di voi si faccia a credere di intraprender la guerra per cosa di piccol momento, se noi non aboliremo il decreto dei Megaresi. È questo un pretesto col quale vogliono principalmente aonestarsi , dicendo che tolto quello di mezzo non vi sarà guerra. Nè resti in voi ombra di rimorso , quasi che l' abbiate intrapresa per lieve oggetto : perchè su cotesto lieve oggetto è fondata la riprova sicura della fermezza dell’animo vostro. Se cederete a quei comandi, incontenente ne avrete dei maggiori, dandosi essi a credere che per timore obbedirete anche a questi j laddove persistendo nel vostro rifiuto , insegnerete ad essi procedere con voi più alla pari.