Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 8.66

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Dieß war aber nur ein Deckmäntel gegenüber der Menge,
da ja doch nur -eben diejenigen die Stadtregierung erhalten sollten;
welche die Verfassung umzustürzen wünschten. Gleichwohl wurde das
Volk, sowie auch der durch'S Bohnenloos erwählte Rath^), immer
noch versammelt. Es kam jedoch nicht nur Nichts zur Berathung,
außer was-den Verschwörern gefiel, sondern auch die auftretenden
Redner'gehörten nur dieser Partei an, und^es war bereits vorher
abgekartet, was sie vorbringen sollten. Von den Andern aber
widersprach bereits Niemand mehr, weil Jeder sich fürchtete; da ersah,
wie groß die Macht der Verschworenen-sei. Wenn aber ja Einer
zu widersprechen wagte, so wurde -er sofort auf geschickte Weise aus
dem'Wege geräumt, und den Thätern wurde weder nachgespürt) noch
auch fand Bestrafung Statt, wenn gegen Einen Verdacht vorlag;
und das Volk verhielt sich so ruhig und war so eingeschüchtert, daß
man es schon für Gewinn hielt; nur an der eigenen Person keine
Gewalt zu erleiden, wenn man 'auch-schweigen mußte. Da sie die
Zahl der Verschworenen überdieß noch-für viel größer hielten; als
sie wirklich war, so hätten sie um so mehr den Muth verloren.. Auch
war man bei der Größe der Stadt und wegen gegenseitiger
Unbekanntschast nicht im Stande, der Verschwörung genau auf den Grund
zu kommen, und eben deßhalb war es auch unmöglich, seine Besorg ¹²³
nisse, por einemAndern auszuschütten, um sich dann der Angriffe
gemeinsam zu erwehren, denn entweder- wäre man.mit seiner
Mitthei-lung" an-einen Unbekannten gerathen, oder, wenn auch an einen
Bekannten, doch.vielleicht,-an einen Unzuverlässigen. - Denn Alle von
d^Volksparjei! behandelten sich-gegenseitig mit dem größten
Argwohn, als,.ob Jeder an dem betheiligt sein könne, was im Plan war.
Und in der That gab es auch viele Leute darunter > von denen
Niemand'je.vermuthet Hätte, daß-sie zur Oligarchie,übergehen°wnrden.
Und gerade solche erregten cunter der Menge daS größte gegenseitige
Mißtrauen und.verhalsen den Oligarchen am meisten zu ihrer
Sicherheit, indem sie. das gegenseitige Mißtrauen in der Volkspartei
unüberwindlich machten. - !. X ' c

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 8.66.1 focus

[1] ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἕξειν γε τὴν πόλιν οἵπερ καὶ μεθίστασαν ἔμελλον. δῆμος μέντοι ὅμως ἔτι καὶ βουλὴ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου ξυνελέγετο· ἐβούλευον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ξυνεστῶσι δοκοίη, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ λέγοντες ἐκ τούτων ἦσαν καὶ τὰ ῥηθησόμενα πρότερον αὐτοῖς προύσκεπτο.

[2] ἀντέλεγέ τε οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων, δεδιὼς καὶ ὁρῶν πολὺ τὸ ξυνεστηκός· εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀντείποι, εὐθὺς ἐκ τρόπου τινὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἐτεθνήκει, καὶ τῶν δρασάντων οὔτε ζήτησις οὔτ’ εἰ ὑποπτεύοιντο δικαίωσις ἐγίγνετο, ἀλλ’ ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ κατάπληξιν τοιαύτην ὥστε κέρδος ὁ μὴ πάσχων τι βίαιον, εἰ καὶ σιγῴη, ἐνόμιζεν.

[3] καὶ τὸ ξυνεστηκὸς πολὺ πλέον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι ἢ ὅσον ἐτύγχανεν ὂν ἡσσῶντο ταῖς γνώμαις, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν αὐτὸ ἀδύνατοι ὄντες διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀγνωσίαν οὐκ εἶχον [αὐτοὶ ἐξευρεῖν].

[4] κατὰ δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ προσολοφύρασθαί τινι ἀγανακτήσαντα, ὥστε ἀμύνασθαι ἐπιβουλεύσαντα, ἀδύνατον ἦν· ἢ γὰρ ἀγνῶτα ἂν ηὗρεν ᾧ ἐρεῖ ἢ γνώριμον ἄπιστον.

[5] ἀλλήλοις γὰρ ἅπαντες ὑπόπτως προσῇσαν οἱ τοῦ δήμου, ὡς μετέχοντά τινα τῶν γιγνομένων. ἐνῆσαν γὰρ καὶ οὓς οὐκ ἄν ποτέ τις ᾤετο ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τραπέσθαι· καὶ τὸ ἄπιστον οὗτοι μέγιστον πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν καὶ πλεῖστα ἐς τὴν τῶν ὀλίγων ἀσφάλειαν ὠφέλησαν, βέβαιον τὴν ἀπιστίαν τῷ δήμῳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καταστήσαντες.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 8.66.1 focus

[1] And this with the most carried a good shew, because they that would set forward the alteration of the state were to have the managing of the same. Yet the people and the Council of the Bean met still, but debated nothing, save what the conspirators thought fit; nay, all that spake were of that number, and had considered before what they were to say.

[2] Nor would any of the rest speak against them, for fear, because they saw the combination was great; and if any man did, he was quickly made away by one convenient means or other, and no inquiry made after the deed-doers, nor justice prosecuted against any that was suspected. But the people were so quiet and so afraid that every man thought it gain to escape violence though he said never a word.

[3] Their hearts failed them because they thought the conspirators more indeed than they were; and to learn their number, in respect of the greatness of the city and for that they knew not one another, they were unable.

[4] For the same cause also was it impossible for any man that was angry at it to bemoan himself, whereby to be revenged on them that conspired; for he must have told his mind either to one he knew not or to one he knew and trusted not.

[5] For the popular approached each other, every one with jealousy, as if they thought him of the plot. For indeed there were such amongst them as no man would have thought would ever have turned to the oligarchy; and those were they that caused in the many that diffidence, and by strengthening the jealousy of the popular one against another, conferred most to the security of the few.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 8.66.1 focus

[1] But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the authors of the revolution were really to govern. However, the Assembly and the Council of the Bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed nothing that was not approved of by the conspirators, who both supplied the speakers, and reviewed in advance what they were to say.

[2] Fear, and the sight of the numbers of the conspirators, closed the mouths of the rest; or if any ventured to rise in opposition, he was presently put to death in some convenient way, and there was neither search for the murderers nor justice to be had against them if suspected; but the people remained motionless, being so thoroughly cowed that men thought themselves lucky to escape violence, even when they held their tongues.

[3] An exaggerated belief in the numbers of the conspirators also demoralised the people, rendered helpless by the magnitude of the city, and by their want of intelligence with each other, and being without means of finding out what those numbers really were.

[4] For the same reason it was impossible for any one to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures to defend himself, as he would have had to speak either to one whom he did not know, or whom he knew but did not trust.

[5] Indeed all the popular party approached each other with suspicion, each thinking his neighbour concerned in what was going on, the conspirators having in their ranks persons whom no one could ever have believed capable of joining an oligarchy; and these it was who made the many so suspicious, and so helped to procure impunity for the few, by confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 8.66 focus

Damit aber sollte die Sache nur in den Augen der Menge
beschönigt werden; denn die Regierung in der Stadt sollte
natürlich den Leuten in die Hände fallen, welche die bestehende
Regierung stürzen wollten. Das Volk und der durchs Bohnen
los gewählte Rat kamen freilich noch zusammen, allein es wurde
nichts beschlossen, was den Verschworenen nicht in den Kram
paßte. Die Sprecher waren ausschließlich Leute aus ihrer
Mitte, die sich obendrein vorher darüber verständigt hatten,
was sie sagen wollten, und von den übrigen wagte niemand
zu widersprechen, da jeder sah, wie zahlreich deren Anhänger
waren, und sich fürchtete. Wenn aber wirklich einmal einer
widersprochen hatte, so konnte er sicher sein, bei erster Gelegen
heit über die Seite gebracht zu werden, ohne daß nach den
Tätern geforscht oder gegen die Verdächtigen eingeschritten
wäre. Das Volk aber rührte sich nicht und war so einge
schüchtert, daß jeder seinem Schöpfer dankte, wenn man ihn
nur zufrieden ließ, auch wenn er den Mund halten mußte. Da
man die Zahl der Vershcworenen für weit größer hielt, als sie
wirklich war, hatte eben alles den Mut verloren. Genau fest
zustellen aber war sie nicht wegen der Größe der Stadt und
weil man einander nicht genügend kannte. Aus diesem Grunde
konnte man auch anderen seine Not nicht klagen und sie um
Beistand gegen Nachstellungen ansprechen; denn entweder wäre
man damit an einen Unbekannten geraten oder an einen Be
kannten, dem man nicht trauen durfte. Denn wenn zwei Demo
kraten einander begegneten, traute einer dem anderen nicht,
weil er nicht sicher war, ob der nicht auch mit dazu gehörte.
Denn unter ihnen gab es manche, von denen niemand geglaubt
hätte, daß sie es mit den Oligarchen halten würden. Und
diese hauptsächlich waren es, welche den Argwohn der Menge
erregten und dadurch, daß sie das Volk mit Mißtrauen er
füllten, am meisten dazu beitrugen, der Sache der Oligarchen
Vorschub zu leisten.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 8.66 focus

LXVI. Ce n’était là qu’une amorce spécieuse pour la multitude; car ceux qui préparaient la révolution se réservaien aussi le gouvernement. Cependant le peuple et le sénat de la fève¹ s’assemblaient encore. ² mais ne décidaient rien qu’avec l’agrément des conjurés; les orateurs mêmes étaient du complot et ne disaient pas un mot qui ne fût concerté avec leurs adhérents. D’aucun côté d’ailleurs il n’y avait ombre de contradiction, tant le nombre des conjurés inspirait de terreur. Si quelqu’un élevait la voix, on trouvait bientôt un moyen quelconque de s’en défaire. Les meurtriers n’étaient ni recherchés ni mis en cause, si on les soupçonnait. Le peuple n’osait remuer, et telle était l’épouvante que chacun, même sans rien dire de compromettant, s’estimait heureux d’échapper à la violente. On croyait la conjuration plus nombreuse qu’elle n’était en effet, et cette pensée glaçait les courages. On ne pouvait même avoir aucune donnée précise; car la ville était immense et on ne se connaissait pas mutuellement. Par le même motif on ne pouvait manifester à personne son indignation, afin de se concerter pour la défense; il eût fallu s’ouvrir ou à un inconnu ou à une personne connue, mais suspecte. Car, dans le parti populaire, chacun était en défiance; on se soupçonnait réciproquement de tremper dans le complot; et, en effet, il y était entré des gens qu’on n’eût jamais crus capables de se tourner vers l’oligarchie; ce furent surtout ces défections qui jetèrent l’inquiétude dans les masses et contribuèrent à la sécurité de la faction oligarchique, en confirmant le parti populaire dans cette méfiance mutuelle de lui-même.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 8.66 focus

Ce n’était là qu'une amorce jetée à la multitude ; car les meneurs entendaient bien garder pour eux le gouvernement. Néanmoins le peuple et le conseil élu au scrutin des fèves ¹ se rassemblaient encore; mais ils ne décidaient rien sans l’agrément des conjurés. Les orateurs mêmes étaient du complot et leurs discours concertés d'avance. Personne n’osait les contredire, tant la faction inspirait de frayeur. Quelqu’un élevait^il la voix, on trouvait bientôt le moyen de s’en défaire. Les meurtriers n’étaient ni recherchés, ni poursuivis lorsqu’on les soupçonnait. Le peuple ne remuait point ; sa terreur était telle que, même en restant muet, il s’estimait heureux d’échapper à la violence. Les esprits étaient subjugués, parce qu’on croyait les conjurés bien plus nombreux qu’ils ne l’étaient. A cet égard, on ne savait à quoi s’en tenir, à cause de la grandeur de la ville ² et parce qu’on ne se connaissait pas assez les uns les autres. Aussi, malgré l’indignation qu’on éprouvait, nul n’osait confier à son voisin le secret de ses plaintes ou ses projets de vengeance; il eût fallu pour cela s’ouvrir à des inconnus ou à des suspects. La défiance était générale dans le parti populaire; on se soupçonnait mutuellement de tremper dans le complot, surtout depuis qu’il y était entré des gens qu’on croyait incapables de pactiser avec l’oligarchie. Rien ne contribua davantage à inspirer au peuple de l’inquiétude et aux oligarques delà sécurité, en confirmant la multitude dans cette suspicion envers elle-même.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 8.66.1 focus

[1] Now this was only a specious pretext intended for the masses, for the very same men who were endeavouring to change the government were going to have control of the state. The people, however, and the council chosen by the bean¹ were none the less still convened; but they discussed nothing that was not approved by the conspirators; nay, not only were the speakers from this party, but what should be said had been previously considered by them.

[2] And no one of the others any longer spoke against them, through fear and because it was seen that the conspiracy was widespread; and if any one did oppose, at once in some convenient way he was a dead man. And no search was made for those who did the deed, nor if they were suspected was any legal prosecution held; on the contrary, the populace kept quiet and were in such consternation that he who did not suffer any violence, even though he never said a word, counted that a gain.

[3] Imagining the conspiracy to be much more widespread than it actually was, they were cowed in mind, and owing to the size of the city and their lack of knowledge of one another they were unable to find out the facts.

[4] For the same reason it was also impossible for any man that was offended to pour out his grievances to another and thus plot to avenge himself,² for he would discover any person to whom he might speak to be either a stranger or, if an acquaintance, faithless.

[5] For all the members of the popular party approached each other with suspicion, as though every one had a hand in what was going on. And, indeed, there were among them men whom one would never have expected to change over and favour an oligarchy; and it was these who caused the greatest distrust among the masses and rendered the most valuable service toward the few in securing their safety by confirming in the populace this distrust of their own people.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 8.66.1 focus

[1] Now this was but a specious profession for the people at large, since the same men would really hold the government as would bring about the revolution. The people, however, and the council of five ¹ hundred still met notwithstanding, though they discussed nothing that was not approved of by the conspirators, but both the speakers belonged to that party, and the points to be brought forward were previously discussed by them.

[2] Indeed no one else any longer opposed them, through fear, and from seeing that the conspiracy was extensively spread; and if any one did speak against them, he immediately came to his end in some convenient way, and there was neither any search made for those who had perpetrated the deed, nor were they brought to justice if they were suspected; but the commons remained still, and in such consternation that every one thought himself fortunate who did not meet with some violent treatment, even though he held his tongue.

[3] From supposing, too, that the conspiracy was much more general than it really was, they were the more faint-hearted, and were unable to ascertain its extent, being powerless in consequence of the size of the city, and their not knowing one another's views.

[4] And on this same ground also it was impossible for a man to bemoan himself to another in his indignation, so as ² to repel one who was plotting against him; since he would either have found a person he did not know, to whom to speak his mind, or one whom he knew but could not trust.

[5] For all the members of the popular party approached each other with suspicion, supposing every one to have a hand in what was going on. For there were amongst them some whom one would never have supposed likely to join an oligarchy; and it was these that produced the greatest distrust in the many, and that contributed most to the safety of the few, by confirming the people's want of confidence in each other.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 8.66.1 focus

[1] Haec autem res apud plerosque speciosum praetextum habebat, siquidem rempublicam qui erant immutaturi, iidem etiam administraturi erant. Verumtamen et pupulus adhuc, et senatus fabis creatus congregabatur; sed consul-labant de nulla re, quae non conjuratis placeret, atque etiam illi, qui condonabantur, erant ex horum numero, et quse dicenda essent, prius ab iis deliberatum erat.

[2] Nec jam amplius contradicebat quisquam ex reliquis, quod magnum conjuratorum numerum metueret ac videret; et si quis etiam contradixisset, confestim aliquo idoneo modo necabatur; et de caedis auctoribus neque inquirebatur, neque, si suspecti erant, supplicium sumebatur; sed populus quiescebat, ad-coque perterrefactus erat, ut, si cui nulla visafTerreliuvis in lucro poneret, etiam si taceret.

[3] Et quum longe majorem conjuratorum numerum esse ducerent, quam erat, fracti erant animis; eum enim compertum habere non poterant , tum propter civitatis magnitudinem, tum propter mutuam ignorationem.

[4] Quinetiam hac ipsa de causa non licebat cuiquam apud alium lamentari ira concepta, ita ul ulcisceretur eum, qui sibi insidias struxisset; aul enim igno tum invenisset, cui diceret, aut notum fidei dubium.

[5] Inter sc enim universi, qui erant de populo, cum suspicione coibant, ut si alter quisque particeps esset rerum, quae agebantur. Nam socii erant etiam, quos nemo unquam suspicatus fuisset se ad paucorum dominatum conversuros, et hi in primis effecerunt, ut diffidenti* populo incederet, et plurimum contulerunt ad confirmandum paucorum dominatum, quod certam causam diffidentiae mutuae populo pra*-buerant.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 8.66 focus

Era questo un bel pretesto presso la moltitudine, perchè di fermo eran per avere il governo della Repubblica quelli stessi che volevano cambiarlo. Pur nondimeno il popolo ed il senato si adunavano per suffragi, ma nulla si decideva senza Fapprovazione dei cospiratori. Anzi anche gli oratori erano del numero di questi, i quali esaminavano le cose prima che e’ le dicessero al pubblico. Rissuno degli altri contradiceva perchè temeva e vedeva che la trama avea molte £la ; e se pur vi era chi contradicesse era subito con qualche acconcio modo levato di mezzo. Ricerche di tali omicidi non si facevano f i sospetti non si processavano , e il popolo stava fermo e pieno di tanto terrore, che si recava a guadagno se anche tacendo non soffrisse qualche violenza. Inoltre la opinione che i cospiratori fossero più numerosi di quello che veramente non erano, avea avvilito gli animi ; e non v’era modo di saperne il vero, attesa la grandezza della città e il non conoscersi l’un l'altro. E per questo appunto chi di ciò fremeva non polea sfogar con alcuno il suo dispetto per cercar modo di vendetta ; essendovi il perìcolo di trovarsi a parlare o con persona non conosciuta, o, se conosciuta, non fedele; perciocché tutti i popolani si avvicinavano sospettosamente, come se ognuno avesse parte in quei maneggi. Infatti vi avea di quelli che nissuno avrebbe creduto doversi voltare all’oligarchia, v questi seminarono diffidenza grandissima nella moltitudine; e con aver raffermato nei popolani questa diffidenza medesima , aiutarono la sicurezza degli oligarchici.

Notes on the current edition

History of the Peloponnesian War

1. 45) Dir Zweck war, die Armen durch Entziehung der Besoldungen von den
StaatSgeschästen und Gerichten zn entfernen (Kr.). ' ^

2. ' 46) Der Rath oder Senat der 500. Bei der Wahl wurden-die Namen der
wahlfähigen (über 30 Jahre alten) Bürger abgelesen und gleichzeitig bei jedem Namen ein
Griff in einen Topf gethan, der mit weißen und schwarzen Bohnen gefüllt war. Eine
weiße machte zum Rathsherrn. — Bei Xenophon, Denkwürdigkeiten des SokrateS. I, 2.
9, sagt dieser: Nur Narren können die Wahl der Staatsbehörden einer Bohne'anver»
trauen; für einen durchs BohnenlovS gewählten Steuermann würde sich Jeder bedanken.

3. 411
v..
Chri

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 8.66

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

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