Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 7.60

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Den Athenern nun, als sie die Sperrung deS Hafens
sahen und auch die sonstigen Absichten der Syrakusaner merkten,
schien eS hohe Zeit, einen Beschluß zu fassen. Demnach traten ihre
Feldherren und die Hauptleute zusammen, und in Rücksicht-ihrer
Verlegenheit in andern Dingen, und weil sie auch nicht einmal für
den Augenblick genügende LebenSmittel mehr hatten — denn sie
hatten Botschaft nach Katana geschickt, als wollten sie absegeln, und die
Zufuhr abgesagt — und solche auch für die Zukunft sich nicht
verschaffen konnten, wenn sie nicht zuvor eine Seeschlacht gewannen, so
beschlossen sie, die landeinwärts IV) gelegene Verschanzung zu
verlassen und dicht bei den Schiffen selbst einen Raum von möglichst
geringem Umfang, wie er für das Gepäck und die Kranken eben
genüge, mit einer Mauer einzufassen und durch eine Besatzung zu
schützen, mit dem ganzen übrigen Heere aber sämmtliche Schiffe,
sowohl die dienstfähigen, als auch die weniger seetüchtigen, zu bemannen
und eine Seeschlacht zu wagen. Siegten sie, so wollten sie nach
Katana fahren, wo nicht, die Schiffe in Brand stecken und in
Schlachtordnung zu Lande abmarschiren. wo immer sie zunächst an einem
befreundeten Platz einen Haltpunkt finden würden, sei er nun
hellenisch oder barbarisch. Und wie beschlossen war, so thaten sie: von
den Verschanzungen landeinwärts rückten sie in aller Stille ab und
bemannten sämmtliche Schiffe, indem sie Jedermann nöthigten, an
Bord zu gehen, wer nur immer dem Alter nach tauglich und wie
immer brauchbar schien. So wurden alle Schiffe voll, ungefähr
hundert und zehn an der Zahl. Auch Bogenschützen und Speerträger
von den Akarnanern und andern Söldnern schifften sie, in großer
Zahl ein, und auch die sonstigen Anstalten trafen sie, soweit es in so
bedrängter Lage und bei ihrem verzweifelten Vorhaben möglich war.
Nikias aber, als das Meiste schon in Bereitschaft war und er sah,
wie die Soldaten durch die ganz' ungewohnten wiederholten
Schlappen zur See muthlos waren und wegen des Mangels an LebenSmit- ¹²
teln so rasch als möglich den Entscheidungskampf wünschten, rief Alle
zusammen und dachte durch folgende Rede ihren Muth zu erwecken.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 7.60.1 focus

[1] τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις τήν τε ἀπόκλῃσιν ὁρῶσι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην διάνοιαν αὐτῶν αἰσθομένοις βουλευτέα ἐδόκει.

[2] καὶ ξυνελθόντες οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ταξίαρχοι πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἀπορίαν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ὅτι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὔτε αὐτίκα ἔτι εἶχον̔ προπέμψαντες γὰρ ἐς Κατάνην ὡς ἐκπλευσόμενοι ἀπεῖπον μὴ ἐπάγειν’ οὔτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἔμελλον ἕξειν, εἰ μὴ ναυκρατήσουσιν, ἐβουλεύσαντο τὰ μὲν τείχη τὰ ἄνω ἐκλιπεῖν, πρὸς δ’ αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀπολαβόντες διατειχίσματι ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐλάχιστον τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν ἱκανὸν γενέσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν φρουρεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἄλλου πεζοῦ τὰς ναῦς ἁπάσας, ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ καὶ ἀπλοώτεραι, πάντα τινὰ ἐσβιβάζοντες πληρῶσαι, καὶ διαναυμαχήσαντες, ἢν μὲν νικῶσιν, ἐς Κατάνην κομίζεσθαι, ἢν δὲ μή, ἐμπρήσαντες τὰς ναῦς πεζῇ ξυνταξάμενοι ἀποχωρεῖν ᾗ ἂν τάχιστα μέλλωσί τινος χωρίου ἢ βαρβαρικοῦ ἢ Ἑλληνικοῦ φιλίου ἀντιλήψεσθαι.

[3] καὶ οἱ μέν, ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ ἐποίησαν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄνω τειχῶν ὑποκατέβησαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρωσαν πάσας, ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι.

[4] καὶ ξυνεπληρώθησαν νῆες αἱ πᾶσαι δέκα μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν· τοξότας τε ἐπ’ αὐτὰς πολλοὺς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τῶν τε Ἀκαρνάνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων ἐσεβίβαζον, καὶ τἆλλα ὡς οἷόν τ’ ἦν ἐξ ἀναγκαίου τε καὶ τοιαύτης διανοίας ἐπορίσαντο.

[5] ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ὁρῶν τοὺς στρατιώτας τῷ τε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς πολὺ ταῖς ναυσὶ κρατηθῆναι ἀθυμοῦντας καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνιν ὡς τάχιστα βουλομένους διακινδυνεύειν, ξυγκαλέσας ἅπαντας παρεκελεύσατό τε πρῶτον καὶ ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.60.1 focus

[1] The Athenians, seeing the shutting up of the haven and the rest of the enemy's designs, thought good to go to council upon it.

[2] And the generals and commanders of regiments having met and considered their present want, both otherwise and in this, that they neither had provision for the present (for upon their resolution to be gone, they had sent before to Catana to forbid the sending in of any more), nor were likely to have for the future unless their navy got the upper hand, they resolved to abandon their camp above and to take in some place, no greater than needs they must, near unto their galleys, with a wall, and leaving some to keep it, to go aboard with the rest of the army, and to man every galley they had, serviceable and less serviceable; and having caused all sorts of men to go aboard and fight it out, if they gat the victory, to go to Catana; if not, to make their retreat in order of battle by land (having first set fire on their navy) the nearest way unto some amicable place, either barbarian or Grecian, that they should best be able to reach unto before the enemy.

[3] As they had concluded, so they did. For they both came down to the shore from their camp above and also manned every galley they had and compelled to go aboard every man of age of any ability whatsoever.

[4] So the whole navy was manned to the number of one hundred and ten galleys, upon which they had many archers and darters, both Acarnanians and other strangers, and all things else provided according to their means and purpose.

[5] And Nicias, when almost everything was ready, perceiving the soldiers to be dejected for being so far overcome by sea, contrary to their custom, and yet in respect of the scarcity of victual desirous as soon as could be to fight, called them together and encouraged them then the first time with words to this effect:

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.60.1 focus

[1] The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbor and informed of their further designs, called a council of war.

[2] The generals and colonels assembled and discussed the difficulties of the situation; the point which pressed most being that they no longer had provisions for immediate use (having sent on to Catana to tell them not to send any, in the belief that they were going away), and that they would not have any in future unless they could command the sea. They therefore determined to evacuate their upper lines, to enclose with a cross-wall and garrison a small space close to the ships, only just sufficient to hold their stores and sick, and manning all the ships, seaworthy or not, with every man that could be spared from the rest of their land forces, to fight it out at sea, and if victorious, to go to Catana , if not, to burn their vessels, form in close order, and retreat by land for the nearest friendly place they could reach, Hellenic or barbarian.

[3] This was no sooner settled than carried into effect: they descended gradually from the upper lines and manned all their vessels, compelling all to go on board who were of age to be in any way of use.

[4] They thus succeeded in manning about one hundred and ten ships in all, on board of which they embarked a number of archers and darters taken from the Acarnanians and from the other foreigners, making all other provisions allowed by the nature of their plan and by the necessities which imposed it.

[5] All was now nearly ready, and Nicias, seeing the soldiery disheartened by their unprecedented and decided defeat at sea, and by reason of the scarcity of provisions eager to fight it out as soon as possible, called them all together, and first addressed them speaking as follows:—

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 7.60 focus

Als die Athener sahen, daß der Hafen gesperrt werden
sollte, und merkten, worauf es dann weiter abgesehen war,
hielten sie es für nötig, darüber zu Rate zu gehen, und die
Feldherren und Hauptleute traten zu einem Kriegsrat zu
sammen. Angesichts ihrer bedenklichen Lage, namentlich da
sie jetzt keine Lebensmittel mehr hatten - denn als sie abfahren
wollten, hatten sie in Katana die Zufuhr abbestellt - und auch
künftig nicht haben konnten, beschlossen sie, die Werke weiter
oben aufzugeben, in unmittelbarer Nähe der Schiffe aber einen
Fleck, wie er zur Aufnahme des Gepäcks und der Kranken
allenfalls genügte, zu befestigen nnd zu besetzen, das ganze
übrige Heer aber bis auf den letzten Mann einzuschiffen und
sämtliche Schiffe, gleichviel ob mehr oder weniger tauglich,
damit zu bemannen und es auf eine Seeschlacht ankommen zu
lassen. Dann aber wollten sie, falls sie isegten, nach Katana
fahren, sonst aber die Schiffe verbrennen und mit dem Land
heere in Schlachtordnung abziehen und möglichst bald einen
befreundeten, sei es griechischen sei es nichtgriechischen Ort zu
erreichen suchen. Und wie sie eS beschlossen, so machten sie eS
auch. Aus den Werken weiter oben zogen sie in aller Stille
ab und bemannten alle ihre Schiffe, indem sie jeden, der
körperlich noch irgend brauchbar schien, zwangen, an Bord zu
gehen. So wurden dann auch die sämtlichen etwa hundert
undzehn Schiffe voll besetzt. Auch viele Speer- und Dogen
schützen aus der Zahl ihrer akarnanishcen und anderen Söldner
wurden miteingeschifft und alle sonst erforderlichen Vorkehrungen
getroffen, soweit das bei einem so im Dränge der Not gefaßten
Plane möglich war. Als alles bereit, ließ Nikias, welcher sah,
wie seinen Leuten nach den mehrfachen ungewohnten Nieder
lagen zur See der Mut gesunken war, und bei dem Mangel an
Lebensmitteln je eher je lieber eine Schlacht zu liefern wünschte,
sie alle zusammenkommen und suchte sie erst durch folgende
Ansprache zu ermutigen.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.60 focus

LX. Les Athéniens, se voyant enfermer et devinant toute la pensée de l’ennemi, crurent devoir délibérer. Les généraux et les taxiarques¹ tinrent conseil : l’armée manquait de tout; les vivres étaient épuisés, et comme on avait fait passer l’ordre à Catane, en vue du départ projeté, de suspendre les envois, on n’en pouvait espérer pour l’avenir, à moins d’une victoire navale. En présence de cette situation, ils s’arrêtèrent aux résolutions suivantes : abandonner la partie supérieure de leurs murailles²; retrancher auprès des vaisseaux l’espace strictement nécessaire pour le matériel et les malades, et y mettre garnison; embarquer le reste de l’armée de terre sur tous les vaisseaux, même sur ceux qui étaient moins propres au service, et forcer le passage en combattant; vainqueurs, se retirer à Catane : vaincus, brûler la flotte, prendre, en ordre de bataille, la voie de terre et occuper au plus tôt quelque place amie, soit grecque, soit barbare. Cette résolution prise, l’exécution suivit : ils abandonnèrent furtivement les retranchements supérieurs pour se rabattre vers la mer, équipèrent tous leurs vaisseaux et forcèrent à s’y embarquer sans distinction quiconque paraissait, par sa vigueur, propre à rendre le moindre service. On arma ainsi cent dix vaisseaux en tout; on y fit monter un grand nombre d’archers et des gens de trait étrangers, Acarnanes et autres; enfin on disposa tout le reste autant que le permettaient les nécessités du moment et un pareil dessein.

Les préparatifs à peu près terminés, Nicias, voyant ³⁴ les soldats découragés de tant de défaites sur mer auxquelles ils n’étaient pas habitués, et résolus néanmoins, faute de vivres, à risquer au plus tôt le combat, les assembla tous et leur adressa pour la première fois quelques paroles d’encouragement. Il s’exprima en ces termes :

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.60 focus

Les Athéniens, voyant la fermeture du port et devinant leur pensée, jugèrent à propos de délibérer. Les généraux et les taxiarques se réunirent donc pour aviser aux embarras de la situation. Les vivres étaient épuisés ; car, depuis qu’on avait pris la résolution de décamper , on avait fait dire à Catane de suspendre les envois ; et l’on ne pouvait en espérer pour l’avenir, à moins d’une bataille navale. Il fut donc arrêté qu’on abandonnerait les retranchements situés sur la hauteur, et qu’on établirait à proximité de la flotte un campement strictement suffisant pour les bagages et pour les malades ; qu’on y laisserait une garde, et que tout le reste de l’armée de terre monterait sur les vaisseaux, tant ceux qui étaient en bon état que ceux qui étaient moins capables de servir. Si l’on était vainqueur, on cinglerait vers Catane ; sinon, l’on brûlerait les vaisseaux, et l’on se retirerait par terre, en bon ordre, dans la première place amie, grecque ou barbare, qu’on pourrait gagner. Cette résolution prise, on l’exécuta sur-le-champ. On évacua les retranchements supérieurs et l’on descendit vers la mer. On fit monter sur la flotte tout ce qu’il y avait d’hommes valides, et l’on parvint ainsi à équiper jusqu’à cent dix vaisseaux. On embarqua beaucoup d’archers et de gens de trait, Acamaniens ou étrangers ; enfin l’on prit toutes les précautions que permettaient les circonstances.

Quand les préparatifs furent à peu près achevés, Nicias, voyant les soldats abattus par la grandeur inaccoutumée de leur défaite navale, et pourtant déterminés, vu le manque te vivres, à risquer le plus tôt possible un combat décisif, les rassembla pour leur adresser l’exhortation suivante :

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.60.1 focus

[1] But the Athenians, observing the closing of the harbour and being aware of the general plans of the enemy, thought it desirable to hold a council.

[2] So the generals and the taxiarchs came together and took counsel with reference to the difficulties which now confronted them both in other ways, and especially owing to the fact that they no longer had supplies for their immediate needs—for in the expectation that they would sail away they had already sent word to Catana and stopped the bringing in of provisions—and were not likely to have them in the future, unless they should hold the mastery at sea. They determined, therefore, to abandon their upper walls,¹ and cutting off by means of a cross-wall the smallest possible space, close to the ships, that would suffice for the stores and for the sick, to put a garrison in this: they would then take the rest of their land-force and man all their ships, not only those which were fit for service, but also the less seaworthy, putting aboard every available man, and fight the issue out at sea; if they won, they would proceed to Catana, but if not, they would burn their ships, and, forming in line of battle, make their retreat by land, taking whatever route would enable them soonest to reach some friendly place, whether Barbarian or Hellenic.

[3] These plans having once been determined upon, they acted accordingly: they descended stealthily from the upper walls and manned all their ships, compelling everyone to embark who, provided lie was of military age, seemed to be at all fit for service.

[4] So there were manned altogether about one hundred and ten ships; and they put on board a large number of archers and javelin-men, both of the Acarnanians and of the other foreigners,² and in general they made such provision as was possible under the stress of necessity and with the object they had in view.

[5] But when almost all their preparations were ready, Nicias, seeing that the soldiers were not only discouraged, because contrary to their wont they had been badly beaten at sea, but that they also, on account of the scarcity of provisions, were anxious to risk a battle as soon as possible, called them all together before giving the order for battle and exhorted them, speaking as follows:

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.60.1 focus

[1] The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour, and having received intelligence of their other plans, thought it necessary to hold a council.

[2] Accordingly the generals and the Taxiarchs assembled to deliberate on their difficulties, arising both from other causes, and especially because they had neither any more provisions for their immediate use, (for, thinking that they were going to sail away, they had sent before to Catana, and commanded them to bring them no longer,) nor were likely to have them in future, unless they should gain the command of the sea. They determined therefore to evacuate the upper part of their lines, and having enclosed with a cross wall just by the ships the least space that could be sufficient to hold their stores and their sick, to garrison that, while with the rest of their troops, making every one go on board, they manned all their ships, both such as were sound and such as were less fit for service; and after a naval engagement, if they were victorious, to proceed to Catana; but if not, to burn their ships, throw themselves into him. and retreat by land, in whatever direction they would soonest reach some friendly town, whether barbarian or Grecian.

[3] They, then, having resolved on these things, acted accordingly; for they gradually descended from their upper lines, and manned all their ships, having compelled to go on board whoever, even in any degree, seemed of age for rendering service.

[4] Thus there were manned in all about a hundred and ten ships; on board which they embarked a large number of bow-men and dart-men, taken from the Acarnanian and other mercenaries, and provided every thing else, as far as it was possible for them, when acting upon a plan which necessity alone dictated, such as the present.

[5] When most things were in readiness, Nicias, seeing the soldiers disheartened by their decided defeat at sea, and wishing, in consequence of the scarcity of provisions, to hazard a final battle as speedily as possible, assembled them, and on that ¹ occasion addressed them all together first, and spoke as follows:

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.60.1 focus

[1] Athenienses autem quum hanc portus obstructionem viderent, et cetera .illorum consilia intellexissent, consul-fandum esse censebant,

[2] et congregati duc es et centuriones ad praesentes difficultates quum ceterarum rerum, tum vero, quod commeatum nec in praesenti amplius haberent, (nam nuntiis Catanam praemissis, quippe discessuri, interdixerant, ne adveherent) nec in posterum -habituri essent, nisi classe superarent, statuerunt superiores quidem mnni-tiones deserere, prope ipsas vero naves munimento quam possent minimum loci concludere, tantum quod ad utensilia et aegrotos capiendos satis esset, atque hoc quidem pncsidiu tueri, reliquo vero peditatu naves omnes et validas et minus ad navigandum idoneas explere, ita ut quoslibet in eas imponerent, et navali proelio commisso, si vincerent, Catanam se recipere, sin secus, incensa classe, pedestri itinere, agmine composito abire, qua celerrime locum aliquem aut barbaricum aut Graecum, qui amicus esset, adipisci possent.

[3] Atque lii quidem, ut haec placuerunt, sic fecerunt; nam et ex superioribus munitionibus ad littus descenderunt, omnesque naves compleverunt; cunctis eas ingredi coactis, quicumque per aetatem quoquo modo idonei esse videbantur.

[4] Universae autem naves ad centum ac decem completa; sunt; et sagittarios in eas multos jaculatoresque et Acarnanum et ceterorum peregrinorum imposuerunt, et cetera, prout in re angusta et hujus modi consilio fieri poterat, compararunt.

[5] Nicias autem, rebus magna ex parte jam paratis, videns, milites animo consternatos esse, quod praeter solitum navali proelio longe superati essent, et propter commeatus inopiam velle quam celerrime belli fortunam periclitari, omnes convocatos primum est adhortatus, et dixit haec:

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.60 focus

Gli Ateniesi vedendosi serrare il porto, ed accorgendosi di tutte le altre intenzioni del nemico, stimarono esser da deliberare. Per lo che adunatisi i generali e quei di stalo maggiore, vedendo, oltre la presente penuria delle altre cose, che attualmente non resta van più viveri ( perchè col pensiero di far vela avean mandato a Catana a disdirne il trasporto), e che in seguito non ne potrebbero avere senza una vittoria in mare, deliberarono di abbandonare le fortificazioni che erano dentro terra, e con uu muro vicinissimo alla flotta occupando un circuito il più piccolo che si potesse, tanto che fosse capace delle bagaglie e degl’ invalidi, tenersi a guardia di quello. Quindi risolvevano che l’altro esercito di terra montasse ed empisse le navi tutte, tanto quelle che erano in buono stato che quelle men atte a navigare, e che si venisse a battaglia , nella quale se vincessero si ridurrebbero a Catana ; se no , bruciate le navi si ritirerebbero schierati per la via di terra, ovunque più tostamente potessero arrivare a qualche luogo amico, fosse barbaro o greco. E come ebbero deliberato ciò, così lo recavano ad effetto. Laonde dalle munizioni che erano dentro terra scendevano furtivamente al lido, empievano tntte le navi in numero di centodieci in circa, costringendovi a salire chiunque per età pareva dover esser buono a qualche cosa, e mettendovi a bordo molti lanciatori degli Àcarnani e degli altri forestieri ; e procacciavano in quella strettezza tutto ciò che potesse servire ai loro disegni. E poiché il più delle cose fu in pronto, Micia vedendo clic i soldati per la grande sconfitta avuta in mare contro il consueto erano scoraggiati , e che per la scarsità dei viveri desideravano di venire prestissimamente al cimento, convocatili tutti, allora per la prima volta prese a confortarli con queste parole :

Notes on the current edition

History of the Peloponnesian War

1. 36) Beim Tempel'des Herakles, nach Plutarch. Nikias, nep. er, in dem später
sogenannten Neapoli». (Arnold.) . l,T

2. 413
v.
Chr.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.60

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

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