Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 7.51

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"Die Syrakusaner, die ihrerseits auch von all dem Kunde
erhalten, paßten nun noch viel mehr auf, um die Athener nicht
entwischen zu lassen, da diese nun auch selbst eingesehen hätten, daß sie ¹
ferner weder mit den Schiffen, noch mit der Landmacht ihnen über ²
legen seien — denn sonst wurden sie sich nicht zur Abfahrt entschlossen
haben.'- Dann wollten sie aber auch nicht, daß diese sich anderswo
in Sieilien festsetzen sollten, wo sie nur um so schwerer zu bekämpfen
wären, sondern hier am Platze, wo der Vortheil auf ihrer Seite sei,
wollten sie sie zur'Seeschlacht zwingen. Daher bemannten sie ihre
Schiffe und stellten' durch einige'Tage, bis es ihnen genug dünkte,
mit denselben Uebungen an. Als es ihnen aber an der Zeit schien,
griffen sie Tags vorher die Mauer der Athener an, und als eine nicht
sehr große Zahl von Schwerbewaffneten und Reitern aus einigen
Thoren gegen sie ausfiel, schnitten sie einige Schwerbewaffnete ab
und die Andern schlugen und verfolgten sie/und da die
Schanzenthore sehr eng waren, so verloren die Athener hiebei siebenzig Pferde
und etliche Schwerbewaffnete. . ' ' H! /

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 7.51.1 focus

[1] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο πυθόμενοι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπηρμένοι ἦσαν μὴ ἀνιέναι τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς καὶ αὐτῶν κατεγνωκότων ἤδη μηκέτι κρεισσόνων εἶναι σφῶν μήτε ταῖς ναυσὶ μήτε τῷ πεζῷ (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβουλεῦσαι), καὶ ἅμα οὐ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς ἄλλοσέ ποι τῆς Σικελίας καθεζομένους χαλεπωτέρους εἶναι προσπολεμεῖν, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ ὡς τάχιστα καὶ ἐν ᾧ σφίσι ξυμφέρει ἀναγκάσαι αὐτοὺς ναυμαχεῖν.

[2] τὰς οὖν ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ἡμέρας ὅσαι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκουν ἱκαναὶ εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσέβαλλον, καὶ ἐπεξελθόντος μέρους τινὸς οὐ πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππέων κατά τινας πύλας ἀπολαμβάνουσί τε τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τινὰς καὶ τρεψάμενοι καταδιώκουσιν· οὔσης δὲ στενῆς τῆς ἐσόδου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἵππους τε ἑβδομήκοντα ἀπολλύασι καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν οὐ πολλούς.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.51.1 focus

[1] The Syracusians, also having intelligence of this, were encouraged unto the pressing of the Athenians much the more, for that they confessed themselves already too weak for them, both by sea and land; for else they would never have sought to have run away. Besides, they would not have them sit down in any other part of Sicily, and become the harder to be warred on; but had rather thereright, and in a place most for their own advantage, compel them to fight by sea.

[2] To which end they manned their galleys; and after they had rested as long as was sufficient, when they saw their time, the first day they assaulted the Athenians' camp. And some small number of men of arms and horsemen of the Athenians sallied out against them by certain gates; and the Syracusians intercepting some of the men of arms, beat them back into the camp. But the entrance being strait, there were seventy of the horsemen lost, and men of arms some, but not many.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.51.1 focus

[1] and the Syracusans getting wind of what had happened, became more eager than ever to press the Athenians, who had now themselves acknowledged that they were no longer their superiors either by sea or by land, as otherwise they would never have planned to sail away. Besides which the Syracusans did not wish them to settle in any other part of Sicily , where they would be more difficult to deal with, but desired to force them to fight at sea as quickly as possible, in a position favorable to themselves.

[2] Accordingly they manned their ships and practised for as many days as they thought sufficient. When the moment arrived they assaulted on the first day the Athenian lines, and upon a small force of heavy infantry and horse sallying out against them by certain gates, cut off some of the former and routed and pursued them to the lines, where, as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and some few of the heavy infantry.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 7.51 focus

Die Syrakuser, die das recht gut gemerkt hatten, paßten
nun um so eifriger auf, daß die Athener ihnen nicht ent
wischten, die ja jetzt selbst eingesehen, daß sie ihnen weder
zur See noch zu Lande mehr überlegen wären, da sie sich sonst
schwerlich zur Abfahrt entschlossen haben würden. Auch wollten
sie sie sich nicht anderswo in Sizilien festsetzen lassen, wo sie
schwerer zu bekämpfen wären, sondern sie zwingen, gleich hier,
wo sie ihrerseits im Vorteil, die Schlacht mit ihrer Flotte
aufzunehmen. Sie bemannten also ihre Schiffe und übten
sie einige Tage ein, bis sie meinten, daß es damit genug sei.
Als es so weit war, unternahmen sie am ersten Tage einen
Angriff auf die Festungswerke der Athener, und als einige
kleinere Abteilungen ihrer Hopliten und Reiter aus vershciedenen
Toren gegen sie vorrückten, wurden diese von ihnen geschlagen
und verfolgt, auch einige Hopliten abgeschnitten. Die Athener
aber verloren, da der Eingang eng war, siebzig Pferde und
eine Anzahl Hopliten.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.51 focus

LI. Les Syracusains, informés de ces détails, eurent l'oeil plus ouvert encore à ne laisser aucun relâche aux Athéniens, puisque ceux-ci reconnaissaient eux-mêmes et prouvaient suffisamment par leurs projets de départ qu’ils n’avaient plus dès lors la supériorité ni sur terre ni sur mer; autrement ils n’auraient pas songé au départ. Voulant d’ailleurs les empêcher de s’établir sur quelque autre point de la Sicile, où ils seraient plus difficiles à combattre, ils résolurent de les forcer au plus vite sur place, et dans des conditions avantageuses pour eux-mêmes, à un combat naval. Ils équipèren donc leurs vaisseaux et s’exercèrent pendant quelques jours, jusqu’à ce qu’ils se crussent suffisamment préparés. Le moment arrivé, ils attaquèrent dès la veille¹ les murs des Athéniens. Un corps peu considérable d’hoplites et de cavaliers s’étant avancé contre eux par quelques portes de sortie, ils coupèrent quelques-uns des hoplites, les mirent en fuite et les poursuivirent. Comme l’entrée² était étroite, les Athéniens perdirent soixante-dix chevaux et des hoplites, mais ceux-ci en petit nombre.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.51 focus

Informés de ces particularités, les Syracusains n’en devinrent que plus ardents à serrer de près les Athéniens, qui par ces projets faisaient l’aveu de leur faiblesse sur terre et sur mer ; d’ailleurs ils ne voulaient pas qu’ils s’établissent sur quelque autre point de la Sicile, où ils seraient plus difficiles à vaincre. Ils résolurent donc de profiter au plus tôt de leurs avantages pour engager un combat naval. Ils équipèrent leurs vaisseaux et s’exercèrent le temps nécessaire; puis, la veille du jour fixé pour la bataille, ils assaillirent les murs des Athéniens. Un détachement d’hoplites et de cavaliers étant sorti à leur rencontre par une poterne, les Syracusains coupèrent une partie de ces troupes, les mirent en fuite et les poursuivirent Comme le passage était étroit, les Athéniens perdirent soixante-dix chevaux et un certain nombre d’hoplites.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.51.1 focus

[1] The Syracusans on their part, on learning about this, were far more aroused than before and determined not to give the Athenians any respite, seeing that these had now of their own act confessed themselves no longer superior either with their fleet or with their land-force, for otherwise they would not have laid plans for their departure; and at the same time, because they did not want them to settle down somewhere else in Sicily where it would be more difficult to carry on war against them, they were determined to force them to fight a sea-battle as quickly as possible on the spot, in a place that suited themselves.

[2] Accordingly they regularly manned their ships and practised for as many days as they thought sufficient. Then, when the favourable moment came, they assaulted on the first day the Athenian walls, and when a small body of hoplites and of horsemen came out against them by certain gates, they cut off a number of the hoplites, and putting them to flight followed in pursuit; and as the entrance to the camp was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and a few of the hoplites.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.51.1 focus

[1] When the Syracusans, too, heard this, they were much more stimulated not to relax in their efforts against the Athenians, since they themselves had now confessed that they were no longer their superiors, either by sea or by land, (for they would not else have meditated sailing away;) and at the same time, because they did not wish them to go and settle in any other part of Sicily, and so to be more difficult to make war upon;

[2] but were desirous of forcing them to a sea-fight there, as quickly as possible, in a position that was advantageous to themselves. They manned their ships therefore, and practised as many days as they thought sufficient. And when a favourable opportunity presented itself, on the first day they assaulted the Athenian lines; and a small division of their heavy-armed and horse having sallied forth against them through certain gateways, they intercepted some of the heavy-armed, and routed and pursued them back; and as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses, and some few heavy-armed.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.51.1 focus

[1] Syracusani vero quum hoc et ipsi intellexissent, animis multo magis erecti erant, ne remissius agerent adversus Athenienses, quod vel ipsi jam dejectis animis agnoscerent, se neque classe neque peditatu Syracusanis amplius superiores esse (alioquin enim eos furtivam abitionem non molituros fuisse), et simul quod nollent eos in aliqua alia Siciliae parte considere, ubi oppugnatu difficiliores essent, sed illic primo quoque tempore et in loco sibi commodo eos ad proelium navale committendum adigere.

[2] Naves igitur instruere coeperunt, et aliquot dies, quot iis satis esse videbantur, se exercebant. Postquam vero tempus opportunum aderat, priore quidem die Atheniensium munitiones oppugnabant, quumque quaedam non magna manus et gravis armaturae militum et equitum per quasdam portas eruptionem in eos fecisset, nonnullos gravis armatura: milites interceperunt, et ceteros in fugam versos persecuti sunt; quum autem angustus esset introitus, Athenienses amiserant septuaginta equos, et milites non multos.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.51 focus

I Siracusani informati eglino pure di questo, tanto meglio si risvegliarono a non lasciar partire gli Ateniesi, sì perchè dalla macchinata partenza deducevano che essi medesimi non si credevano più superiori a loro nè per terra nè per mare , sì eziandio perchè non volevano lasciarli fermare iu qualche altro luogo di Sicilia ove fosse più difficile il guerreggiarli, ma costringerli a combatter per mare quanto prima, in quel medesimo alloggiamento favorevole alle proprie armi. Però allestivano le navi e vi si esercitavano per alcuni giorni quanti credevano dover bastare; e quando fu tempo nel primo dì assaltarono i muri degli Ateniesi, donde esseudo usciti per una porta non molti fanti gravi e cavalli, i Siracusani interchiudono alcuni dei fanti, e messili in fuga gl’ inseguono ; e per la strettezza dell’accesso gli Ateniesi vi perdono settanta cavalli, e non molti dei soldati gravi.

Notes on the current edition

History of the Peloponnesian War

1. 29) Am 27. August nach 8 (dtjithungiwtist M/,) Uhr Abends, nach i „Hell, dies
Linpernifft des pelvpvnnes. Krieg««' S. 1l. (Kr.) '

2. 413
v.
Chr.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.51

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

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