Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 7.47

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Die Feldherren der Athener beriethen nun, was nach dem
geshcehenen Unglück und bei der gänzlichen Entmuthigung deS Heeres
zu thun sei. Mit ihren Unternehmungen — das sahen sie ein —
war daS Glück nicht, und die Soldaten murrten über längeres
Dableiben. Denn sie waren auch von Krankheiten heimgesucht, und
zwar aus zwei Gründen, einmal, weil es überhaupt die Jahreszeit
war, in welcher die Menschen den meisten Krankheiten unterworfen
sind, und dann weil die Gegend, in welcher sie lagerten, sumpfig und
ungesund war. Aber auch in jeder andern Beziehung erschien ihre
Lage hoffnungslos. Demosthenes war deßhalb der Meinung, man
dürfe nicht länger bleiben, sondern wie er auch schon bei dem
entscheidenden Versuche gegen Epipolä, falls derselbe fehlschlüge,'im
Sinne gehabt, so, meinte er, müsse man abziehen und nicht länger
zögern, so lange die Seefahrt noch offenstehe und sie wenigstens mit
den Truppen der zuletztgekommenen Schiffe den Feind im Schach
halten könnten. Auch sei eS ersprießlicher für den Staat, sagte er,
gegen die Feinde Krieg zu führen, die sich in ihrem eigenen Lande
daheim verschanzt hätten, als gegen die Syrakusaner, die man
so leicht nicht mehr bemustern könne; und außerdem habe eS auch
keine Vernunft, dahier sitzen zu bleiben und so viel Geld ganz
vergeblich aufzuwenden. > ' '

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 7.47.1 focus

[1] οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐβουλεύοντο πρός τε τὴν γεγενημένην ξυμφορὰν καὶ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ κατὰ πάντα ἀρρωστίαν. τοῖς τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἑώρων οὐ κατορθοῦντες καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀχθομένους τῇ μονῇ·

[2] νόσῳ τε γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο κατ’ ἀμφότερα, τῆς τε ὥρας τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ταύτης οὔσης ἐν ᾗ ἀσθενοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι μάλιστα, καὶ τὸ χωρίον ἅμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἑλῶδες καὶ χαλεπὸν ἦν, τά τε ἄλλα ὅτι ἀνέλπιστα αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο.

[3] τῷ οὖν Δημοσθένει οὐκ ἐδόκει ἔτι χρῆναι μένειν, ἀλλ’ ἅπερ καὶ διανοηθεὶς ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς διεκινδύνευσεν, ἐπειδὴ ἔσφαλτο, ἀπιέναι ἐψηφίζετο καὶ μὴ διατρίβειν, ἕως ἔτι τὸ πέλαγος οἷόν τε περαιοῦσθαι καὶ τοῦ στρατεύματος ταῖς γοῦν ἐπελθούσαις ναυσὶ κρατεῖν.

[4] καὶ τῇ πόλει ὠφελιμώτερον ἔφη εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ σφῶν ἐπιτειχίζοντας τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι ἢ Συρακοσίους, οὓς οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι χειρώσασθαι· οὐδ’ αὖ ἄλλως χρήματα πολλὰ δαπανῶντας εἰκὸς εἶναι προσκαθῆσθαι.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.47.1 focus

[1] In the meantime the Athenian generals went to council upon their late overthrow and present general weakness of the army. For they saw not only that their designs prospered not, but that the soldiers also were weary of staying.

[2] For they were troubled with sickness, proceeding from a double cause, this being the time of the year most obnoxious to diseases, and the place where they lay moorish and noisome; and all things else appeared desperate.

[3] Demosthenes thought fit to stay no longer, and since the execution of his design at Epipolae had failed, delivered his opinion for going out of the haven whilst the seas were open and whilst, at least with this addition of galleys, they were stronger than the army of the enemy.

[4] For it was better, he said, for the city to make war upon those which fortify against them at home than against the Syracusians, seeing they cannot now be easily overcome; and there was no reason why they should spend much money in lying before the city. This was the opinion of Demosthenes.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.47.1 focus

[1] In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon the disaster which had happened, and upon the general weakness of the army. They saw themselves unsuccessful in their enterprises, and the soldiers disgusted with their stay;

[2] disease being rife among them owing to its being the sickly season of the year, and to the marshy and unhealthy nature of the spot in which they were encamped; and the state of their affairs generally being thought desperate.

[3] Accordingly, Demosthenes was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but agreeably to his original idea in risking the attempt upon Epipolae, now that this had failed, he gave his vote for going away without further loss of time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and their late reinforcement might give them the superiority at all events on that element.

[4] He also said that it would be more profitable for the state to carry on the war against those who were building fortifications in Attica , than against the Syracusans whom it was no longer easy to subdue; besides which it was not right to squander large sums of money to no purpose by going on with the siege.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 7.47 focus

Unterdessen überlegten die athenischen Feldherren, was
nach der erlittenen Niederlage und bei der jetzt im Heere ein
gerissenen Mutlosigkeit zu tun. Sie sahen, daß sie bei ihren
Unternehmungen kein Glück hatten und ihre Leute einen längeren
Aufenthalt in Sizilien verwünschten, einmal weil sie an Krank- ¹
heiten litten, da es die Jahreszeit war, wo der Mensch be
sonders zu Krankheiten neigt, und ihr Lager sich an einer
sumpfigen, ungesunden Stelle befand, außerdem aber auch
weil sie die Lage als hoffnungslos ansahen. Deshalb war
Demotshenes dafür, nicht länger zu bleiben, und wie es schon
vorher seine Absicht gewesen war, falls der Angriff auf Epipolai
mißglückte, mit dem Heere abzuziehen, so riet er auch jetzt
dazu und die Zeit wahrzunehmen, solange die Schiffahrt noch
offen und man wenigstens in der Lage sei, mit den neu an
gekommenen Schiffen die See zu behaupten. Seiner Meinung
nach sei es auch für die Stadt selbst ersprießlicher, die Feinde,
welche in ihrem eigenen Lande Festungen anlegten, zu be
kämpfen als die Sprakuser, die man doch schwerlich noch unter
kriegen werde, und eine Torheit, für eine längere Belagerung
noch unnütz Geld wegzuwerfen.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.47 focus

XLVII. Cependant les généraux athéniens tinrent conseil à propos du dernier désastre et de l’état d’épuisement où, à tous égards, l’armée était réduite. Ils voyaient toutes leurs entreprises déjouées et les soldats impatients de leur séjour; les maladies sévissaient, développées par une double cause, d’une part la saison où l’on était, la plus défavorable de toutes sous ce rapport¹, de l’autre l’assiette du camp sur un terrain marécageux et malsain. Tout leur paraissait d’ailleurs complètement désespéré. Démosthènes voulait ne pas séjourner plus longtemps et suivre, puisqu’il avait échoué, le plan déjà arrêté dans sa pensée lorsqu’il avait tenté l’attaque d’Épipolæ² : on devait, suivant lui, partir sans retard pendant que la traversée était encore possible et que l’arrivée de la nouvelle flotte³ promettait la supériorité sur l’ennemi. Il représentait d’ailleurs que mieux valait pour Athènes faire la guerre à ceux qui élevaient des fortifications sur son territoire, qu’aux Syracusains, bien difficiles à vaincre désormais; qu’il ne convenait pas d’ailleurs de faire inutilement d’énormes dépenses pour continuer le siége. Tel était l’avis de Démosthènes.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.47 focus

En présence du désastre qu’ils venaient d’essuyer et de la démoralisation croissante de l’armée, les généraux athéniens tinrent conseil. Tous leurs plans avaient échoué; les soldats succombaient à la fatigue; les maladies se développaient sous la double influence d’une saison malsaine et d'on campement incommode et marécageux; en un mot, la situation ne leur paraissait plus tenable. Aussi Démosthène était-il convaincu qu’il ne fallait pas rester plus longtemps; il persistait dans Tavis qu’il avait énoncé lors de l’attaque risquée contre les Épipoles, et opinait pour que, après cet échec, on partît sans le moindre délai, pendant que la mer était encore praticable et que la flotte renforcée promettait la supériorité. « Mieux vaut, disait-il, pour Athènes faire la guerre aux ennemis cantonnés sur son territoire, qu’aux Syracusains dont il n’est plus facile d’avoir raison, et ne pas prodiguer en pure perte nos ressources par un séjour indéfiniment prolongé. » Telle était l’opinion de Démosthène.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.47.1 focus

[1] Meanwhile the Athenian generals were deliberating about the situation in view both of the calamity that had happened and of the utter discouragement that now prevailed in the army. They saw that they were not succeeding in their undertaking, and that the soldiers were finding their stay burdensome.

[2] For they were distressed by sickness for a double cause, the season of the year being that in which men are most liable to illness, while at the same time the place in which they were encamped was marshy and unhealthy; and the situation in general appeared to them to be utterly hopeless.

[3] Demosthenes, therefore, was of the opinion that they should not remain there any longer, but since the plan which had induced him to risk the attack upon Epipolae had failed, his vote was for going away without loss of time, while it was still possible to cross the sea and to have some superiority over the enemy with at any rate the ships of the armament which had come to reinforce them.

[4] From the point of view of the State, also, he said, it was more profitable to carry on the war against the enemy who were building a hostile fortress in their own territory than against the Syracusans, whom it was no longer easy to conquer; and furthermore, it was not right that they should continue the siege and spend a great deal of money to no purpose.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 7.47.1 focus

[1] The Athenian commanders, in the mean time, consulted on the disaster which had befallen them, and on the want of vigour which at present on all accounts prevailed in their camp; seeing that they were both unsuccessful in their attempts, and that the soldiers were annoyed by their stay in the country.

[2] For they were suffering with sickness from two different causes, both because this was the season of the year at which men are most liable to disease, and at the same time, too, because the position in which they were encamped was marshy and unfavourable; while they were also distressed because every thing else appeared hopeless to them. Demosthenes then, was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer;

[3] but, according to the plan with which he had hazarded the attack on Epipolae, since that had failed, he gave his vote for departing, and not wasting the time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and while, as regarded forces, they might command the superiority with the squadron that had lately joined them, at any rate.

[4] He said, too, that it would be more beneficial to the state to carry on the war against those who were building fortresses for their annoyance in their own country, than against the Syracusans, whom it was no longer easy to subdue: nor, again, was it right for them to waste large sums of money to no purpose by continuing the siege. Such, then, was the view entertained by Demosthenes.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.47.1 focus

[1] Atheniensium vero duces interea consultabant et de clade, quam acceperant, et de afflicta omnibus in rebus fortuna, in qua totus exercitus tunc erat constitutus. Videbant enim conata sibi sua non succedere, et milites mansione gravari;

[2] nam et morbo premebantur, duabus de causis, quod et id erat anni tempus, quo potissimum homines aegrotant, et quod locus, in quo castra habebant, ; palustris ac gravis erat; et de ceteris rebus quod iis nulla amplius spes ostenderetur.

[3] Demostheni igitur non ridebatur diutius manendum esse, sed quando spes illa, qua adductus belli fortunam apud Epipolas tentavisset, eum fefellisset, abeundum esse censebat nec amplius morandum, donec adhuc mare tngiciendi facultas esset et e suo exercitu earum certe navium ope, quae postea advenissent, vincere possent.

[4] Et reipublicae magis conducere dicebat, bellum cum illis gerere, qui in suo agro munitiones adversus se ex· struerent, quam cum Syracusanis, quos expugnare nequaquam amplius facile esset; neque etiam rationi consenta· neum esse, magnam pecuniae vim in obsidione frustra consumere. Atque Demosthenis quidem haec erat sententia;

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.47 focus

Frattanto i generali ateniesi andavano discorrendo della passata sciagura e della presente universal debolezza dell’esercito. Vedevano tornati invano i loro sforzi, ed i soldati gravati di quella stanza, attesoché erano afflitti dalle malattie per due cagioni; sì perchè correva la stagione dell’anno nella quale principalmente gli uomini infermano , sì eziandio perchè il luogo ove erano alloggiati era paludoso ed insalubre ; ed a ciò si aggiugneva che tutti gli altri tentativi pareano loro disperati. Per lo che Demosteue giudicava non esser più da rimanere ; ma da che era fallita T impresa dell9 Epipole da lui disegnata e tentata , proponeva che senza indugio si cercasse una strada di mezzo ai nemici , mentre che potè vasi ancora tragittar il mare f e colKaggiunta almeno delle navi sopravvenute superare l’armata nemica. Diceva esser più vantaggioso alla Repubblica far la guerra contro quelli che edificavano munizioni nelle terre di lei, innanzi che contro i Siracusani, i quali ornai non potevano agevolmente sottomettersi ; e non esser ragionevole il fermarsi più a lungo in quell’ assedio spendendo senza prò gran copia di denaro. Tale era la mente di Demostene.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.47

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

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