Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 6.18

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„Mit welchen Gründen also könnten wir denn hier vor
uns selbstuns entschuldigen, wenn wir das Unternehmen aus den
Händen ließen? — mit welchen gegenüber unsern dortigen Bundesgenossen, ¹²
wenn wir ihnen nicht zu Hülfe kämen? Haben wir uns mit ihnen
doch eidlich verbunden, und sind also verpflichtet, ihnen zu helfen,
ohne ihnen vorzuhalten, daß wir von ihnen keine Hülfe erwarten
könnten. Denn nicht, damit sie uns hieher Gegenhülfe leisten, haben
wir sie in unsere Bundesgenossenschaft aufgenommen, sondern damit
wir unsern dortigen Feinden Schaden thun und sie hindern, selber
hieher zu kommen. Denn die Herrschaft haben sowohl wir, als wer
sonst immer Herrschaft erlangt hat, dadurch gewonnen, daß wir
bereitwilligst denen beisprangen, die unsere Hülfe anriefen, mochten sie nun
Barbaren sein oder Hellenen; denn wenn Alle der Ruhe Pflegen, oder
immer erst genau den Verwandtschaftsgrad untersuchen wollten, wenn
es sich darum handelt, Einem beizuspringen, so würde unsere
Herrschaft nur sehr unmerklich wachsen, und wir würden sie erst dadurch
recht in Gefahr bringen. Denn wer einmal eine Uebermacht besitzt,
gegen den ergreift man nicht nur dann die Waffen, wenn er Einem
zu Leibe geht, sondern man kommt ihm zuvor, damit er nicht angreisen
kann. Und es steht auch nicht bei uns, abzumessen, wie weit wir
unsere Herrschaft ausbreiten wollen, sondern da wir schon einmal auf
dieser Stufe der Macht stehen, so zwingt uns die Nothwendigkeit, auf
die Unterwerfung der Einen zu denken und die Andern sich unserer
Herrschaft nicht entziehen zu lassen, denn wenn wir nicht selbst über
Andere herrschen, so gerathen wir in die Gefahr, von ihnen beherrscht
zu werden. Ruhige Unthätigkeit dürft ihr nicht mit denselben Augen
ansehen, wie Andere, wenn ihr nicht zuerst die Grundsätze eures
Verhaltens nach der Art jener umwandeln wollt."

„Bedenken wir also, daß wir unsere hiesige Macht verstärken,
wenn wir gegen jene zu Felde ziehen, und laßt uns den Seezug
unternehmen, damit den Peloponnesiern ihr Hochmuth vergehet, wenn sie
sehen, daß wir diese gegenwärtige Unthätigkeit verachten und sogar
gegen Sieilien segeln. Und entweder werden wir aller
Wahrscheinlichkeit nach über ganz Hellas herrschen, wenn wir auch die dortigen
Staaten unterworfen haben, oder wir werden doch wenigstens den
Syrakusanern empfindlich schaden, und auch davon werden sowohl
wir selbst, als unsre Bundesgenossen Nutzen haben. Sichere
Bürgschaft des Verbleibens sowohl, wenn die Sache von Statten geht,
als auch der Rückkehr, werden uns die Schiffe gewähren, denn auch
denn auch zur See werden wir aller Sikelioten Meister sein. Mögen ³
euch nicht die Worte des Nikias, die süße Ruhe empfehlen und
zwischen Jungen und Aelteren Zwietracht zu stiften suchen, von der
Sache abwendig machen, sondern in der hergebrachten gesetzlichen
Weise und wie auch unsere Väter ihrer Zeit, als die Jungen durch
gemeinsame Berathung mit den Alten den Staat zu seiner jetzigen
Macht gehoben haben, so und auf dieselbe Weise sucht auch jetzt den
Staat vorwärts zu bringen, in der Ueberzeugung, daß Jugend und
Alter ohne einander Nichts vermögen, und daß die Mischung von
Leichtsinn, Mittelschlag und übergenauer Berechnung wohl die meiste
Kraft ergebe, — daß der Staat, wenn er in Unthätigkeit versinkt,
sich in sich selbst verzehre, wie jedes andere Wesen, und daß auf diese
Weise jede Geschicklichkeit in sich veraltere, daß aber durch Kampf
der Staat immer zunehme an Erfahrung und die Selbstvcrtheidigung
mehr durch die That als durch Worte immer in Uebung behalte.
Ueberhaupt aber ist es meine feste Ueberzeugung, daß ein Staat, der
bis dahin nie unthätig war, durch den Umschlag in die Unthätigkeit
wohl am schnellsten seinem Verderben cntgegengeführt werde, und
daß unter den Menschen Diejenigen ihre Existenz am meisten sichern,
welche in der Staatsführung von den bestehenden Sitten und
Gewohnheiten. wenn sie auch mangelhaft sein sollten, am wenigsten
abweichen."

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 6.18.1 focus

[1] ὥστε τί ἂν λέγοντες εἰκὸς ἢ αὐτοὶ ἀποκνοῖμεν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους σκηπτόμενοι μὴ βοηθοῖμεν; οἷς χρεών, ἐπειδή γε καὶ ξυνωμόσαμεν, ἐπαμύνειν, καὶ μὴ ἀντιτιθέναι ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἡμῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα δεῦρο ἀντιβοηθῶσι προσεθέμεθα αὐτούς, ἀλλ’ ἵνα τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἐχθροῖς ἡμῶν λυπηροὶ ὄντες δεῦρο κωλύωσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπιέναι.

[2] τήν τε ἀρχὴν οὕτως ἐκτησάμεθα καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι ἦρξαν, παραγιγνόμενοι προθύμως τοῖς αἰεὶ ἢ βαρβάροις ἢ Ἕλλησιν ἐπικαλουμένοις, ἐπεὶ εἴ γε ἡσυχάζοιεν πάντες ἢ φυλοκρινοῖεν οἷς χρεὼν βοηθεῖν, βραχὺ ἄν τι προσκτώμενοι αὐτῇ περὶ αὐτῆς ἂν ταύτης μᾶλλον κινδυνεύοιμεν. τὸν γὰρ προύχοντα οὐ μόνον ἐπιόντα τις ἀμύνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἔπεισι προκαταλαμβάνει.

[3] καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τῷδε καθέσταμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιβουλεύειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἀνιέναι, διὰ τὸ ἀρχθῆναι ἂν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων αὐτοῖς κίνδυνον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοιμεν. καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἥσυχον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὁμοῖον μεταλήψεσθε.

[4] ‘λογισάμενοι οὖν τάδε μᾶλλον αὐξήσειν, ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα ἢν ἴωμεν, ποιώμεθα τὸν πλοῦν, ἵνα Πελοποννησίων τε στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα, εἰ δόξομεν ὑπεριδόντες τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἡσυχίαν καὶ ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεῦσαι· καὶ ἅμα ἢ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῶν ἐκεῖ προσγενομένων πάσης τῷ εἰκότι ἄρξομεν, ἢ κακώσομέν γε Συρακοσίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὠφελησόμεθα.

[5] τὸ δὲ ἀσφαλές, καὶ μένειν, ἤν τι προχωρῇ, καὶ ἀπελθεῖν, αἱ νῆες παρέξουσιν· ναυκράτορες γὰρ ἐσόμεθα καὶ ξυμπάντων Σικελιωτῶν.

[6] καὶ μὴ ὑμᾶς ἡ Νικίου τῶν λόγων ἀπραγμοσύνη καὶ διάστασις τοῖς νέοις ἐς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀποτρέψῃ, τῷ δὲ εἰωθότι κόσμῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ἅμα νέοι γεραιτέροις βουλεύοντες ἐς τάδε ἦραν αὐτά, καὶ νῦν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ πειρᾶσθε προαγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ νομίσατε νεότητα μὲν καὶ γῆρας ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲν δύνασθαι, ὁμοῦ δὲ τό τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνυ ἀκριβὲς ἂν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστ’ ἂν ἰσχύειν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἐὰν μὲν ἡσυχάζῃ, τρίψεσθαί τε αὐτὴν περὶ αὑτὴν ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ πάντων τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐγγηράσεσθαι, ἀγωνιζομένην δὲ αἰεὶ προσλήψεσθαί τε τὴν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ μᾶλλον ξύνηθες ἕξειν.

[7] παράπαν τε γιγνώσκω πόλιν μὴ ἀπράγμονα τάχιστ’ ἄν μοι δοκεῖν ἀπραγμοσύνης μεταβολῇ διαφθαρῆναι, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλέστατα τούτους οἰκεῖν οἳ ἂν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἤθεσι καὶ νόμοις, ἢν καὶ χείρω ᾖ, ἥκιστα διαφόρως πολιτεύωσιν.’

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 6.18.1 focus

[1] "What therefore can we allege with any probability for our backwardness; or what can we pretend unto our confederates for denying them assistance? Whom we ought to defend, were it but because we have sworn it to them, without objecting that they have not reciprocally aided us. For we took them not into league that they should come hither with their aids, but that by troubling our enemies there they might hinder them from coming hither against us.

[2] And the way whereby we, and whosoever else hath dominion hath gotten it, hath ever been the cheerful succouring of their associates that required it, whether they were Greeks or barbarians. For if we should all sit still, or stand to make choice which were fit to be assisted and which not, we should have little under our government of the estates of other men, but rather hazard our own.

[3] For when one is grown mightier than the rest, men use not only to defend themselves against him when he shall invade, but to anticipate him, that he invade not at all. Nor is it in our power to be our own carvers how much we will have subject to us; but considering the case we are in, it is as necessary for us to seek to subdue those that are not under our dominion, as to keep so those that are; lest if others be not subject to us, we fall in danger of being subjected unto them.

[4] Nor are we to weigh quietness in the same balance that others do, unless also the institution of this state were like unto that of other states. Let us rather make reckoning by enterprising abroad to increase our power at home, and proceed on our voyage that we may cast down the haughty conceit of the Peloponnesians and show them the contempt and slight account we make of our present ease by undertaking this our expedition into Sicily.

[5] Whereby, either conquering those states we shall become masters of all Greece, or weaken the Syracusians, to the benefit of ourselves and our confederates. And for our security to stay, if any city shall come to our side, or to come away if otherwise, our galleys will afford it.

[6] For in that we shall be at our own liberty, though all the Sicilians together were against it. Let not the speech of Nicias, tending only to laziness and to the stirring of debate between the young men and the old, avert you from it; but with the same decency wherewith your ancestors, consulting young and old together, have brought our dominion to the present height, endeavour you likewise to enlarge the same. And think not that youth or age, one without the other, is of any effect, but that the simplest, the middle sort, and the exactest judgments tempered together is it that doth the greatest good; and that a state as well as any other thing will, if it rest, wear out of itself, and all men's knowledge decay; whereas by the exercise of war experience will continually increase, and the city will get a habit of resisting the enemy, not with words, but action.

[7] In sum, this is my opinion: that a state accustomed to be active, if it once grow idle, will quickly be subjected by the change; and that they of all men are most surely planted that with most unity observe the present laws and customs, though not always of the best.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 6.18.1 focus

[1] In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist them, without objecting that they have not assisted us. We did not take them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas , but that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from coming over here and attacking us.

[2] It is thus that empire has been won, both by us and by all others that have held it, by a constant readiness to support all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite assistance; since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they ought to assist, we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil those we have already won. Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made.

[3] And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs.

[4] Be convinced then that we shall augment our power at home by this adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily , and letting them see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and at the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage of ourselves and our allies.

[5] The faculty of staying if successful, or of returning, will be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be superior at sea to all the Siceliots put together.

[6] And do not let the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his setting of the young against the old, turn you from your purpose, but in the good old fashion by which our fathers, old and young together, by their united counsels brought our affairs to their present height, do you endeavour still to advance them; understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and deliberate judgment are strongest when united, and that, by sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in word but in deed.

[7] In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one's character and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can.’

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 6.18 focus

„Wie könnten wir eine so zaghafte Politik vor unS selbst
und vor unseren dortigen Bundesgenossen rechtfertigen, wollten
wir ihnen nicht zu Hilfe kommen? Nachdem wir uns ihnen
einmal eidlich verpflichtet, müssen wir ihnen auch helfen und
dürfen nicht einwenden, daß sie uns ja auch nicht hülfen.
Denn nicht deshalb haben wir sie als Bundesgenossen ange
nommen, um uns hier von ihnen helfen zu lassen, sondern um
durch sie einen Druck auf unsere dortigen Feinde zu üben und
diese dadurch zu hindern, uns hier anzugreifen. Wie alle
mächtigen Staaten eben auch, sind wir dadurch zur Macht gelangt,
daß wir Griechen und Barbaren, wenn sie uns darum an
gingen, stets bereitwillig unsere Hilfe gewährten. Wenn man
sich nicht rührt oder erst lange untersucht, ob man einem als
Stammesgenossen auch helfen müsse, hat es mit der Erweite
rung unserer Macht kurze Wege, ja wir laufen Gefahr, sie
völlig zu verlieren. Gegen einen mächtigen Feind setzt man sich
nicht nur zur Wehr, wenn er uns angreift, sondern sucht sich
auch schon vorher gegen seinen Angriff zu sichern. Wir sind
nicht in der Lage, im voraus zu bemessen, wie weit wir unsere
Herrschaft ausdehnen wollen, aber, nachdem wir es einmal
so weit gebracht, sind wir gezwungen, nicht nur die alten Er
oberungen festzuhalten, sondern auch auf neue auszugehen,
weil wir gewärtigen müssen, wenn wir nicht über andere
herrshcen, selbst unter fremde Herrschaft zu geraten. Wir dürfen
uns auch nicht wie andere der Ruhe hingeben, wenn wir nicht
überhaupt die Rolle mit ihnen tauschen wollen. Also, weil
wir darauf rechnen können, unsere hiesige Macht zu mehren,
wenn wir nach Sizilien gehen, laßt uns den Zug dahin unter ¹
nehmen, damit wir den Hochmut der Peloponnesier dämpfen,
wenn sie sehen, daß wir unS aus der Ruhe nichts machen
und jetzt sogar eine Flotte nach Sizilien schicken. Gelingt eS
uns aber, dort festen Fuß zu fassen, so haben wir alle Aus
sicht, ganz Griechenland unserer Herrschaft zu unterwerfen
oder wenigstens die Syrakuser so zu schwächen, wie es unserem
Interesse und dem unserer Bundesgenossen entspricht. Die
Sicherheit aber, wenn die Sache gut geht, uns dort zu be
haupten oder auch wieder abzuziehen, gewährt unS die Flotte;
denn zur See werden wir auch der Gesamtheit der sizilischen
immer überlegen sein. Laßt euch auch durch Nikias nicht
irremachen, wenn er euch zum Schlaraffenleben verführen und
zwischen Alten und Jungen Zwietracht säen will, sondern so
wie unsere Väter in einträchtigem Zusammenwirken von jung
und alt die Stadt groß gemacht haben, so sucht auch ihr jetzt
ihre Macht zu mehren, und glaubt nur, daß Jugend und Alter
ohne einander nichts können, die richtige Mischung von etwas
Leichtsinn, Manneskraft und bedächtiger Überlegung aber das
Höchste vermag. Und wie es jedem geht, so zehrt auch eine
Stadt, wenn sie sich völlig zugibt, letztlich an ihrem eigenen
Fette, und ihre Kräfte verkümmern, während sie im Kampfe
beständig zulernt und sich gewöhnt, mit dem Degen statt mit
Worten zu fechten. Ja, ich bin völlig davon überzeugt, daß
grade eine Stadt, welche bisher die Tätigkeit selbst war, am
ersten zu Fall kommt, wenn sie sich der Untätigkeit ergibt, und
daß man da am sichersten fährt, wo man an den alten Sitten
und Gewohnheiten, selbst wenn an ihnen dies oder jenes aus
zusetzen wäre, am zähesten festhält."

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 6.18 focus

XVIII. « Quel motif plausible pourrions-nous donc donner de nos hésitations, et sous quel prétexte refuserions-nous de secourir nos alliés de Sicile, nous qui sommes tenus par des serments mutuels à les défendre, sans pouvoir objecter qu’ils ne nous ont point aidés de leur côté? car, en nous les attachant, notre but n’était pas d’obtenir par réciprocité leurs secours chez nous; nous voulions qu’en inquiétant chez eux nos ennemis, ils ne leur permissent pas de venir ici. D’ailleurs, comment avons-nous obtenu l’empire, nous et tous ceux qui l’ont exercé? C’est en nous empressant toujours de secourir ceux qui nous invoquaient, Grecs ou Barbares : rester en repos, ou chicaner sur ceux qu’il faut secourir, c’est non-seulement se condamner à ajouter peu de chose à notre domination, mais la rendre elle-même beaucoup plus précaire. Car, contre une puissance supérieure, on ne se borne pas à repousser l’attaque, on prend les devants pour la pré- venir. Il n’est pas en notre pouvoir de fixer une limite où s’arrêtera notre empire; car telle est notre situation, qu’il nous faut agir contre ceux-ci,, ne pas abandonner ceux-là, ou bien risquer de subir nousmêmes le joug d’autrui, si nous ne l’imposons aux autres. Vous ne pouvez envisager le repos du même point de vue que les autres, à moins de changer aussi tout votre système de conduite pour-vous assimiler à eux. Soyons donc convaincus qu’en allant en Sicile nous accroitrons ici notre puissance; faisons cette expédition, afin que les Péloponnésiens soient humiliés dans leur orgueil, lorsqu’ils nous verront, dédaigneux du repos présent, faire voile pour la Sicile. Cette conquête, ajoutée à notre puissance actuelle, nous assurera vraisemblablement l’empire sur la Grèce entière; ou du moins le mal que nous ferons aux Syracusains servira à la fois et nos propres intérêts et ceux de nos alliés. Nos vaisseaux nous donneront toute sécurité, soit pour rester si nous avons quelque avantage, soit pour nous retirer; car du côté de la marine nous serons supérieurs même à tous les Siciliens réunis. Ne vous laissez point détourner par ces discours de Nicias, qui prêchent l’indolence et sèment la division entre les jeunes gens et les vieillards : fidèles aux anciens usages, semblables à nos pères qui, par les conseils réunis de la jeunesse et de la vieillesse, ont élevé la république à ce point de grandeur, tâchez, vous aussi, en ce jour, d’étendre également sa puissance; songez que jeunes gens et vieillards ne peuvent rien les uns sans les autres; mais que du mélange de la faiblesse, de la médiocrité, et de la vigueur en pleine possession d’elle-même, résulte une force irrésistible; songez que la république abandonnée au repos s’usera contre elle-même comme toute autre chose, que toute capacité s’y éteindra dans la décrépitude, tandis que dans la lutte elle acquerra sans cesse une expérience nouvelle et contractera l’habitude de se défendre, non en paroles, mais par des actes. En un mot, je suis convaincu qu’un État habitué à l’activité périrait bientôt en passant à l’inaction; que le meilleur gage de sécurité pour un peuple est le respect des coutumes et des lois établies, fussent-elles même défectueuses, et la stabilité du gouvernement. »

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 6.18 focus

« Comment donc justifier notre défaut de zèle et notre refus de secourir nos alliés? Nous leur devons aide et protection ; nos serments nous y obligent. N’écoutez pas ceux qui vous disent qu’il ne faut attendre d'eux aucune réciprocité. Si nous les avons accueillis, ce n'était pas pour qu’ils vinssent ici nous défendre, mais pour qu’ils retinssent chez eux nos ennemis. Par quel autre système avons-nous obtenu l’empire, nous et tous ceux qui l’ont possédé, si ce n'est en étant toujours prêts à secourir les Grecs et les Barbares qui réclamaient notre appui? Si chacun de nous, quand son aide est nécessaire, demeurait en repos ou chicanait sur les races, nous étendrions peu notre puissance, ou plutôt nous la mettrions en péril. Avec des adversaires formidables, la prudenee consiste à prévenir leurs attaques, non moins qu'à les repousser. Nous ne sommes pas libres de graduer à volonté l’extension de notre empire. Porce nous est de menacer les uns et de comprimer les autres ; car nous serions en danger de tomber sous une domination étrangère, si nous cessions nous-mêmes de dominer. Vous ne pouvez envisager le repos du même œil que les autres peuples, à moins de modeler vos principes sur les leurs.

« En naviguant vers ces parages, nous augmenterons sans aucun doute la puissance que nous possédons déjà. Faisons cette entreprise, ne fût-ce que pour rabattre Porgueil des Pé-loponésiens, et pour leur montrer que, peu soucieux de la tranquillité présente, nous portons nos armes jusqu’en Sicile. Par là de deux choses l’une : ou nous ferons une conquête qui noos vaudra l’empire de la Grèce entière, ou tout au moins nous écraserons les Syracusains, ce qui sera un bénéfice réel pour nous et pour nos alliés. Nos vaisseaux assureront notre séjour en cas de succès, ou notre retraite; car nous l’emporterons toujours par la marine sur les Siciliens réunis.

« Ne vous laissez pas influencer par les discours de Nicias, par l’inaction qu’il vous conseille, ni par la scission qu’il cherche à établir entre les jeunes et les vieux ; mais, fidèles à nos anciennes coutumes et à l’exemple de nos pères, qui, par l’union de ces deux âges, ont élevé notre patrie au rang qu’elle occupe aujourd’hui, efforcez-vous d’accroître sa puissance en marchant sur leurs traces. Songez que la vieillesse et la jeunesse ne peuvent rien l’une sans l’autre ; mais que ce qui fait la force, c’est l’assemblage et la combinaison de la faiblesse, de la médiocrité et de la perfection. Soyez-en bien persuadés: si la république est inactive, elle s’usera elle-même comme tout le reste, et tous les talents y périront de décrépitude, tandis que par la lutte elle acquerra sans cesse une nouvelle vigueur et s’accoutumera à se défendre par des actions plutôt que par des paroles. En un mot, j’estime qu’un État accoutumé à l’activité marche rapidement à sa ruine lorsqu’il se plonge dans l’inertie, et que, pour un peuple, le meilleur moyen d’assurer sa sécurité, c’est de s’écarter le moins possible des mœurs et des lois établies, quelque imparfaites qu’elles soient. »

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 6.18.1 focus

[1] "On what reasonable plea, then, can we hold back ourselves, or make excuse to our allies there for refusing to aid them? We ought to assist them, especially as we have actually sworn to do so, and may not object that they did not help us, either. For we took them into our alliance, not that they might bring aid here, but in order that by annoying our enemies there they might hinder them from coming hither against us.

[2] It was in this way that we acquired our empire—both we and all others that have ever won empire—by coming zealously to the aid of those, whether barbarians or Hellenes, who have at any time appealed to us; whereas, if we should all keep quiet or draw distinctions of race as to whom we ought to assist, we should add but little to our empire and should rather run a risk of losing that empire itself.

[3] For against a superior one does not merely defend oneself when he attacks, but even takes precaution that he shall not attack at all. And it is not possible for us to exercise a careful stewardship of the limits we would set to our empire; but, since we are placed in this position, it is necessary to plot against some and not let go our hold upon others, because there is a danger of coming ourselves under the empire of others, should we not ourselves hold empire over other peoples.

[4] And you cannot regard a pacific policy in the same light as other states might, unless you will change your practices also to correspond with theirs.¹
“Calculating, then, that we shall rather strengthen our power here if we go over there, let us make the voyage, that we may lay low the haughty spirit of the Peloponnesians, as we shall if we let men see that in contempt of our present peaceful condition² we even sail against Sicily;

[5] and that we may, at the same time, either acquire empire over all Hellas, as in all probability we shall, when the Hellenes there have been added to us, or may at least cripple the Syracusans, whereby both ourselves and our allies will be benefited.

[6] And as to safety—both to remain, if things go well, and to come away—our ships will provide that; for we shall be masters of the sea even against all the Siceliots combined. And let not the policy of inaction that Nicias proposes, or his putting the younger at variance with the older men, divert you from your purpose; but in our usual good order, just as our fathers, young men taking counsel with older men, raised our power to its present height, do you now also in the same way strive to advance the state. And consider that youth and age without one another avail nothing, but that the simple, the mediocre, and the very subtle tempered together will have most strength; and that the state, if she remain at peace, will, like anything else, wear herself out upon herself, and her skill in all pursuits will grow old; whereas, if she is continually at conflict, she will always be adding to her experience, and will acquire more, not in word but in deed, the habit of defending herself.

[7] In short, I declare that a state which is accustomed to activity would very quickly be ruined by a change to inactivity; and that those men live most securely whose political action is least at variance with existing habits and institutions, even when these are not the best.”

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 6.18.1 focus

[1]

On what reasonable argument, then, could we ourselves shrink from it; or on what plea addressed to our allies there could we refuse to succour them? For since we have entered into league with them, we ought to assist them, and not to object that they too have not assisted us. For we united them with us, not that they might come here to help us in their turn, but that by annoying our enemies there they might prevent their coming here to attack us.

[2]

And it is in this way that empire has been won, both by us and and by all others who have enjoyed it; I mean, by readily taking part with those barbarians or Greeks who from time to time called them to their aid; since if all should remain quiet, or ¹ nicely choose whom they ought to assist; we should make but slight additions to it, but should rather run a risk of losing even what it now is.

[3]

For men do not only defend themselves against a superior when he has attacked them, but also strike the first blow, to prevent his attacking them. And it is not possible for us to portion out exactly how far we wish to hold dominion; but since we are in our present position, we must form designs against some, and not give up others; because we should be, subjected to the rule of another party, if we did not ourselves rule over others.

[4]

Nor must you take the same view of quiet as the rest of the world, unless you will also receive fresh institutions assimilating to theirs. Considering, then, that we shall rather aggrandize our possessions here, if we go in quest of those there, let us make the expedition; that we may both prostrate the pride of the Peloponnesians, by being seen, regardless of present peace, to sail even against Sicily; and at the same time, by either ruling, as we most probably shall, over the whole of Greece, through being joined by those there, or at any rate by injuring the Syracusans, by which both ourselves and our allies will be benefited.

[5]

And as for security, whether for remaining there, in case of any success, or for returning, our fleet will provide us with it:

[6]

for by sea we shall be superior to all the Siceliots put together. And let not the non-interfering policy which Nicias recommends in his speeches, nor his setting the young against the old, divert you from your purpose; but acting in your usual order, just as our fathers, by consulting young with old, raised the state to its present height, do ye now too, in the same manner, endeavour to advance it; being convinced that youth and old age can do nothing without each other; but that the period of levity, and of mid-age, and of extreme preciseness, will have most power when joined together; and that the state, if it remain quiet, will be worn out on itself, like any thing else, and its skill in every thing grow dull; while by entering into contest it will continually gain fresh experience, and will find self—defence habitual to it, not in word, but rather in deed.

[7]

My decided opinion then is, that I think a state of no inactive character would most quickly be ruined by a change to inactivity; and that those men live most securely, who regulate their affairs in accordance with their existing habits and institutions, even though they may be of an inferior character, with the least variation.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 6.18.1 focus

[1] « Quid igitur rationi consentaneum reputantia aut nos ipsi tergiversemur aut quid praetendentes sociis, qui illic sunt, non succurramus ? quibus, quandoquidem vel jurejurando interposito societatem fecimus, opem ferre oportet , nec objicere, quod ne illi quidem nobis opem fcraut. Neque enim eos nobis adjunximus, ut huc vicissim opem nobis ferant, sed ut hostibus, quos illic habemus, negotium facessentes, eos impediant, ne contra nos huc veniant.

[2] Sic enim imperium paravimus et nos et quotquot alii rerum potiti sunt, impigre succurrendo semper iis, qui nostrum auxilium implorarent, sive barbaris sive Graecis, quoniam si omnes quiescant, aut gentium delectum habeant, quibus auxilium sit ferendum, exiguum quoddam incrementum imperio nostro adjungentes de hoc ipso potius periclitabimur. Eum enim, qui praepotens est, non solum contra se venientem propulsare solent, sed etiam antevertere, ne contra veniat.

[3] Neque nobis licet ratione deducta imperium habere in quantum volumus, sed necessitas cogit, quando io hoc loco constituti sumus, aliis insidiari, alios non misso» facere, quod periculum nobis ipsis immineat, ne aliorum imperio pareamus, nisi ipsi aliis imperemus. Neque eodem modo nobis, quo ceteris, ratio quietis est habenda, nisi etiam studia vestra in illorum similitudinem commutabitis.

[4] Considerantes igitur fore ut has res magis augeamus, si ad illas proficiscamur, hanc expeditionem suscipiamus, ut Peloponnesiorum spiritus deprimamus, si contempta videbimur praesenti quiete in Siciliam etiam trajicere; et simul, etiam aut Graeciae totius, ut probabile est, imperium obtinebimus, rebus illis in nostram potestatem redactis, aut saltem malo Syracusanos afficiemus, unde et nos ipsi et socii utilitatem percipiemus.

[5] Tuto autem et manendi, ai quis se nobis dedat, et abeundi facultatem naves praestabunt; maris enim imperium etiam in universos Sicilienses obtinebimus.

[6] Neque vero Niciae oratio, quae quietem vobis suadet, et dissidium inter juvenes et senes excitat, vos avertat, sed consueto ordine quemadmodum et majores nostri res in hunc statum extulerunt, dum juniores um cum senioribus consultant, nunc etiam eadem ratione rempublicam amplificare conemini, et existimetis, juventutem ac senectutem, alteram sine altera, nihil posse, sed sin»· quior aetas et media et maxime circumspecta sint, simul permixtae, maximas iis vires esse, et rempublicam, si qjne-scat, ipsam per se attritum iri, ut alias res, et foturum, ut omnium disciplina consenescat, sed si bella gerat, peritiam sibi semper adjuncturam, et usum adepturam, quo non verbis, sed factis potius se tueri possit.

[7] In summa ita sentio, civitatem negotiosam, si negotium cum otio commutet, meo judicio confestim everti, et illos homines tutissime degere vitam, qui praesentibus institutis legibusque, quamvis sint deteriores, in civitatibus, minime discordes vivunt. »

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 6.18 focus

« Laonde quale addurremo giusta ragione del nostro inritrosire, o scusa agli alleati del non aiutarli ? Noi dobbiamo soccorrerli per via de’giuramenti, e non opporre che essi non ci soccorrono ; avvegnaché non gli abbiamo aggiunti alla nostra lega perchè dal canto loro venissero qua in nostro aiuto, ma perchè inquietassero i nemici nostri di là, e impedissero loro venir qua contro noi. E noi e qualunqu’altri abbiamo impero, lo abbiamo acquistato in questo modo; cioè col soccorrere sollecitamente chi ci chiamasse fosse greco o fosse barbaro. Imperocché se tutti stieno quieti, o facciano rigorosa scelta di quelli che per ragione debbano aiutarsi, certo quand'anche volessimo accrescere d’un poco il nostro Stato, correremmo maggior pericolo per quello stesso che abbiamo : perchè nessuno aspetta a difendersi dal più forte quando è da quello assalito, ma tenta furargli le mosse acciò non gli venga contro. Senza di che non sta in noi di contemperare l’impero nostro alla foggia de’nostri desideri : ma poiché siamo io questo stato ci é forza tendere insidie ad alcuni, ad alcuni poi uon allentare la briglia , essendovi pericolo di soggiacer noi stessi all’altrui dominio se non sappiamo dominare sugli altri; tanto più che come gli altri non possiamo brigarci della tranquillità, ove non vogliate del pari con loro cambiar di maniere. Per lo che considerando che coll’andare colà accresceremo vie più lo stato nostro, facciamo la spedizione per abbassare la superbia de’Peloponnesi, mostrando che pieni di disprezzo per loro sappiamo preferire alla presente quiete anche la navigazione in Sicilia. Confido inoltre che coll’aggiunta delle forze di colà probabilmente ci assoggetteremo tutta la Grecia} o almeno danneggeremo i Siracusani ; nel che avvantaggeremo noi stessi e gli alleati. La sicurezza poi o di restarvi, se alcuno si aggiunga a noi, o di tornare indietro, l'avremo dalle navi : avvegnaché ne potremo più di tutti i Siciliani insieme. E però l’inazione e la discordia fra giovani e vecchi, accennate dai discorsi di Kicia, non vi smuovano : anzi con quel solito buon ordine, la cui mercè i padri nostri tutti d’accordo e giovani e vecchi avanzarono a questo grado lo stato, nell’ istesso modo ora anche voi sforzatevi di aggrandire la Repubblica. E siate persuasi che la gioventù e la vecchiezza disgiunte tra loro non posson nulla ; ma che ove sieno unite, venendo a mescolarsi insieme tutto ciò che è debole, mediocre e buonissimo, sono sufficienti a tutto ; che la città stando in ozio si consumerà da sè stessa, siccome avviene dell’altre cose, ed ogni maniera di sapere v? invecchierà ; mentre esercitandosi in guerra acquisterà sempre nuova perizia , e si avvezzerà a difendersi non colle parole ma coi fatti. Insomma io quanto a me penso che una città operosa dovrà ben presto corrompersi passando ad una vita d’ozio ; e che i più sicuri nel loro stato sono coloro, che di comune concordia si governano colle costumanze e leggi presenti, tuttoché non perfettissime »,

Notes on the current edition

History of the Peloponnesian War

1. 40) In diesem Kriege ist nach der Auffassung des Thukydideö der ganze
peloponnesische Krieg. Denn die Athener konnten doch nicht daran denken, auch die noch solt
genden Begebenheiten mit den vorangegangenen zusammenzufassen. Ja. sie hatten jelz»
eigentlich seit sechs Jahren Frieden. (Kr.)

2. 415
v.
Chr.

3. 415
v.
Chr.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides: Book 6 (Thucydides, Book VI. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909.) focus

τὰ μὲν κτλ — i.e. all this explains how I came to support democracy: lit. ‘this is how the circumstances came about that bear on the prejudices aroused against me.’

εἴ τι πλέον οἶδα —this is subject of εἰσηγητέον, concerning which ‘I must bring to your notice whatever information I have that is new to you.’

ἐπλεύσαμεν —Alc. proceeds to speak of his own schemes as though they were the schemes of the Athenians at large.

αὐτῶν —as distinct from their possessions in Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, etc. ( ἀρχῆς).

καὶ ἄλλους κτλ — i.e. καὶ ἄλλους ὁμολογουμένως νῦν μαχιμωτἀτους τῶν ἐκεὶ βαρβἀρων, though the position of βαρβἀρων is awkward.

καὶ Ἴβηρας καὶ ἄλλους is epexegetic of πολλοὺς βαρβάρους. 17

πέριξ πολιορκοῦντες —the fleet would blockade the coasts, while the army would invade the Pel. by land. Athens did not herself possess a large enough army to invade the Pel. effectually, and Pericles had taught that she must be content with making descents upon the coasts.

ἐκ γῆς ἐφορμαῖς —‘by attacks on the land side.’ ἐφορμή, which is rare, is explained by Hesychius as ὅθεν ἄν τις πολέμῳ ἐφορμήσειεν.

ἐντειχισάμενοι = περιτειχίσαντες.

εὐπορώτερον —adverb: cf. c. 92, 1; VII. 4 ῥᾷον αὐτῳ ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι. ‘So that they should in every case be forthcoming in abundance.’ τι gives a distributive force, and αὐτῶν refers to χρήματα καὶ σῖτον. (So Classen and Sitzler. Others understand by τι αὐτῶν ‘our various projects.’)

διαρκῆ —pred. to χρήματα καὶ σῖτον. ἄνευ ‘without touching.’

ἐνθένδε = ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλἀδος.

ὅσοι —the edd. all say that Nicias and Lamachus are meant, and Reiske even proposed ὼς οἱ as a correction; but ὅσοι ὑπόλοιποι means ‘all those who remain now I am withdrawn,’ ‘all the generals left behind, including those who have not gone to Sicily,’ and not ‘those whom I have left in Sicily.’ That this is so is shown by the following facts: (1) the use of ὑπόλοιπος in Thuc.: I. 105 τὸ πρὸς Αἰγίνῃ στρἀτευμα is contrasted with οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπόλοιποι: IV. 2 στρατηγοὶ οἱ ὑπόλοιποι are contrasted with ὁ ἤδη προαφιγμένος ἐς Σικελίαν: VII. 64 τοὺς ἐκεῖ ( i.e. at home) ἡμῶν ὑπολοίπους: cf. also ib. ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις and c. 17 ὑπόλοιπον ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀντίπαλον ναυτικόν: (2) in c. 62, 1 the generals left in Sicily are called οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ: (3) in II. 65 Thuc. speaks of the support given to the expedition at home after it sailed out; and of course the στρατηγοί in Athens would have to advise about this, and some of them might be sent out to replace Alcibiades: (4) αὐτἀ = all the schemes including the καταπολέμησις of Peloponnese. It would be absurd to attribute the whole of this work to Nicias and Lamachus alone.

ὁμοίως — i.e. ‘though I have withdrawn.’ οὐ περιέσται τἀκεῖ—οὐ σωθήσεται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ.

ἀπειρότεροι —sc. τῶν Ἀθηναιῶν. ξυστραφέντες—c. 77, 1.

πανδημεί —c. 68, 2.

ἔχεται —‘is in their power.’ The pres. denotes the certainty of the event. Stahl, Q.G.2 p. 12

κίνδυνον ἐκεῖθεν —‘danger from that quarter.’

οὐκ belongs to μακροῦ: cf. c. 15, 4.

ὥστε —‘and thus’; M.T. § 602.

εἰ μὴ ποιήσετε —‘unless you mean to do this.’ With the construction οἰέσθω βουλεύειν, εἰ μὴ ποιήσετε cf. Lys. 13, 93 εἰ γὰρ ἀποψηφιεῖσθε . . τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ καταψηφίζεσθε, and § 3 above.

στρατίαν τε πέμψετε —epexegesis of τἀδε ποιήσετε. For

οἵτινες cf. ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου . . οἵ c. 80, 1. ὡς ἂν . . ξυντάξῃ—ὡς ἄν only here in Thuc.; M.T. § 326. The construction is poetical, ὄς with fut. indic. being the ordinary prose form of expression. Several constructions that are familiar in Thuc. are found on examination to be poetical: e.g. the dat. with verbs of motion, expressing interest or the goal, as ἦλθον αὐτοῖς c. 46, 3; ἐπί with dat.= against c. 61, 1; and others already noticed. (See C. F. Smith, Trans. of Am. Phil. Association 1894 p. 61 ff.)

ξυντάξη —‘organise.’

τοὺς μὴ θέλοντας , sc. παρεῖναι. The form θέλειν for ἐθέλειν is regular after μή .

οἱ ἐνδοιάζοντες —such as Camarina. An Ionic word.

τὰ ἐνθάδε —this may be either adverbial, ‘in Greece,’ or direct object of ἐκπολεμοῦν, ‘the Greek states.’

ἧσσον . . πέμπωσι —‘may be prevented from sending.’

τειχίζειν δὲ χρή —the passage that follows is written with a knowledge of later events. The chief results of the occupation are to be: (1) the capture or surrender of most of the property, (2) the loss to Athens of the revenue from the mines, (3) the tribute from the allies will not be paid. These are the results that in VII. 27 are actually stated to have followed (Jebb, Hellenica p. 290).

Δεκέλειαν —it commands the road from Athens to Oropus, and thus the route to Euboea, whence came a great part of the corn supplies of Athens. The fort built there overlooked the richest parts of Attica.

ὅπερ — i.e. τὸ τειχίζειν. For

αὐτοῦ in place of οὗ see c. 4, 3 n.

τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ —the A. had adopted this plan against Sparta at Pylus. ‘The only suffering incidental to the war of which they have not had a thorough experience.’

βεβαιότατα δ’ ἂν κτλ —‘the surest way of injuring an enemy is to bring on him that which one ascertains from clear in formation that he fears most.’

εἰκὸς γάρ —‘it is natural that every one should have the most accurate knowledge of the particular dangers that he fears,’ i.e. he realises best the nature and extent of the danger he is in.

κωλύσετε —sc. ὠφελεῖσθαι.

αὐτόματα —this refers to ‘the desertion of slaves, included in the κατασκευαί as household chattels or “live stock”’ (Jebb).

ἥξει πρὸς ὑμᾶς —‘will come into your hands.’

τῶν ἀγυρείων μ. —Aesch. Persae 237 ἀργύρου πηγήτις αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ θησαυρὸς χθονός. They were farmed out on hereditary leases. τὰς < ἀπὸ> τοῦ Λ. Stein.

ἀπὸ γῆς —produce to the tenant and the rent paid to the state.

δικαστηρίων —fees and fines to the state and pay to the dicasts. The business of the courts would be at an end. This may be somewhat exaggerated. In VII. 28 it is explained that all citizens were required for military duty. (The conjecture δεκατευτηρίων—see crit. note—is too technical to be satisfactory; and the tithes and taxes on land are included in ἀπὸ γῆς.) For the omission of the prep. with δικαστηρίων cf. ce. 6, 2; 26, 2.

τῆς . . προσόδου —the most important source of revenue. For the change from accus. to gen. with ἀποστερήσονται ef. c. 85, 2 n.

ἧσσον διαφορουμένης =‘less regularly transmitted.’ There is no other instance of this sense of διαφορεῖν, the nearest being in c. 100, 3, where it=‘to transfer.’

τὰ παρ’ ὑμῶν . . πολεμεῖσθαι —‘that the war is being condueted on your part.’ τὰ πὰρ’ ὐμῶν is prob. subject, not adverbial.

ὀλιγωρήσουσι sc. τοῦ διαφορεῖν τὴν π.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.18

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

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