Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.18

[1] "Know it, by seeing this present misfortune fallen on us, who, being of greatest dignity of all the Grecians, come to you to ask that which before we thought chiefly in our own hands to give.

[2] And yet we are not brought to this through weakness nor through insolence upon addition of strength, but because it succeeded not with the power we had as we thought it should, which may as well happen to any other as to ourselves.

[3] So that you have no reason to conceive that for your power and purchases fortune also must be therefore always yours.

[4] Such wise men as safely reckon their prosperity in the account of things doubtful do most wisely also address themselves towards adversity and not think that war will so far follow and no further as one shall please more or less to take it in hand, but rather so far as fortune shall lead it. Such men also, seldom miscarrying because they be not puffed up with the confidence of success, choose then principally to give over when they are in their better fortune.

[5] And so it will be good for you, men of Athens, to do with us, and not, if rejecting our advice you chance to miscarry (as many ways you may), to have it thought hereafter that all your present successes were but mere fortune; whereas, on the contrary, it is in your hands without danger to leave a reputation to posterity both of strength and wisdom.

[1] To be convinced of this you have only to look at our present misfortune. What power in Hellas stood higher than we did? and yet we are come to you, although we formerly thought ourselves more able to grant what we are now here to ask.

[2] Nevertheless; we have not been brought to this by any decay in our power, or through having our heads turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources are what they have always been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to which all are equally liable.

[3] Accordingly the prosperity which your city now enjoys, and the accession that it has lately received, must not make you fancy that fortune will be always with you.

[4] Indeed sensible men are prudent enough to treat their gains as precarious, just as they would also keep a clear head in adversity, and think that war, so far from staying within the limit to which a combatant may wish to confine it, will run the course that its chances prescribe; and thus, not being puffed up by confidence in military success, they are less likely to come to grief, and most ready to make peace, if they can, while their fortune lasts.

[5] This, Athenians, you have a good opportunity to do now with us, and thus to escape the possible disasters which may follow upon your refusal, and the consequent imputation of having owed to accident even your present advantages, when you might have left behind you a reputation for power and wisdom which nothing could endanger.

„Grade unser jetziges Mißgeschick ist der beste Beweis
dafür. Wir, die wir in Griechenland das beste Ansehen hatten
und uns bis dahin einbildeten, es stände lediglich bei uns,
euch unserseits Bitten zu gewähren, kommen jetzt als Bittende
zu euch. Und das nicht etwa, weil wir an Macht eingebüßt
oder unS unserer Macht überhoben hätten, sondern weil wir
unS auf unsere Macht zu sehr verließen; und so kann es
jedem gehen. Darum dürft auch ihr nicht jetzt im Vertrauen
auf die jetzige Macht eurer Stadt und eures Bundes darauf
rechnen, daß euch das Glück beständig treu bleiben werde.
Verständige Männer, die sich nicht zu fest auf das Glück ver­
lassen, verlieren auch im Unglück nicht gleich den Kopf und
wissen, daß der Krieg nicht nach ihrem Belieben verläuft,
sondern wie es des Schicksals Wille ist. Und wie sie so leicht
kein Unglück trifft, weil ein Erfolg sie nicht übermütig macht,
so werden sie gewiß auch im Unglück am ersten bereit sein,
die Hand zum Frieden zu bieten. Und das würde auch euch,
Athener, jetzt uns gegenüber wohl anstehen, um nicht später,
wenn ihr uns abgewiesen und dann, wie das immer kommen
kann, auf einmal Unglück habt, eure jetzigen Erfolge nur als
einen Glücksfall ansehen zu müssen, während ihr es jetzt in
der Hand habt, ohne was dabei zu wagen, den Ruhm eurer
Macht und Einsicht auf die Nachwelt gelangen zu lassen.

XVIII. « Voyez plutôt, et considérez nos malheurs actuels. Nous dont la réputation n’avait pas d’égale parmi les Grecs, nous venons vers vous solliciter nousmêmes ce que jusqu’ici nous nous croyions plus que personne en mesure d’accorder aux autres. Et cependant nos désastres ne tiennent ni à l’affaiblissement de nos forces, ni à l’insolence qu’inspire l’accroissement de la puissance : notre puissance était ce qu’elle fut toujours lorsque toutes nos prévisions ont été déçues ; et il n’est personne à qui le même malheur ne puisse arriver. Il ne faut donc pas que la prospérité présente de votre république et vos récents succès vous fassent croire que la fortune sera toujours avec vous. Les vrais sages sont ceux qui mettent en sûreté des biens dont ils connaissent l’instabilité ; ce sont aussi ceux qui savent le mieux tirer parti des revers de la guerre. Ils ne croient pas qu’on puisse prolonger les hostilités suivant son caprice, et prennent bien plutôt conseil des événements. Aussi, moins exposés que personne aux revers, parce qu’ils ne se laissent pas emporter par la confiance qu’inspire le succès, ils ne sont jamais plus disposés à mettre fin aux hostilités qu’au milieu de la prospérité.

« Voici pour vous, Athéniens, le moment opportun de tenir avec nous cette conduite : si, comme cela est très possible, il vous survenait plus tard quelque revers pour avoir négligé nos avis, on pourrait croire que c’est à la fortune seule que vous avez dû même vos succès actuels ; tandis que vous pouvez, sans courir aucun danger, léguer à la postérité une haute idée de votre puissance et de votre sagesse.

« Pour vous en convaincre, il suffit d’envisager nos récentes disgrâces. Naguère au premier rang des Grecs, nous venons aujourd’hui solliciter ce dont alors nous pensions être les arbitres. Et pourtant, ce changement ne provient ni de la diminution de nos forces ni de l’insolence d’une prospérité nouvelle. Nos forces sont ce qu’elles ont toujours été; mais nous nous sommes trompés dans nos prévisions, comme il peut arriver à chacun. Vous-mêmes vous auriez tort de croire que la puissance actuelle de votre république et la gloire que vous venez d’y ajouter, vous garantissent un bonheur durable. Les hommes sages ont pour principe de regarder les avantages comme précaires et ils savent aussi iriieux que d’autres supporter les revers. Ils tiennent pour assuré qu’il n’est pas possible de ne prendre de la guerre que la mesure qui nous convient, mais qu’il faut en subir les chances diverses. Moins éblouis par les succès, ils sont plus à l’abri des fautes, et d’autant plus traitables qu’ils sont plus heureux

« Telle est, ô Athéniens, la conduite qu’il serait honorable pour vous de tenir à notre égard. Autrement il est à craindre qu’avec le temps, si vous éprouvez quelque revers, — et il n’y aurait là rien d’impossible, — on n’attribue à la fortune vos avantages passés ; au lieu que vous pouvez laisser à la postérité une renommée incontestable de puissance et de sagesse.

[1] "To be convinced of this, you need only look at our present misfortunes. We who of all the Hellenes formerly were held in the highest consideration have come before you, although we have been wont to regard ourselves as better entitled to confer such favours as we have now come to beg of you.

[2] And yet it was neither through lack of power that we met with this misfortune, nor because our power became too great and we waxed insolent; nay, our resources were what they always were and we merely erred in judgment—a thing to which all are alike liable.

[3] Accordingly there is no reason why you, because of the strength both of your city and of its new acquisitions at the present moment, should expect that the favour of fortune will always be with you.

[4] Prudent men take the safe course of accounting prosperity mutable ¹ —the same men, too, would deal more sagaciously with misfortunes—and consider that when anyone is at war he may not limit his participation to whatever portion of it he may choose to carry on, ² but that he must follow where his fortune leads. Such men are least likely to come to grief, since they do not allow themselves to become elated by overconfidence in military success, and are therefore most likely to seize the moment of good fortune for concluding peace.

[5] And this, Athenians, is the policy which it is good for you to adopt towards us to-day, and not at some future time, should you perchance through rejecting our overtures incur disaster—and of this there are many possibilities—be credited with having won even your present successes through good fortune, when it is possible to leave to posterity an unhazarded reputation at once for strength and sagacity.

[1] "You may learn this lesson by looking at our present misfortunes; for though enjoying the highest reputation of all the Greeks, we are now come [with this request] to you, though we were before accustomed to think that we had ourselves more power to grant what we have now come to sue for.

[2] And yet we were not reduced to this either from decay of power, or from insolence on account of greater accession to it, but from failure in our plans, while reckoning on our ordinary resources;

[3] a subject in which the same thing is alike incident to all. So that it is not right for you to suppose, that because of the present strength of your city and its accessions, fortune too will be always on your side.

[4] They indeed are wise men who cautiously regard their good things as doubtful; (the same men would also deal with misfortunes more discreetly than others;) and who think that war does not conform itself to that measure on which men may wish to meddle with it, but will proceed as chances may lead them on. Such men, too, while they meet with fewest failures, because they are not elated by confiding in their military success, would be most inclined to bring the war to a conclusion during their prosperity.

[5] And you, Athenians, have now an excellent opportunity of doing this with us; and of escaping hereafter, should you not be persuaded by us, and then meet with reverses, (which is very possible,) the imputation of having gained even your present advantages by mere chance; when you might have left behind you a character for power and wisdom exposed to no such hazard.

[1] « Hoc autem cognoscatis nostros praesentes casus intuentes, qui qoum simus summae inter Graecos dignitatis, tamen ad vos advenimus, antea quidem nos ipsos existimantes plus potestatis habere concedendi ea, quae nunc huc profecti vos rogamus.

[2] Neque tamen vel quod defuerit nobis potentia, vel quod ob ejus incrementum insolentes facti simus, haec nobis acciderunt, sed in pristina potentia consilio decepti, qua in re omnibus idem pariter contingere potest.

[3] Quare non oportet vos nunc praesentibus civitatis vestrae viribus et aliarum rerum accessione fretos opinari fortunam etiam vobiscum perpetuo futuram.

[4] Illi autem inter viros sapientes numerandi sunt, qui rebus secundis, dum earum ambiguitatem considerant, tuto usi sunt; atque adversas iidem sapientius ferre possint; et de bello ita statuant, non in quantum quis id tractare velit, uti se eo posse, sed ita, ut eventa ipsos duxerint. Et quum hujusmodi homines minimum labantur, propterea quod non rebus feliciter evenientibus confisi efferuntur, in bona potissimum fortuna bellum component.

[5] Quod nunc, Athenienses, vos decet erga nos facere, et ita cavere, ne forte posthac , si vos a nobis non exorati adversi aliquid patiamini, qualia multa accidere possunt, existimemini istos etiam rerum progressus fortunae favore consecuti esse, quum liceat vobis non periculosam potentiae atque prudentiae opinionem in posterum relinquere.

[1] Akanthier! Die Absicht Spartas bei Aussendung meines Heeres ist keine andere, als den Zweck unseres Krieges mit Athen, als welchen wir in der Kriegserklärung die Befreiung Griechenlands angekündigt, zur Wirklichkeit zu machen. An unserm späten Erscheinen aber ist die durch die bisherigen Feldzüge getäuschte Hoffnung schuld, euch den Kampf zu ersparen und in kurzer Zeit allein mit Athen fertig zu werden; und es kann uns dasselbe um so weniger zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, da wir jetzt die erste Gelegenheit ergreifen, hieher zu kommen und auch euch zur Theilnahme an dem Vernichtungskampfe einzuladen. Um so mehr befremdet es mich, aus dem Sperren der Thore auf eine unfreundliche Stimmung bei euch schliessen zu müssen. In dem guten Glauben, in euch längst, vor unserer Ankunft schon, entschiedene Bundesgenossen zu finden, denen wir nur willkommen sein würden, haben wir Lacedämonier die Gefahr nicht angesehen, die mit einem so weiten Marsch durch fremdes Gebiet verbunden war, und jedes mögliche Opfer gebracht, — und wie, ihr solltet ganz andere Gesinnungen hegen, solltet eurer eigenen und aller Griechen Befreiung euch widersetzen wollen? Denn nicht allein, dass ihr zu dem Feinde stehet, es müsste auch alle folgenden Städte zurückhaltend und besorgt machen, wenn gleich anfangs eine so ansehnliche und einflussreiche Stadt wie die eurige mich abwiese. Der Glaube an meine Sendung wäre dahin ¹ , man argwohnte nur Böses in der Freiheit, die ich bringe ² , oder sähe in meinem Heere einen zu schwachen und nichtssagenden Schutz gegen Athens drohende Rache. Zwar es war dasselbe Heer, mit dem ich vor Nisäa zog, wo die Athener trotz ihrer Uebermacht keinen Angriff wagten, und ein so zahlreiches Heer wie das nisäische würden sie ohnehin in keinem Fall gegen euch über's Meer schicken. ³

« Ed apprendete ciò per la veduta delle nostre? presenti calamità. Noi tenuti in grandissima estimazione appo i Greci ricorriamo a voi ; noi che prima credevamo esser piuttosto in istato di accordar quello che ora vi vegnamo chiedendo. Ciò non pertanto non soffriamo questo per difetto di forze, nè per avere insolentito nell’ incremento di esse ; ma andammo falliti nei nostri disegui tutto che presi a misura di quelle che sempre avevamo ; nel qual caso può a tutti egualmente accader lo stesso. Laonde è a voi richiesto che attesa la presente fortezza della vostra Repubblica, sostenuta anche da nuovi acquisti , non vogliate darvi a credere che la fortuna abbia di continuo ad esser con voi. Perciocché prudenti sono tra gli uomini quelli che con sicuro consiglio pongono in ambiguo le prosperità ; stantecliè procederanno essi più saggiamente nelle disgrazie , stimeranno che la guerra non sempre andrà a lor talento qual che si sia il modo con cui uno voglia amministrarla, ma che anderà come la condurranno i destini ; e meno di tutti vacilleranno perchè non gonfiandosi per la fiducia del buon successo nella guerra stessa, le porranno termine quando è propizia la fortuna. Ciò che , Ateniesi, è per voi dicevol cosa adoperare con noi ; acciocché , se mai non andando di ciò convinti, in avvenire vi incolga qualche sinistro (come spesso succede), non s’abbia a credere che per mera fortuna abbiate tanto progredito nelle vittorie ; mentre sta in poter vostro tralasciare ai posteri stabile reputazione di fortezza e di senno.