Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 4.125

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

← Previous Next →

Als sie nun hierüber nickt einig werden konnten, wurde
gemeldet, daß auch die Illyiier den PerdikkaS verrathen und sich mit
Arrhibäos vereinigt hätten, und nun hielten eS beide für daS Beste,
den Rückzug anzutreten, weil sie jene als streitbare Manner fürchteten;
doch wann man aufbrechen sollte, wurde ihrer Uneinigkeit wegen nicht
ausgemacht, und als die Nackt einbrach, überfiel die Makedonier und
die große Menge der Barbaren ein plötzlicher Schrecken, — wie es
ja oft bei großen Heeren zu geschehen vflegt, daß sie ohne greifbaren
Grund in panischen Schrecken gerathen — und im Glauben, daß
ihrer eine vielfach größere Zahl heranziehe, als wirklich gekommen
waren, und daß sie jeden Augenblick über sie herfallen würden, suchten
sie auf der Stelle das Weite und eilten der Heimatd zu; und so
wurde auch Peidikkasder Anfangs davon Nichts merkte, als er
dann erfuhr, waS vorging, genöthigt noch früher abzuziehen, als er
den Brasidas sprechen knurrte, denn beide Lager waren durch einen
weiten Zwischenraum getrennt. Als Brasidas dann mit Tagesanbruch die
Makedonier schon vorausgeeilt sah, und daß die Jllyrier und
Arrhibäos sich zum Angriff anschickten, zog auch er seine Schwerbewaffneten
in eine viereckige Ausstellung zusammen, nahm den leichten Haufen in
die Mitte und gedachte so seinen Rückzug fortzusetzen. Um zur
Abwehr auszufallen, wenn die Feinde wo angreifen sollten, bestimmte er
die Jüngsten, und er selbst mit dreihundert Mann ausgewählter
Truppen wollte als der hinterste aus dem Rückzug den vordersten
Feinden, wenn sie angreifen würden. Widerstand leisten und
sie-zurückweisen. Und bevor noch die Feinde sich in der Nähe zeigten, sprach
er seinen Soldaten mit solchen Worten Zuversicht ein:

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 4.125.1 focus

[1] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διαφερομένων αὐτῶν ἠγγέλθη ὅτι οἱ Ἰλλυριοὶ μετ’ Ἀρραβαίου προδόντες Περδίκκαν γεγένηνται· ὥστε ἤδη ἀμφοτέροις μὲν δοκοῦν ἀναχωρεῖν διὰ τὸ δέος αὐτῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων μαχίμων, κυρωθὲν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς διαφορᾶς ὁπηνίκα χρὴ ὁρμᾶσθαι, νυκτός τε ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν βαρβάρων εὐθὺς φοβηθέντες, ὅπερ φιλεῖ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἀσαφῶς ἐκπλήγνυσθαι, καὶ νομίσαντες πολλαπλασίους μὲν ἢ ἦλθον ἐπιέναι, ὅσον δὲ οὔπω παρεῖναι, καταστάντες ἐς αἰφνίδιον φυγὴν ἐχώρουν ἐπ’ οἴκου, καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τὸ πρῶτον οὐκ αἰσθανόμενον, ὡς ἔγνω, ἠνάγκασαν πρὶν τὸν Βρασίδαν ἰδεῖν (ἄπωθεν γὰρ πολὺ ἀλλήλων ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο) προαπελθεῖν.

[2] Βρασίδας δὲ ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ὡς εἶδε τοὺς Μακεδόνας προκεχωρηκότας τούς τε Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ τὸν Ἀρραβαῖον μέλλοντας ἐπιέναι, ξυναγαγὼν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τετράγωνον τάξιν τοὺς ὁπλίτας καὶ τὸν ψιλὸν ὅμιλον ἐς μέσον λαβὼν διενοεῖτο ἀναχωρεῖν.

[3] ἐκδρόμους δέ, εἴ πῃ προσβάλλοιεν αὐτοῖς, ἔταξε τοὺς νεωτάτους, καὶ αὐτὸς λογάδας ἔχων τριακοσίους τελευταῖος γνώμην εἶχεν ὑποχωρῶν τοῖς τῶν ἐναντίων πρώτοις προσκεισομένοις ἀνθιστάμενος ἀμύνεσθαι.

[4] καὶ πρὶν τοὺς πολεμίους ἐγγὺς εἶναι, ὡς διὰ ταχέων παρεκελεύσατο τοῖς στρατιώταις τοιάδε.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 4.125.1 focus

[1] Whilst they thus varied, word was brought that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas and joined themselves with Arrhibaeus. So that now it was thought good to retire by them both, for fear of these who were a warlike people; but yet for the time when to march, there was nothing concluded, by reason of their variance. The next night, the Macedonians and multitude of barbarians (as it is usual with great armies to be terrified upon causes unknown) being suddenly affrighted, and supposing them to be many more in number than they were, and even now upon them, betook themselves to present flight and went home. And Perdiccas, who at first knew not of it, they constrained when he knew, before he had spoken with Brasidas (their camps being far asunder), to be gone also.

[2] Brasidas betimes in the morning, when he understood that the Macedonians were gone away without him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibaeans were coming upon him, putting his men of arms into a square form and receiving the multitude of his light-armed into the middle, intended to retire likewise. The youngest men of his soldiers he appointed to run out upon the enemy when they charged the army anywhere [with shot];

[3] and he himself, with three hundred chosen men marching in the rear, intended, as he retired, to sustain the foremost of the enemy, fighting if they came close up.

[4] But before the enemy approached, he encouraged his soldiers, as the shortness of time gave him leave, with words to this effect:

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 4.125.1 focus

[1] While they were thus disputing, the news arrived that the Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas and had joined Arrhabaeus; and the fear inspired by their warlike character made both parties now think it best to retreat. However, owing to the dispute, nothing had been settled as to when they should start; and night coming on, the Macedonians and the barbarian crowd took fright in a moment in one of those mysterious panics to which great armies are liable; and persuaded that an army many times more numerous than that which had really arrived was advancing and all but upon them, suddenly broke and fled in the direction of home, and thus compelled Perdiccas, who at first did not perceive what had occurred, to depart without seeing Brasidas, the two armies being encamped at a considerable distance from each other.

[2] At daybreak Brasidas, perceiving that the Macedonians had gone on, and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were on the point of attacking him, formed his heavy infantry into a square, with the light troops in the center, and himself also prepared to retreat.

[3] Posting his youngest soldiers to dash out wherever the enemy should attack them, he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear intended to face about during the retreat and beat off the most forward of their assailants.

[4] Meanwhile, before the enemy approached, he sought to sustain the courage of his soldiers with the following hasty exhortation:—

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 4.125 focus

Während sie darüber stritten, kam die Nachricht, daß die
Illyrier Perdikkas im Stich gelassen und sich Arrhibaios an
geschlossen hätten. Nun sahen sie beide ein, daß ihnen solch
streitbaren Feinden gegenüber nichts übrigblieb, als den Rück
zug anzutreten; infolge ihres Streites hatten sie jedoch ver
säumt, sich über die Zeit zu verständigen, wann aufgebrochen
werden sollte. In der Nacht aber überkam die Makedonier
und die barbarischen Völker eine plötzliche Furcht, wie ja manch
mal in großen Heeren ein blinder Lärm entsteht. In der
Meinung, die Feinde seien noch viel zahlreicher, als sie wirk
lich waren, und würden im nächsten Augenblick über sie her
fallen, wandten sie sich plötzlich zur Flucht und liefen davon.
Als Perdikkas, der anfangs nichts davon gemerkt hatte, das
gewahr wurde, sah auch er sich gezwungen, mit abzuziehen,
noch ehe er Brasidas sprechen konnte, da die beiden Lager
weit voneinander entfernt waren. Als Brasidas bei Tages
anbruch sah, daß die Makedonier schon über alle Berge waren
und die Illyrier und Arrhibaios Miene machten, ihn an
zugreifen, zog er seine Hopliten in ein Viereck zusammen,
nahm das leichte Volk in die Mitte und dachte, so seinen Rück
zug zu bewerkstelligen. Zum Ausfall gegen etwaige Angriffe
stellte er seine Jüngsten an, er selbst aber bildete mit drei
hundert auserwählten Leuten den Beschluß des Zuges, um
damit den Anprall des feindlichen Vortrabs abzuweisen. Bevor
die Feinde herankamen, ermutigte er seine Soldaten in der
Eile noch durch folgende Worte:

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 4.125 focus

CXXV. Au milieu de ce dissentiment, on annonce que les Illyriens, trahissant Perdiccas, se sont joints à Arrhibée. Tous deux alors se prononcent également pour la retraite, dans la crainte de ce peuple belliqueux ; mais, par suite de leur désaccord, rien n’est arrêté sur le moment du départ. La nuit étant survenue, les Macédoniens et la foule des Barbares sont pris d’une terreur subite, comme il arrive souvent, sans cause apparente, dans les armées nombreuses ; ils s’exagèrent le nombre des ennemis qui s’avancent, se figurent qu’ils vont paraître à l’instant, et soudain ils se mettent à fuir du côté de leur pays. D’abord Perdiccas ne s’était douté de rien ; à peine instruit de ce qui se passait, il fut forcé par eux à les suivre, sans même avoir vu Brasidas ; car il y avait entre leurs camps une grande distance. Brasidas apprit au point du jour le départ précipité des Macédoniens et l’approche des Illyriens unis à Arrhibée : il rassembla ses hoplites, les forma en carré, plaça les troupes légères au milieu, et songea lui-même à la retraite. Pour éviter toute surprise, il disposa en éclaireurs¹ les plus jeunes de ses soldats ; lui-même, avec trois cents hommes d’élite, ferma la marche, afin de faire face aux premiers ennemis qui viendraient inquiéter la retraite. Avant que l’ennemi fût à portée, il adressa à la hâte cette exhortation à ses soldats.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 4.125 focus

Au milieu de ce dissentiment, on apprend tout à coup que les Illyriens ont trahi Perdiccas pour se joindre à Arrhibéos.

Dès lors il n’y eut plus qu’une opinion sur l’opportunité de la retraite ; car on craignait ces peuples belliqueux. Mais la mésintelligence fut cause qu’on ne fixa point l’heure du départ. La nuit étant survenue, les Macédoniens et la foule des Barbares furent, on ne sait pourquoi, saisis d’une de ces terreurs paniques auxquelles les grands corps d’armée sont quelquefois sujets. S’exagérant follement le nombre des ennemis et persuadés qu’ils allaient paraître, ils se mirent soudain en fuite du coté de leur pays. D’abord Perdiccas ne s’en aperçut point; ensuite il fut entraîné avant d’avoir vu Brasidas, car leurs camps étaient fort éloignés l’un de l’autre. Au point du jour, Brasidas apprit à la fois le départ des Macédoniens et l’approche des Illyriens unis à Arrhibéos. Il rassembla promptement ses hoplites, les forma en carré, mit au centre les troupes légères et se disposa à la retraite. Il désigna les plus jeunes soldats pour sortir des rangs et courir sur tous les points menacés; lui-même avec trois cents hommes d’élite se plaça à l’arrière-garde pour faire face aux premiers assaillants. Avant que l’ennemi fût à portée, il adressa rapidement à sa troupe l'exhortation suivante :

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 4.125.1 focus

[1] Meanwhile, as they were disputing, it was announced that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas and taken sides with Arrhabaeus; consequently, because of their fear of these people, who were warlike, both generals now agreed that it was best to retreat. But in consequence of their dispute nothing had been determined as to when they should set out; and when night came on the Macedonians and the mass of the barbarians immediately took fright, as large armies are wont to be smitten with unaccountable panic, and thinking that the advancing enemy were many times more numerous than they really were and were all but on them, betook themselves to sudden flight and hastened homewards. Perdiccas, who at first was not aware of their movement, was compelled, when he did learn of it, to go away without seeing Brasidas; for they were encamped far away from each other.

[2] But at daybreak, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had already decamped and that the Illyrians and Arrhabaeus were about to come against him, he formed his hoplites into a square, put the crowd of light-armed troops in the centre, and was himself intending to retreat.

[3] He so stationed the youngest of his troops that they might dash out against the enemy, in case they attacked at any point, and proposed to take himself three hundred picked men and, bringing up the rear, to make a stand and beat off the foremost of the enemy whenever they pressed him hard.

[4] And before the enemy were near he exhorted his soldiers, so far as haste allowed, in the following words:

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 4.125.1 focus

[1] In the mean time, while they were thus at variance, news arrived that the Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas, and joined Arrhibaeus: so that now both parties thought it best to retreat through their fear of them, as they were men of a warlike character; but nothing being settled, in consequence of their quarrel, as to when they should march, and night coming on, the Macedonians and the multitude of the barbarians were immediately terrified, (as great armies are wont to be panic-stricken for no certain cause;) and thinking that many times more than had really come were advancing against them, and had all but reached them, they broke into sudden flight, and proceeded homeward. Perdiccas, who at first was not aware of it, was compelled by them, on his learning it, to depart before seeing Brasidas (for they were encamped at a great distance from each other)

[2] In the morning, when Brasidas saw that the Macedonians had gone before him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibaeus were on the point of attacking him, he, on his side, drew his heavy-armed together into a square, and taking the light-armed multitude into the centre, intended to retire. And he appointed his youngest men to dash out, on whatever point they might charge them;

[3] while he himself with three hundred picked men in the rear intended during the retreat to face about, and resist the first of the enemy that should fall upon them.

[4] Before the enemy came near, he addressed his men, as well as the short time allowed him, with the following exhortation:

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 4.125.1 focus

[1] Interea vero dum ipsi inter se contendunt, nnn* eiatum est Illyrios, prodito Perdicca, cum Arrbibaeo se conjunxisse. Quare quum utrisque propter eorum metum, quod essent homines bellicosi, recedere jam placeret, sed a contentione nihil certi constitutum esset, quando inde discedendum esset, quumque nox intervenisset, Macedones quidem et barbarorum multitudo, subito timore perculsi, id quod magnis exercitibus contingere consuevit, ut incertis de causis animis consternentur, et existimantes, longe plures hostes contra se venire, quam reapse veniebant, ac jam jamque adfore, se in repentinam fugam conjicientes domum tendebant, et Perdiccam, qui rem initio non senserat, obi rescivit, antequam Brasidam videret (alter enim ab altero castra valde procul habebat), ocius abire coegerunt.

[2] Brasidas vero simul ac dies illuxit, quum animadvertisset Macedones jam discessisse, atque Illyrios et Arrhibaeum contra se venturos, ipse quoque gravis armaturae militibus in agmen quadratum coactis et levis armaturae militibus in medium agmen receptis recedere cogitabat.

[3] Juniores autem disposuit ad excursiones faciendas, siqua hostes se invaderent, ipse vero cum delecta trecentorum manu in animo habebat postremus subsequens et hostium primis, qui impressionem in suos facturi erant, resistens se defendere.

[4] Et antequam hostes appropinquarent, pro temporis angustiis milites suos adhortatus est liis fere verbis:

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 4.125 focus

Stando essi così discordi, giunse la nuova aver gl’ Illirici tradito Perdicca per darsi ad Arribeo. Per lo che amendue impauriti di quella gente armigera, si erano determinati di retrocedere : ma perchè non erano mai d’accordo insieme, non avevano nulla fermato del quando fosse da partire. In questa sopravvenne la notte ; e come è solito ai numerosi eserciti sbigottirsi senza sapere il perchè, così i Macedoni e la moltitudine de’ barbari impaurirono; e credendo avvicinarsi i nemici assai più numerosi di quello che erano , e di averli poco men che addosso, si diedero a repentina fuga per tornarsene a casa. Perdicca, che da primo non ne sapeva nulla, intesa la cosa in obbligato a partire senza poter vedere Brasida , perchè i due campi erano molto distanti. E Brasida sul far dell’alba, poiché seppe che i Macedoni erano già partiti e che gl’Illirici con Arribeo or ora l’assalirebbero , fatto un quadrato delle genti gravi e poste in mezzo le leggere pensava di riunirsi. Scelse ancora per iscorridori alcuni dei più giovani, caso che il nemico volesse da qualche parte assalirlo. Egli poi cappati trecento soldati, aveva in animo di ritirarsi l’ultimo per ributtare di piè fermo i nemici che fossero i primi ad assalirlo. E prima che essi si avvicinassero secondochè permetteva la strettezza del tempo , esortava in questa guisa le sue genti.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 4.125

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

Search the Perseus Catalog for:

Current edition First1KGreek

Stable identifiers