Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Adolf Wahrmund (Translator), 2.20

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Dabei nun, daß Archidamos zur Schlackt bereit in der
Gegend von Acharnä stehen blieb und bei diesem Vorrücken nicht gleich in
die Ebene hinabstieg, soll sein Gedanke der gewesen sein: die Athener,
welche an junger Mannschaft Ueberfluß hatten und wie nie zuvor zum
Kriege gerüstet waren, würden wohl ausfallen und nicht ruhig zusehen,
wie ihr Gebiet verwüstet werde; da sie ihm aber weder bei Eleusis
noch auf der thriasischen Ebene entgegenrückten, so versuchte er, sie
durch das Lager bei Acharnä herauszulocken; denn es schien ihm der
Platz zu einem Lager sehr geeignet; und dann glaubte man auch von
den Acharnern, welche einen großen Theil der Stadtbevölkerung
ausmachten, — sie stellten nämlich dreitausend Schwerbewaffnete, — sie
würden die Verheerung ihres Eigenthums nicht ruhig mit ansehen,
sondern auch die Uebrigen zum Kampfe anspornen. Sollten aber die
Athener auch bei diesem Einfalle nicht aus der Stadt rücken, so könne
er sür die Zukunft um so furchtloser die Ebene verwüste« und der
Stadt selbst sich nähern; denn die ihres Eigenthums beraubten
Acharner würden nicht sehr geneigt sein, sich wegen Anderer Gut der Gefahr
auszusetzen, und es werde dann Uneinigkeit eintreten. Solche
Gedanken bestimmten den Archidamos, bei Acharnä stehen zu bleiben.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Adolf Wahrmund (Translator). Stuttgart. 1864.

Current edition First1KGreek

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs (German) (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 2.20.1 focus

[1] γνώμῃ δὲ τοιᾷδε λέγεται τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον περί τε τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς ὡς ἐς μάχην ταξάμενον μεῖναι καὶ ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ οὐ καταβῆναι·

[2] τοὺς γὰρ Ἀθηναίους ἤλπιζεν, ἀκμάζοντάς τε νεότητι πολλῇ καὶ παρεσκευασμένους ἐς πόλεμον ὡς οὔπω πρότερον, ἴσως ἂν ἐπεξελθεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἂν περιιδεῖν τμηθῆναι.

[3] ἐπειδὴ οὖν αὐτῷ ἐς Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ τὸ Θριάσιον πεδίον οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, πεῖραν ἐποιεῖτο περὶ τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς καθήμενος εἰ ἐπεξίασιν·

[4] ἅμα μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ χῶρος ἐπιτήδειος ἐφαίνετο ἐνστρατοπεδεῦσαι, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀχαρνῆς μέγα μέρος ὄντες τῆς πόλεως (τρισχίλιοι γὰρ ὁπλῖται ἐγένοντο) οὐ περιόψεσθαι ἐδόκουν τὰ σφέτερα διαφθαρέντα, ἀλλ’ ὁρμήσειν καὶ τοὺς πάντας ἐς μάχην. εἴ τε καὶ μὴ ἐπεξέλθοιεν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδεέστερον ἤδη ἐς τὸ ὕστερον τό τε πεδίον τεμεῖν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν χωρήσεσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ Ἀχαρνέας ἐστερημένους τῶν σφετέρων οὐχ ὁμοίως προθύμους ἔσεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κινδυνεύειν, στάσιν δ’ ἐνέσεσθαι τῇ γνώμῃ.

[5] τοιαύτῃ μὲν διανοίᾳ ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος περὶ τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς ἦν.

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 2.20.1 focus

[1] Archidamus was said to have stayed so long at Acharnas with his army in battle array and not to have come down all the time of his invasion into the champaign with this intention.

[2] He hoped that the Athenians, flourishing in number of young men and better furnished for war than ever they were before, would perhaps have come forth against him and not endured to see their fields cut down and wasted;

[3] and, therefore, seeing they met him not in Thriasia, he thought good to try if they would come out against him lying now at Acharnas.

[4] Besides, the place seemed unto him commodious for the army to lie in; and it was thought also that the Acharnans, being a great piece of the city (for they were three thousand men of arms), would not have suffered the spoiling of their lands, but rather have urged the rest to go out and fight. And if they came not out against him at this invasion, they might hereafter more boldly both waste the champaign country and come down even to the walls of the city. For the Acharnans, after they should have lost their own, would not be so forward to hazard themselves for the goods of other men; but there would be the thoughts of sedition in one towards another in the city.

[5] These were the cogitations of Archidamus, whilst he lay at Acharnas.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 2.20.1 focus

[1] The reason why Archidamus remained in order of battle at Acharnae during this incursion, instead of descending into the plain, is said to have been this.

[2] He hoped that the Athenians might possibly be tempted by the multitude of their youth and the unprecedented efficiency of their service to come out to battle and attempt to stop the devastation of their lands.

[3] Accordingly, as they had not met him at Eleusis or the Thriasian plain, he tried if they could be provoked to a sally by the spectacle of a camp at Acharnae.

[4] He thought the place itself a good position for encamping; and it seemed likely that such an important part of the state as the three thousand heavy infantry of the Acharnians would refuse to submit to the ruin of their property, and would force a battle on the rest of the citizens. On the other hand, should the Athenians not take the field during this incursion, he could then fearlessly ravage the plain in future invasions, and extend his advance up to the very walls of Athens . After the Acharnians had lost their own property they would be less willing to risk themselves for that of their neighbors; and so there would be division in the Athenian counsels.

[5] These were the motives of Archidamus for remaining at Acharnae.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 2.20 focus

Angeblich hat sich Archidamos damals, als er hier bei
Acharnai schlachtbereit stehen blieb und bei diesem Einfall
nicht weiter in die Ebene vordrang, die Sache so gedacht: Er
nahm an, daß die Athener, mit ihrer zahlreichen jungen Mann
schaft und zum Kriege gerüstet wie nie zuvor, sich sicherlich
außerhalb der Stadt zur Schlacht stellen und der Verwüstung
ihres Landes nicht ruhig zusehen würden. Nachdem es bei
Eleusis und in der Ebene von Thria dazu nicht gekommen war,
wollte er versuchen, ob sie sich jetzt nicht zu einem Angriff auf
seine Stellung bei Acharnai verleiten ließen. Denn wie er
einerseits Acharnai für einen besonders geeigneten Lagerplatz
hielt, so glaubte er anderseits, die Acharner, die einen sehr
ansehnlichen Teil der Bürgerschaft ausmachten und dreitausend
Hopliten stellten, würden die Verwüstung ihrer Besitzungen
schwerlich ruhig mit ansehen, sondern auch die übrigen zu einer
Schlacht zu bestimmen suchen. Sollten die Athener trotzdem
bei diesem Einfall nicht herauskommen, so würde er ihnen das
nächste Mal um so unbedenklicher die Ebene verheeren und bis
an die Stadt selbst rücken können; denn dann würden die
Acharner, nachdem sie das Ihrige verloren, keine Lust mehr
haben, ihre Haut für fremdes Gut zu Markte zu tragen, und
die Athener sich infolgedessen untereinander in die Haare ge
raten. In dieser Weise wird Archidamos bei Acharnai die
Sache angesehen haben.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 2.20 focus

XX. Voici, dit-on, dans quel but Archidamus resta, pendant cette invasion, en ordre de bataille aux environs d’Acharné, sans descendre dans la plaine. Il espérait que les Athéniens, avec leur nombreuse et florissante jeunesse, leur appareil militaire plus imposant que jamais, viendraient à sa rencontre, et ne se contiendraient pas à la vue de leur territoire ravagé. Comme ils ne s’étaient présentés pour combattre ni à Éleusis, ni à la plaine de Thria, il faisait une nouvelle tentative et campait à Acharné dans le dessein de les y attirer. L’endroit lui semblait favorable pour asseoir son camp ; d’ailleurs, il était probable que les Acharnéens, formant une partie considérable de la population (puisqu’ils fournissaient trois mille hoplites), ne laisseraient pas ravager leurs terres, et qu’avec eux toute l’armée sortirait pour combattre. Que si les Athéniens laissaient cette invasion s’accomplir sans sortir de la ville, on pourrait dès lors ravager la plaine avec beaucoup plus de sécurité, et s’avancer jusque sous les murs d’Athènes ; car les Acharnéens, une fois dépouillés de leurs biens, ne devaient plus s’exposer avec la même ardeur pour défendre ceux des autres, et la discorde pénétrerait dans les esprits. Ces considéra- tions déterminèrent Archidamus à demeurer autour d’Acharné.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 2.20 focus

En prenant position près d’Acharnes en ordre de bataille, sans descendre encore dans la plaine, Archidamos espérait, dit-on, que les Athéniens, fiers de leur nombreuse jeunesse et parfaitement préparés, sortiraient peut-être, et n’assisteraient pas de sang-froid à la dévastation de leur territoire. Ne les ayant rencontrés ni à Eleusis ni dans la plaine de Thria, il voulut voir si, en s’établissant près d’Acharnes, il ne les attirerait pas en rase campagne. L’endroit lui paraissait favorable pour y asseoir un camp. Il pensait que les Achamiens, formant une portion notable de l’Etat, puisqu’ils fournissaient trois mille hoplites, ne laisseraient pas dévaster leurs terres, mais qu’ils entraîneraient la masse au combat. Enfin, si les Athéniens ne s’opposaient pas à cette invasion, rien n’empêcherait de ravager la plaine et de pousser même jusqu’à la ville ; car il était peu probable que les Achamiens, après la ruine de leurs propriétés, missent la même ardeur à défendre celles des autres ; il en résulterait de la désunion. C’est là ce qui retenait Archidamos aux environs d’Acharnes.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 2.20.1 focus

[1] And it is said that the motive of Archidamus in waiting about Acharnae with his troops ready for battle, instead of descending into the plain during this invasion, was as follows:

[2] He cherished the hope that the Athenians, who were at their very best as regards the multitude of their youth and prepared for war as never before, would perhaps come out against him and not look on and see their land ravaged.

[3] So when they did not come to meet him at Eleusis and in the Thriasian plain, he settled down in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, to make a test whether they would come out;

[4] for not only did that seem to him a suitable place for his camp, but also the Acharnians were an important part of the state, their hoplites numbering three thousand, and he thought that they would not look on and see their fields ravaged, but would urge the whole people also to fight. And even if the Athenians should not come out against him during this invasion, he would thenceforward proceed with less apprehension to ravage the plain and even advance to the very walls of the city; for the Acharnians, once stripped of their own possessions, would not be as eager to incur danger as before in behalf of the lands of the rest, and so a division would arise in the counsels of the Athenians.

[5] It was with this design that Archidamus stayed at Acharnae.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 2.20.1 focus

[1] It was with the following views that Archidamus is said to have remained in order of battle at Acharnae, and not to have gone down to the plain during that incursion.

[2] He hoped that the Athenians, abounding as they were in numbers of young men, and prepared for war as they had never before been, would perhaps come out against him, and not stand still and see their land ravaged.

[3] Since, then, they had not met him at Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, he pitched his camp at Acharnae, and tried whether they would now march out against him.

[4] For he thought the post a favourable one for encamping in, and moreover that the Acharnians, forming as they did a large part of the state, (for they amounted to three thousand heavy-armed,) would not overlook the destruction of what belonged to them, but would stir up the whole army also to an engagement. If, on the other hand, the Athenians should not come out against him during that incursion, he would then lay waste the plain with less fear in future, and advance to the city itself; for the Acharnians, after losing their own property, would not be so forward to run into danger for that of other people, but there would be a division in their counsels.

[5] It was with this view of the case that Archidamus remained at Acharnae.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 2.20.1 focus

[1] Consilio autem tali dicitur Archidamum circum Acharnas cum exercitu ad pugnam committendam instructo mansisse, nec illius irruptionis tempore in planitiem descendisse :

[2] sperabat enim Athenienses, qui mulla juventute florebant, et ad bellum, ut nunquam ante, instructi erant, fortasse obviam sibi prodituros, nec agrum vastari passuros.

[3] Postquam igitur ad Thriasium campum ipsi non occurrerant, castris ad Acharnas positis tentabat, si contra se prodire auderent.

[4] Simul enim hic locus stativis habendis opportunus ipsi videbatur, simul etiam Acharnenses, qui magna civitatis pars erant (fuerunt enim tria militum gravis armaturae millia) non videbantur rerum suarum vastationem neglecturi, sed et ceteros ad proelium committendum impulsuri. Atque etiam si Athenienses inter illam irruptionem non prodirent, jam minore cum metu in posterum se et planitiem vastaturam, et ad ipsam urbem accessurum; Acbarnenses enim suis rebus privatos, non ita promptos tore ad pericula pro aliis subeunda, ideoque discordias in civium animis futuras.

[5] Tali igitur consilio Arcbidamus ad Acharnas manebat.

Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides First1KGreek (Thucydides. Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides. Gürsching, Heinrich, translator. Augsburg: Wirth, 1856.) — 2.35.1 focus

[1] Wenn es bisher bei den Rednern an dieser Stätte fast allgemeiner Brauch geworden, den Mann zu rühmen, der mit der Bestattung diese Rede verband, weil an dem Grabe gefallener Krieger ein ehrendes Wort sich zieme, so würde ich es für hinreichend gehalten haben, dass man Helden der That mit einer festlichen Handlung ehre, — wie das denn der Staat durch die Bestattung gethan hat, deren Zeugen ihr so eben gewesen — und würde die Verherrlichung so vieler Männer nicht einem Einzelnen und der zufälligen Wirkung seines Vortrags anheimgegeben haben.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 2.20 focus

Dicesi che Archidamo si fermò coll’ esercito in ordinanza intorno ad A carne , senza scendere in questa prima invasione alla pianura, con questo intendimento. Sperava egli che gli Ateniesi fiorenti per numerosa gioventù ed apparecchiamenti di guerra , quanto non mai per l'innanzi, gli sarehbono forse usciti incontro , non potendo patire di vedersi devastate le loro terre. Poiché adunque non gli erano venuti incontro ad Eieusi, né alla pianura triasia , voleva tentare con questa fermata intorno ad Acarne, se almeno allora si risolvessero a far sortita contro di lui. Oltre di che il luogo parevagli opportuno per porvi il campo , e faceva stima che gli Acarnei, parte considerevole della Repubblica ( poiché tremila di grave armatura erano dei loro ) non sarebbero indifferenti al guasto della loro campagna, ma avrebbero spinto tutti gli altri a combattere. Se poi in questa prima invasione gli Ateniesi non gli fossero usciti incontro, avrebbe allora più francamente corso la pianura e portato le armi fino sotto le mura di Atene stessa. Conciossiachè gli Acamei spogliati dei beni loro, non sarebbono ugualmente pronti ad incontrar pericoli per gli altrui, e gran discordia entrerebbe negli animi dei cittadini. Con questa intenzione Archidamo si tratteneva presso ad Acarne.

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides Book 2 (Thucydides, Book II. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1891.) focus

Ὡς ... ταξάμενον ]—by no means in accordanee with the desultory nature of Archidamus' operations. On λέγεται, see c. 57, 1.

ἐς τὸ πεδίον —the Attic plain.

ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ —temporal. See c. 13, 9, 57, 2. Rutherford, Syntax, p. 68.

Τμηθῆναι —the infinitive after περιορᾶν is found only in Herod. and Thuc.; π. then = ἐᾶν, the notion of perception or want of it being lost. Cf. c. 18, 5. M. T. 903, 6.

Ἐνστρατοπεδεῦσαι —for ἐν in compounds with ad- verbial force, cf. c. 44, 1.

μέρος —see c. 21, 3. There were probably heroes of Marathon to be found among the Acharnians, who were by no means inclined to see their vines cut down without a blow being struck. The deme was proud of its distinction in war. See Aristoph. Ach. 180 .

ὁρμήσειν —transitive, governing τοὺς πάντας .

Τοιαύτῃ μὲν —resuming and dismissing γνώμῃ τοιᾷδε in 1 above. Cf. 9, 1 and 6.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 2.20

Adolf Wahrmund (Translator)

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