Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 6.64

[1] The Athenian generals, having observed this and being desirous to draw forth the Syracusians' whole power as far as might be from the city, to be able in the meantime without impeachment, going thither in the night by sea, to seize on some convenient place to encamp in; for they knew they should not be able to do it so well in the face of an enemy prepared, nor if they were known to march by land, for that the Syracusian horsemen being many would greatly annoy the light-armed and other multitude, they themselves having no horsemen there; whereas thus they might possess themselves of a place where the horse could not do them any hurt at all to speak of (now the Syracusian outlaws that were with them had told them of a place near the temple Olympieium, which also they seized); I say, the Athenian generals, to bring this their purpose to effect contrived the matter thus:

[2] They send a man, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and in the opinion of the Syracusian commanders no less a friend of theirs. This man was a Catanaean and said he came from Catana, from such and such, whose names they knew, and knew to be the remnant of their well-willers in that city.

[3] He told them that the Athenians lay every night within the town and far from their arms; and that if with the whole power of their city, at a day appointed betimes in a morning they would come to their camp, those friends of the Syracusians would shut the Athenians in and set on fire their galleys, by which means the Syracusians, assaulting the pallisado, might easily win the camp, and that the Catanaeans that were to help them herein were many, and those he came from already prepared for it.

[1] Aware of this, the Athenian generals determined to draw them out in mass as far as possible from the city, and themselves in the meantime to sail by night along shore, and take up at their leisure a convenient position. This they knew they could not so well do, if they had to disembark from their ships in front of a force prepared for them, or to go by land openly. The numerous cavalry of the Syracusans (a force which they were themselves without), would then be able to do the greatest mischief to their light troops and the crowd that followed them; but this plan would enable them to take up a position in which the horse could do them no hurt worth speaking of, some Syracusan exiles with the army having told them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they afterwards occupied. In pursuance of their idea, the generals imagined the following stratagem.

[2] They sent to Syracuse a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan generals thought to be no less in their interest; he was a native of Catana , and said he came from persons in that place, whose names the Syracusan generals were acquainted with, and whom they knew to be among the members of their party still left in the city.

[3] He told them that the Athenians passed the night in the town, at some distance from their arms, and that if the Syracusans would name a day and come with all their people at daybreak to attack the armament, they, their friends, would close the gates upon the troops in the city, and set fire to the vessels, while the Syracusans would easily take the camp by an attack upon the stockade. In this they would be aided by many of the Catanians, who were already prepared to act, and from whom he himself came.

Die Feldherrn der Athener wußten dieß! und sie dachten
nun, die ganze Streitmacht der Syraküsancr möglichst weit von ihrer
Stadt wegzulocken, um gleichzeitig unter dem Schutze'der Nacht mit
ihren Schiffen dorthin zu fahren und in aller Ruhe an einem passen--
den Punkte ein Lager zu schlagen. Denn sie wußten, daß dieß nicht
eben so leicht-ginge; wenn'sie von ihren Schiffen im Angesicht eines
kampfbereiten Heeres ihre Truppen'ausschiffen wollten, oder auch,
wenn sie'unter den Augen jener zu Lande vorrückten, — denn ihren
leichtewTruppen und dem großen Haufen wurde die sehr zahlreiche
Syrakusanische Reiterei, bei ihrem völligen Mangel an dieser Waffe,'
großen Schaden zufügen; so aber würden sie einen Platz in Besitz
nehmen, von wo sie leicht vorgehen könnten, 'ohne «durch die Reiterei
erheblichen Schaden zu erleiden. Syrakusanische Verbannte nämlich,
die dem Heere folgten, hatten sie über die Beschaffenheit der
Oertlichkeit beim OlyMpieion des Näheren belehrt; welchen Platz sie
dann auch wirklich einnahmen. Um diese Absicht nun zu erreichen,
setzten die Feldherren Folgendes in's Werk. Sie schickten einen ihnen
ganz ergebenen Mann ab, der aber auch von den'Syrakusanischen
Feldherren als ihrer Sache nicht weniger ergeben betrachtet wurde.
Er war aber ein Katanäer und sagte, er komme von gewissen
Männern aus Katana geschickt, die den Syrakusanischen Feldherren
namentlich bekannt waren, und von denen man wußte, daß sie zu der den
Syrakusiern treu gebliebenen Partei gehörten. ' Er berichtete nun,
daß die Athener in einiger Entfernung von ihrem Waffenplatz die
Nacht in der Stadt zuzubringen pflegten, und wenn jene an einem
vorher bestimmten Tage mit ihrer ganzen Macht bei Sonnenaufgang
das Lager angreifen würden, so wollten sie selbst die Athener in ihren ¹
Mauern absperren und deren Schiffe in Brand stecken, und jene ²
konnten dann das Lager durch einen Angriff aus das Pfahlwerk lklcht i
einnehmen. Unter den Katanäern seien sehr Viele gesonnen, dabei
mitzuhelfen und hätten schon Alles in Bereitschaft gesetzt, und er
selbst sei von diesen hergesandt.

Unter diesen Umständen dachten die Feldherren der Athener
die ganze feindliche Streitmacht möglichst weit aus der Stadt
herauszulocken und unterdessen selbst mit der Flotte bei Nacht
nach Syrakus zu fahren, um dort ungestört an geeigneter
Stelle ein Lager aufzuschlagen, was ihnen offenbar nicht so
leicht möglich gewesen wäre, hätten sie ihre Truppen angesichts
der feindlichen Streitmacht ausschiffen oder unter den Augen
des Feindes zu Lande vorrücken müssen. Denn dann hätte
die zahlreiche Reiterei der Syrakuser bei ihrem Mangel an
Reiterei ihren Leichtbewaffneten und dem Troß sehr gefährlich
werden können; so aber würden sie imstande sein, einen Platz
zu wählen, wo sie von der feindlichen Reiterei nicht sonderlich
zu leiden hätten. Syrakusische Flüchtlinge, die sich ihnen an­
geschlossen, aber machten sie auf den Platz beim Olympieion
aufmerksam, den sie dann auch wirklich wählten. Zu dem
Ende bedienten sie sich nun folgender Kriegslist. Sie schickten
nach Syrakus einen Mann aus Katana, auf den sie sich ver­
lassen konnten, den aber auch die syrakusischen Feldherren für
ihre Zwecke brauchen zu können glaubten. Denen erklärte er,
er komme im Auftrage von Leuten aus Katana, die ihnen dem
Namen nach bekannt waren und von denen sie wußten, daß
sie zu ihren dort noch vorhandenen Anhängern gehörten. Und
nun sagte er ihnen, die Athener blieben nachtS fern von ihrem
Lager in der Stadt, und wenn die Syrakuser an einem be­
stimmten Tage mit ihrem ganzen Heere in aller Frühe vor
dem Lager ershcienen, so würde man die Athener nicht aus
der Stadt lassen und ihre Schiffe in Brand stecken, sie aber
würden alsdann die Palisaden leicht erstürmen und sich des
Lagers bemächtigen können. In Katana aber würden viele
dabei gemeinshcaftliche Sache mit ihnen machen, und seine
Auftraggeber hätten sich darauf schon eingerichtet.

LXIV. Les généraux athéniens, voyant cela, résolurent de les attirer en masse le plus loin possible de la ville, et de profiter eux-mêmes de ce moment pour aller y aborder pendant la nuit et choisir à loisir une position favorable pour leur campement. Ils sentaient bien qu’ils n’auraient pas les mêmes facilités, s’il leur fallait opérer une descente en présence d’un ennemi sur ses gardes, ou s’ils faisaient à découvert une marche par terre; que leurs troupes légères et le gros de leur armée auraient alors beaucoup à souffrir de la cavalerie syracusaine qui était nombreuse, tandis qu’euxmêmes n’en avaient pas; que de cette façon, au contraire, ils pourraient choisir une position où ils ne seraient que médiocrement inquiétés par la cavalerie. Des bannis de Syracuse, qui marchaient avec eux, leur avaient signalé un poste près d’Olympiéon ¹ , celui-là même qu’ils occupèrent. Voici, du reste, à quel artifice les généraux eurent recours pour arriver à leurs fins : ils envoyèrent un homme à eux, mais tout dévoué en apparence aux généraux syracusains. Cet homme, originaire de Catane, s’annonça comme envoyé par des habitants de cette ville dont ils connaissaient les noms et qu’ils savaient y rester encore de leurs anciens amis. Il leur dit que les Athéniens passaient la nuit dans la ville loin de leurs retranchements; que si les Syracusains voulaient, à un jour déterminé, marcher contre le camp vers l’aurore, les Catanéens retiendraient ceux des Athéniens qui seraient dans la ville et brûleraient les vaisseaux; qu’il leur serait facile, en attaquant la palissade, de s’emparer du camp; enfin qu’un grand nombre des habitants ² les seconderaient, qu’ils étaient déjà prêts, et qu’il venait de leur part.

[1] The Athenian generals were aware of all this and purposed to draw the whole of the Syracusan force as far as possible away from the city, and themselves meanwhile to sail down under cover of night and undisturbed to occupy a camp at a suitable place, knowing that they would not be able to do this so well if they should disembark from their ships in the face of an enemy prepared to meet them, or should be detected going by land. For being without horsemen themselves, their own light-armed troops and their mob of camp-followers would, they thought, suffer great harm at the hands of the numerous Syracusan cavalry; but in the way proposed they would take a position where they would not suffer any harm worth mentioning from the cavalry; and certain Syracusan exiles who were with them gave them information as to the position close to the Olympieium, which in fact they subsequently occupied. So then, in furtherance of their plan, the generals devised some such scheme as this:

[2] They sent a man loyal to themselves, but in the opinion of the Syracusan generals no less a friend of theirs. The man was a Catanaean, and said that he had come from men at Catana whose names they recognized and whom they knew to be the remnant of those who were still loyal to them in the city.

[3] He said that the Athenians were in the habit of passing the night in the city away from their arms, and if the Syracusans would come in full force at dawn on an appointed day against their army, they would close the gates on the Athenians in their city and set fire to the ships, and the Syracusans could attack the stockade and easily take the whole army; for there were many Catanaeans who would help them in this undertaking, and the men from whom he himself had come were ready now.

[1] The Athenian generals were acquainted with these things, and wished to draw them as far as possible from their city with their whole force, and themselves, in the mean time, to coast along with their ships by night, and quietly occupy a place for encampment in a favourable position; knowing that ¹ so they would be better able to do it, than if they should land from their ships in face of an enemy prepared to receive them, or should be known to be going by land; (for the Syracusan horse, which was numerous, while they themselves had none, would do great mischief to their light-armed and mob of campfollowers;) and that thus they would take a position where they would not be annoyed by the cavalry in a degree worth speaking of; (for some Syracusan exiles who accompanied them told them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they actually occupied.) The generals, therefore, adopted the following stratagem in furtherance of their wishes.

[2] They send a person who was a faithful friend to them, and no less in the interest of the Syracusans, according to their opinion. The man was a Catanian, and said that he was come from certain individuals in Catana, with whose names they were acquainted, and whom they knew to be still left in the town amongst those who were well affected to them. He stated, then, that the Athenians passed the night at some distance from their arms, within the walls of the city;

[3] and that if the Syracusans would come with all their force early in the morning of an appointed day to attack their armament, the Catanians would close the gates on the men who were with them, and would fire their ships; while the Syracusans would easily take ² the armament by an attack on their stockade. There were many too of the Catanians, he said, who would co-operate with them in this, and were already prepared to do so; namely, the party from which he had himself come.

[1] Quae quum cognoscerent Atheniensium duces, et vellent illos cum universo populo ab urbe quam longissime abducere, ipsi vero interea sub noctem cum classe praetervecti locum castris idoneum per otium occupare, scientes ejus rei se haud perinde facultatem habituros, si ex navibus adversus hostes jam praeparatos descenderent, aut itinere terrestri euntes ab illis animadverterentur (sus enim levi armaturae et multitudini, quod nullus equitatos ipsis adesset, Syracusanorum equitatum, qui multus erat, magna detrimenta daturum; ita vero se locum capturos, unde ab Itostium equitatu nullum memoratu dignum damnum essent accepturi; monebant eos autem de loco ad Olympieum sito, quem etiam occuparunt, Syracusanorum exsules, qui ipsos sequebantur), hujusmodi igitur conatum ad perficienda ea quae cupiebant, duces machinati sunt.

[2] Mittunt quemdam fidei sibi probatae virum et Syracusanorum ducibus pro existimatione sua non minus amicum ; erat autem Catanaeus hic vir, et a quibusdam Cata-nffis se venire dicebat, quorum illi nomina noverant, et quos suae factionis studiosos in urbe adhuc superessc sciebant.

[3] Dicebat autem Athenienses in urbe procul a castris pernoctare, et si illi certa die primo diluculo ad exercitum cum universo populo venire vellent, se quidem interclusuros eos, qui essent apud se, et naves incensuros, illos vero vallum adortos exercitum Atheniensem facile capturos ; fore autem Catanacorum permultos ad rem gerendam adjutores, et jam paratos esse, a quibus ipse veniret.

Considerandosi queste cose pei generali ateniesi volevano attirarli con tutte le forze il più possibilmente lontano dalla città, ed essi intanto favoriti dalla notte avanzarsi a pigliar campo senza controsto in luogo vantaggioso. Bene vedevano che essendo scoperti nissuna di queste due cose sarebbe loro riuscita, sia che volessero scendere dalle navi in faccia al nemico preparato, sia che volessero tenere la via di terra. Attesoché, mancando essi di cavalli, quelli de’Siracusani, che erano in gran numero, danneggerebbero assai i loro soldati leggeri e la moltitudine leggera ; laddove in quest’altra maniera occuperebbero un posto tale da non poter essere molto offesi dalla cavallerìa nemica. E gli usciti siracusani che li seguivano, gli aveano avvertiti di un luogo presso l’Olimpico che occuparono di fatto. Per recar dunque ad effetto le loro intenzioni i generali ateniesi macchinarono quest’astuzia. Spediscono a Siracusa un tale catenese persona fidata, e creduta non meno amica dai generali siracusani, il quale asseriva di venir da Catana per parte di alcuni cittadini ch’e’conoscevano per nome, e che sapevano esser de’ loro partigiani rimasti in quella città. Diceva egli che gli Ateniesi lasciato il campo pernottavano in città; e che se i Siracusani con tutto l' Esercito volessero sul far dell’alba presentarsi all’accampamento in un certo giorno, i medesimi partigiani terrebbero chiusi in città quegli Ateniesi che vi erano, e brucerebbero le navi ; ed essi intanto assalendo la palizzata di leggeri s’impadronirebbero del campo. Aggiugneva inoltre che molti de Catanesi darebbero loro mano, e che quelli dai quali era spedito erano già all’ordine.