Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 2.65

[1] In this speech did Pericles endeavour to appease the anger of the Athenians towards himself and withal to withdraw their thoughts from the present affliction.

[2] But they, though for the state in general they were won and sent to the Lacedaemonians no more but rather inclined to the war, yet they were everyone in particular grieved for their several losses: the poor because entering the war with little, they lost that little; and the rich because they had lost fair possessions, together with goodly houses and costly furniture in them, in the country; but the greatest matter of all was that they had war instead of peace.

[3] And altogether, they deposed not their anger till they had first fined him in a sum of money.

[4] Nevertheless, not long after (as is the fashion of the multitude) they made him general again and committed the whole state to his administration. For the sense of their domestic losses was now dulled, and for the need of the commonwealth they prized him more than any other whatsoever.

[5] For as long as he was in authority in the city in time of peace, he governed the same with moderation and was a faithful watchman of it; and in his time it was at the greatest.

[6] And after the war was on foot, it is manifest that he therein also foresaw what it could do. He lived after the war began two years and six months.

[7] And his foresight in the war was best known after his death. For he told them that if they would be quiet and look to their navy, and during this war seek no further dominion nor hazard the city itself, they should then have the upper hand. But they did contrary in all, and in such other things besides as seemed not to concern the war managed the state, according to their private ambition and covetousness, perniciously both for themselves and their confederates. What succeeded well the honour and profit of it came most to private men, and what miscarried was to the city's detriment in the war.

[8] The reason whereof was this: that being a man of great power both for his dignity and wisdom, and for bribes manifestly the most incorrupt, he freely controlled the multitude and was not so much led by them as he led them. Because, having gotten his power by no evil arts, he would not humour them in his speeches but out of his authority durst anger them with contradiction.

[9] Therefore, whensoever he saw them out of season insolently bold, he would with his orations put them into a fear; and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise erect their spirits and embolden them.

[10] It was in name a state democratical, but in fact a government of the principal man. But they that came after, being more equal amongst themselves and affecting everyone to be the chief, applied themselves to the people and let go the care of the commonwealth.

[11] From whence amongst many other errors, as was likely in a great and dominant city, proceeded also the voyage into Sicily, which was not so much upon mistaking those whom they went against as for want of knowledge in the senders of what was necessary for those that went the voyage. For through private quarrels about who should bear the greatest sway with the people they both abated the vigour of the army and then also first troubled the state at home with division.

[12] Being overthrown in Sicily and having lost, besides other ammunition, the greatest part of their navy, and the city being then in sedition, yet they held out three years both against their first enemies and the Sicilians with them and against most of their revolted confederates besides, and also afterwards against Cyrus the king's son, who took part with and sent money to the Peloponnesians to maintain their fleet and never shrunk till they had overthrown themselves with private dissensions.

[13] So much was in Pericles above other men at that time that he could foresee by what means the city might easily have outlasted the Peloponnesians in this war.

[1] Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the Athenians of their anger against him and to divert their thoughts from their immediate afflictions.

[2] As a community he succeeded in convincing them; they not only gave up all idea of sending to Lacedaemon , but applied themselves with increased energy to the war; still as private individuals they could not help smarting under their sufferings, the common people having been deprived of the little that they ever possessed, while the higher orders had lost fine properties with costly establishments and buildings in the country, and, worst of all, had war instead of peace.

[3] In fact, the public feeling against him did not subside until he had been fined.

[4] Not long afterwards, however, according to the way of the multitude, they again elected him general and committed all their affairs to his hands, having now become less sensitive to their private and domestic afflictions, and understanding that he was the best man of all for the public necessities.

[5] For as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged the power of his country.

[6] He outlived its commencement two years and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better known by his death.

[7] He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favorable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only conduce to the honor and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war.

[8] The causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction.

[9] Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen.

[10] With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude.

[11] This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which they not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home.

[12] Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily , and with faction already dominant in the city, they could still for three years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the king's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders.

[13] So superfluously abundant were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians.

Durch solcherlei Reden suchte Perikles den Unwillen der
Athener gegen sich zu entkräften und ihre Gedanken von den
augenblicklichen Uebeln abzuleiten. In den öffentlichen Angelegenheiten nun
folgten sie seinen Worten und schickten nicht weiter mehr zu den
Lakedämoniern, sondern rüsteten sich noch eifriger zum Kriege; für
sich aber blieb jeder von seinen eigenen Leiden niedergedrückt: das
gemeine Volk, weil es nur Weniges besessen nnd auch das noch
verloren hatte, die Reichen, weil sie sich ihrer schönen Besitzungen, ihrer
Häuser auf dem Lande und der kostbaren Einrichtungen beraubt sahen,
und, was von Allem das Wichtigste, weil sie Krieg hatten anstatt des ¹
Friedens. Und in der That hörten sie insgesammt nicht eher aus,
ihn mit ihrem Unwillen zu verfolgen, als bis sie ihn um eine Summe
Geldes gestraft hatten. Wie es aber der große Haufe zu machen
pflegt, so wählten sie ihn nicht lange danach wieder zum Feldherrn
und übertrugen ihm alle Staatsgeschäfte; denn über das, was Jeder
in seinem Häuslichen zu leiden hatte, dachten sie bereits milder,
den Bedürfnissen des Staates aber glaubten sie, sei er am besten
gewahcsen. Und in der That, so lange er im Frieden dem Staate
vorstand, lenkte er ihn mit Mäßigung und bewahrte ihn mit sicherer Hand
vor Unheil, und unter seiner Regierung erreichte er seine größte Macht.
Als aber der Krieg eintrat, so zeigte es sich, daß er auch hierin die
Kräfte des Staates vorher richtig geschätzt hatte. Er lebte aber
während desselben noch zwei Jahre und sechs Monate, und als er gestorben
war, da wurde seine Voraussicht in Betreff des Krieges erst recht
erkannt; denn er hatte behauptet, wenn die Athener sich sonst ruhig
verhielten, nur auf die Flotte Bedacht nähmen, während des Krieges
ihre Herrschaft nicht weiter ausbreiten und die Stadt selbst keiner
Gefahr aussetzen wollten, so würden sie Sieger bleiben. Sie aber
wendeten dies Alles in's Gegentheil um und unternahmen aus
persönlichem Ehrgeize und um des eigenen Aortheils willen andere Dinge,
die mit diesem Kriege gar nicht im Zusammenhang standen, zu ihrem
eigenen und ihrer Bundesgenossen Unglück, — Dinge, die, wenn sie
gelangen, den Einzelnen zwar Ehre und Nutzen mehren konnten, wenn
sie aber mißlangen, dem Staate für den Verlauf des Krieges zum
Schaden gereichten. Die Ursache davon war, das; jener, an Ansehen
und Einsicht hervorragend, unbestechlich war wie kein Anderer und
die Menge durch seinen Freimuth im Zaume hielt. Er wurde nicht
von jener gelenkt, sondern lenkte sie vielmehr selbst, weil er nicht durch
unerlaubte Mittel zu seiner Macht gelangt war und ihnen deshalb
nicht zu Gefallen reden mußte, sondern sich das Recht nahm, ihnen
auch mit Leidenschaft zu widersprechen. Wenn er nun merkte, daß sie
zur unrechten Zeit aus Uebermuth waghalsig werden wollten, so schlug
er durch seine Reden ihre Stimmung bis zur Zaghaftigkeit nieder, und
sah er sie in übertriebener Furcht, so richtete er sie wieder zur
Kühnheit auf. So gab es dem Namen nach eine Volksherrschaft, in der ² That aber ging vom ersten Manne die Herrschaft aus. Die aber nach
ihm kamen, mehr Einer mit dem Andern gleiches Ranges waren und
doch Jeder der Erste werden wollten, fingen an dem Volke zu Gefallen
ihm die Staatsangelegenheiten in die Hände zu geben, weshalb, wie
es in einem großen und Andere beherrshcenden Staate natürlich ist,
sowohl viele andere Fehler begangen wurden, als auch besonders die
Seeunternehmung gegen Sicilien. Bei dieser lag aber der Fehler
nicht sowohl in der Absicht rücksichtlich derer, gegen welche der Zug
unternommen wurde, als vielmehr darin, daß die Unternehmer
hinterher die Sache des abgegangenen Heeres nicht im Auge behielten,
sondern unter lauter Ränken der Einzelnen um den Vorrang beim
Volke die Kraft des Heeres todt legten und wegen der
Staatsangelegenheiten zuerst unter sich selbst in Zerwürsniß geriethen. Obgleich
sie nun in Sicilien sowohl ihre übrige Kriegsrnstung als auch den
größten Theil der Flotte einbüßten, und auch bereits zu Haus unter
ihnen Zwiespalt herrschte, so widerstanden sie doch noch drei Jahre
ihren früheren Feinden und den Sikelioten noch dazu, während
gleichzeitig auch die meisten ihrer Bundesgenossen zu jenen übergegangen
waren und auch des Perserkönigs Sohn, Kyros, sich denselben
angeschlossen hatte, der den Peloponnesiern Geld zu einer Flotte gab. Und
nicht eher gaben sie nach, als bis sie durch ihre eigenen Zwistigkeiten
ganz und gar herabgekommen waren. Soweit war Penkles damals
noch unter der Wirklichkeit zurückgeblieben, als er voraus berechnete,
daß sie im Kriege gegen die Pcloponnesier allein sehr leicht den Sieg
behalten würden.

Durch solche Vorstellungen suchte Perikles den Unwillen
der Athener zu beschwichtigen und sie über ihre Lage zu be­
ruhigen. Politisch handelten sie auch nach seinem Rat, indem
sie nicht wieder nach Lakedämon schickten und den Krieg mit
neuem Eifer betrieben; die einzelnen aber trugen immer noch
schwer an ihren Leiden: der kleine Mann, weil ihm auch sein
Weniges draufgegangen war; die Reichen, weil sie ihre schönen
Besitzungen auf dem Lande, ihre Häuser und kostbaren Ein­
richtungen dort verloren hatten; hauptsächlich aber, weil Krieg
und kein Friede war. So murrte man immer noch auf ihn
und ruhte nicht, bis man ihn wirklich zu einer Geldstrafe ver­
urteilt hatte. Nicht lange nachher freilich - so ist die Menge -
wählte man ihn dann doch wieder zum Feldherrn und
stellte ihn an die Spitze der Geschäfte, teils weil die einzelnen
sich über ihre Verluste nachgerade schon mehr beruhigt hatten,
teils weil man ihn doch für den Mann hielt, mit dem der
Stadt am besten gedient wäre. Denn in der Tat, solange er
im Frieden an der Spitze der Stadt gestanden, hatte er sie
mit Weisheit und Gerechtigkeit regiert und sicheren Blicks vor
Schaden behütet, und sie war unter ihm zu höchster Blüte ge­
langt. Als es dann zum Kriege kam, zeigte sich, daß er auch
in dieser Beziehung ihre Machtmittel richtig eingeschätzt hatte.
Nach AuSbruch deS Krieges lebte er noch drittehalb Jahre,
und nach seinem Tode überzeugte man sich vollends davon,
wie richtig er den Krieg beurteilt. Er hatte den Athenern
gesagt, wenn sie sich auf keine Schlacht im offenen Felde ein­
ließen, für die Tüchtigkeit ihrer Flotte sorgten und während des
Kriegs auf weitere Unternehmungen zur Ausdehnung ihrer
Herrschaft verzichteten, um die Stadt dadurch nicht in neue Ge­
fahren zu verwickeln, so würden sie Sieger bleiben. Sie aber
taten grade das Gegenteil und ließen sich zu ihrem und ihrer
Bundesgenossen Schaden durch Ehrgeiz und Habgier einzelner
zu Unternehmungen verleiten, die mit dem Kriege offenbar
nichts zu tun hatten, die, wenn sie gelangen, einzelnen allen­
falls Ehre und Vorteil bringen mochten, aber, da sie fehlschlugen,
der Stadt im weitern Verlauf des Krieges zum Verderben
wurden. Das kam daher, daß er ein Mann von größtem An­
sehen und höchster Einsicht und über allem Zweifel erhabener
Unbestehclichkeit war, der es verstand, die Menge vornehm
zu behandeln. Er ließ sich nicht von ihr, sondern sie sich von
ihm leiten; denn da er seine Macht nicht durch unerlaubte
Mittel gewonnen hatte, brauchte er ihr nicht nach dem Munde
zu reden, sondern konnte den Leuten im Zorn bei aller Würde
auch mal tüchtig ins Gepäck fallen. Wenn er merkte, daß sie
zur Unzeit zu hoch hinaus wollten, wußte er sie durch seine
Reden bis zur Zaghaftigkeit zu ducken, und wiederum, wenn
sie ohne Not verzagten, ihnen wieder Mut zu machen. Dem
Namen nach regierte das Volk, tatsächlich aber war er der
erste Mann, der die Stadt regierte. Unter seinen Nachfolgern,
von denen im Grunde keiner mehr bedeutete als der andere
und doch jeder der erste sein wollte, wurde das anders; sie
überließen es dem Volke, auch Politik auf eigene Hand zu treiben,
wobei es in einer Stadt von solcher Größe und Machtstellung
natürlich nicht ausbleiben konnte, daß Fehler über Fehler gemacht
wurden, so namentlich mit dem Zuge nach Sizilien. Bei dem
aber lag der Fehler nicht so sehr darin, daß man ihn über­
haupt unternahm, als darin, daß man hinterher für die Leute
dort nicht gehörig sorgte und, durch ehrgeizige Intriganten,
welche um die Volksgunst buhlten, verführt, das Heer in Sizi­
lien zugrunde gehen ließ, auch seitdem erst infolge innerer Zer­
würfnisse keine einheitliche Politik mehr verfolgte. Aber auch
nach der Niederlage in Sizilien, bei der sie ihr Heer mit allem
Material und den größten Teil ihrer Flotte verloren hatten,
und trotz der in der Stadt herrschenden Parteikämpfe behaup­
teten die Athener sich dann noch drei Jahre nicht nur gegen
ihre ursprünglichen Feinde, sondern auch gegen die diesen aus
Sizilien gewordenen Verstärkungen und ihre der Mehrzahl nach
' zu ihnen übergegangenen Bundesgenossen, ja auch selbst zuletzt
nochmals Kur-us, der Sohn des Perserkönigs, sich den Pelo­
ponnesiern zugewandt hatte und sie mit Geld für ihre Flotte
unterstützte. Und erst dann gaben sie klein bei, als sie infolge
innerer Zerwürfnisse völlig von Kräften gekommen waren. So
überreichlich waren die Mittel, welche Perikles damals zu
Gebote standen und ihn zu der Annahme berechtigten, daß
Athen aus einem Kriege allein mit den Peloponnesiern mit
Leichtigkeit als Sieger hervorgehen würde.

LXV. Tels étaient les discours par lesquels Périclès s’efforçait de calmer l'irritation des Athéniens contre lui et de donner un autre cours à leurs pensées, tout entières aux douleurs du moment : dans les rapports publics, ils se laissaient ramener par ses paroles, n’en- voyaient plus d’ambassades aux Lacédémoniens et montraient plus d’ardeur pour la guerre. Mais, en particulier, ils s’affligeaient de leurs maux ; le peuple, parce qu’il se voyait privé même du peu qu'il possédait ; les riches, parce qu’ils avaient perdu leurs magnifiques propriétés de campagne, leurs coûteuses constructions et leurs somptueux ameublements. Tous s’irritaient surtout de la guerre, et voulaient la paix. L’irritation générale contre Périclès ne céda que lorsqu’on l’eut condamné à l’amende ¹ . Mais, bientôt après, par un caprice familier à la multitude, on le réélut général ² , et on remit entre ses mains tous les intérêts de l’État ; car déjà les douleurs privées de chacun étaient émoussées, et personne ne paraissait autant que lui à la hauteur des besoins de la république. Tout le temps, en effet, qu’il avait été à la tête des affaires pendant la paix, il avait gouverné avec modération et assuré la sécurité générale. La république était par- venue sous son administration à un haut degré de puissance ; une fois la guerre engagée, on vit qu’il avait prévu tout ce qui pouvait en assurer le succès. Il ne survécut que deux ans et six mois ³ au commencement des hostilités ; et, lorsqu’il fut mort, on reconnut mieux encore la justesse de ses prévisions au sujet de la guerre : il avait dit aux Athéniens que s’ils restaient en repos et se contentaient de soigner leur marine, sans chercher dans la guerre un moyen d’étendre leur domination, sans exposer la république à aucun péril, ils auraient le dessus ; sur tous ces points ils firent précisément le contraire ; ils poursuivirent, à leur propre détriment et à celui des alliés, d’autres entreprises ⁴ qui paraissaient étrangères à la guerre, et où ils n’eurent d’autre règle que l’ambition de quelques individus et des intérêts privés. La réussite ne procurait guère honneur et profit qu’à des particuliers, tandis que les revers affaiblissaient les ressources de l’État pour la guerre.

Cela se conçoit : Périclès, aussi éminent par son intelligence que par la considération dont il était entouré, supérieur évidemment aux séductions de la vénalité, contenait le peuple par son noble ascendant et se laissait bien moins conduire par lui qu’il ne le dirigeait lui-même. Cela tenait à ce que, n’ayant pas acquis sa puissance par des moyens illicites, il ne flattait pas le peuple dans ses discours et savait au besoin lui résister avec autorité et colère. Quand il voyait les Athéniens s’abandonner hors de propos à une insolente confiance, il les ébranlait, les modérait par sa parole ; s’il s’apercevait qu’ils fussent abattus sans raison, il relevait leur courage. Le gouvernement était démocratique de nom ; en réalité le pouvoir était aux mains du premier citoyen ⁵ .

Mais ceux qui lui succédèrent, n’ayant entre eux aucune supériorité bien marquée, et aspirant chacun de leur côté au premier rang, se mirent à flatter le peuple et soumirent l’administration à ses caprices. Il en résulta, comme cela est inévitable dans un grand État, placé à la tête d’une vaste domination, des fautes nombreuses, entre autres l’expédition de Sicile. Le plus grand tort, toutefois, n’était pas de s’être engagé dans cette guerre ; la faute fut à ceux qui, les troupes une fois expédiées, ne s’inquiétèrent plus, après le départ, de ce qui leur était nécessaire ; tout entiers à leurs intrigues privées, aspirant à l’envi à gouverner le peuple, ils laissèrent, faute de secours, les opérations languir, et excitèrent les premières dissensions intestines à Athènes. Cependant , même après le désastre de l’expédition de Sicile et la perte de la plus grande partie de la flotte, alors que déjà la sédition était dans la ville, les Athéniens résistèrent trois ans ⁶ à leurs anciens ennemis, auxquels s’étaient joints les Siciliens et les alliés révoltés, et plus tard Cyrus lui-même, fils du roi, qui fournissait de l’argent aux Lacédémoniens pour leur flotte. S’ils finirent par succomber, ce ne fut que sous leurs propres coups, au milieu des ruines amoncelées par leurs dissensions intestines : tant était supérieure la sagacité de Périclès, qui avait prévu dès lors par quels moyens Athènes pourrait, dans cette guerre, s’assurer une victoire aisée sur les Péloponnésiens.

[1] By such words Pericles endeavoured to cure the Athenians of their anger toward him, and to divert their minds from their present ills.

[2] And as regards public affairs they were won over by his arguments, sending no further envoys to the Lacedaemonians, and were more zealous for the war; but in private they were distressed by their sufferings; for the commons, having less to start with, had been deprived even of this, while the upper classes had lost their beautiful estates in the country, both buildings and costly furniture, and above all they had war instead of peace. Indeed one and all they did not give over their resentment against him until they had imposed a fine upon him.

[3] But not long afterwards, as is the way with the multitude, they chose him again as general and entrusted him with the whole conduct of affairs;

[4] for they were now becoming individually less keenly sensible of their private griefs, and as to the needs of the state as a whole they esteemed him invaluable.

[5] For so long as he presided over the affairs of the state in time of peace he pursued a moderate policy and kept the city in safety, and it was under him that Athens reached the height of her greatness; and, after the war began, here too he appears to have made a farsighted estimate of her strength. Pericles lived two years and six months beyond the beginning of the war;

[6] and after his death his foresight as to the war was still more fully recognized.

[7] For he had told the Athenians that if they would maintain a defensive policy, attend to their navy, and not seek to extend their sway during the war, or do anything to imperil the existence of the state, they would prove superior. But they not only acted contrary to his advice in all these things, but also in matters that apparently had no connection with the war they were led by private ambition and private greed to adopt policies which proved injurious both as to themselves and their allies; for these policies, so long as they were successful, merely brought honour or profit to individual citizens, but when they failed proved detrimental to the state in the conduct of the war. ¹

[8] And the reason for this was that Pericles, who owed his influence to his recognized standing and ability, and had proved himself clearly incorruptible in the highest degree, restrained the multitude while respecting their liberties, and led them rather than was led by them, because he did not resort to flattery, seeking power by dishonest means, but was able on the strength of his high reputation to oppose them and even provoke their wrath. At any rate, whenever he saw them unwarrantably confident and arrogant, his words would cow them into fear;

[9] and, on the other hand, when he saw them unreasonably afraid, he would restore them to confidence again. And so Athens, though in name a democracy, gradually became in fact a government ruled by its foremost citizen.

[10] But the successors of Pericles, being more on an equality with one another and yet striving each to be first, were ready to surrender to the people even the conduct of public affairs to suit their whims.

[11] And from this, since it happened in a great and imperial state, there resulted many blunders, especially the Sicilian expedition, ² which was not so much an error of judgment, when we consider the enemy they went against, as of management; for those who were responsible for it, instead of taking additional measures for the proper support of the first troops which were sent out, gave themselves over to personal intrigues for the sake of gaining the popular leadership and consequently not only conducted the military operations with less rigour, but also brought about, for the first time, civil discord at home.

[12] And yet, after they had met with disaster in Sicily, where they lost not only their army but also the greater part of their fleet, and by this time had come to be in a state of sedition at home, they neverthless held out ten years not only against the enemies they had before, but also against the Sicilians, who were now combined with them, and, besides, against most of their allies, who were now in revolt, and later on, against Cyrus son of the King, who joined the Peloponnesians and furnished them with money for their fleet; and they did not finally succumb until they had in their private quarrels fallen upon one another and been brought to ruin.

[13] Such abundant grounds had Pericles at that time for his own forecast that Athens might quite easily have triumphed in this war over the Peloponnesians alone.

[1] By speaking to this effect Pericles endeavoured both to divert the Athenians from their anger towards himself, and to lead away their thoughts from their present hardships.

[2] And in a public point of view they were persuaded by his speech, and were no longer for sending to the Lacedaemonians, but were more resolute for the war; though in their private feeling they were distressed by their sufferings; the commons, because, having set out with less resources, they had been deprived of even those; the higher orders, because they had lost fine possessions in the country, both in buildings and expensive establishments, and, what was the greatest evil of all, had war instead of peace.

[3] They did not, however, cease from their public displeasure toward him, till they had fined him in a sum of money.

[4] But no long time after, as the multitude to they again elected him general, and committed every thing to him; for on the points in which each man was vexed about his domestic affairs, they now felt less keenly; but with regard to what the whole state needed, they thought that he was most valuable.

[5] For as long as he was at the head of the state in time of peace, he governed it with moderation, and kept it in safety, and it was at its height of greatness in his time: and when the war broke out, he appears to have foreknown its power in this respect also.

[6] He survived its commencement two years and six months; and when he was dead, his foresight with regard to its course was appreciated to a still greater degree.

[7] For he said that if they kept quiet and attended to their navy, and did not gain additional dominion during the war, nor expose the city to hazard, they would have the advantage in the struggle. But they did the very contrary of all this, and in other things which seemed to have to do with the war, through their private ambition and private gain, they adopted evil measures both towards themselves and their allies; which, if successful, conducted the honour and benefit of individuals; but if they failed, proved detrimental to the state with regard to the war.

[8] And the reason was, that he, being powerful by means of his high rank and talents, and manifestly proof against bribery, controlled the multiude with an independent spirit, and was not led by them so much as he himself led them; for he did not say any thing to humour them, for the acquisition of power by improper means; but was able on the strength of his character to contradict them even at the risk of their displeasure.

[9] Whenever, for instance, he perceived them unseasonably and insolently confident, by his language he would dash them down to alarm; and, on the other hand, when they were unreasonably alarmed, he would raise them again to confidence. And so, though in name it was democracy, in fact it was a government administered by he first man.

[10] Whereas those w o came after, being more on level with each other, and each grasping to become first, had recourse to devoting [not only their speeches, but] even their measures, to the humours of the people.

[11] In consequence of this both many other blunders were committed, as was likely in a great and sovereign state, and especially the expedition to Sicily; which was not so much an error of judgment with respect to the people they went against, as that those who had sent them out, by not afterwards voting supplies required by the armament, but proceeding with their private criminations, to gain the leadership of the commons, both blunted the spirit of measures in the camp, and for the first time were embroiled with one another in the affairs of the city.

[12] But even when they had suffered in Sicily the loss of other forces, and of the greater part of their fleet, and were now involved in sedition at home, they nevertheless held out three years, both against their former enemies, and those from Sicily with them, and moreover against the greater part of their allies who had revolted, and Cyrus, the king's son, who afterwards joined them, and who supplied the Peloponnesians with money for their fleet: nor did they succumb, before they were overthrown and ruined by themselves, through their private quarrels.

[13] Such a superabundance of means had Pericles at that time, by which he himself foresaw that with the greatest ease he could gain the advantage in the war over the Peloponnesians by themselves.

[1] Talia Pericles dicens conabatur Atheniensium iram in se cooceptam mitigare, animosqae a praesentibus malis abducere.

[2] Ilii vero publice quidem ejus oratiooe flectebantur, nec legatos ad Lacedaemonios amplius minebant, et in bellum animis impensius incumbebant, sed privatim calamitates , quibus premebantur, aegre ferebant, plebs quidem , quod, tenuiores facultates habens, bellum ingressa, et tamen his ipsis privata esset, illi vero, qui opibus pollebant, quod egregia in agris praedia villasque magnifice aedificatas et sumptuosa supellectile instructas amisissent; sed quod omnium erat grav issimum, quod pro pace bellum haberent.

[3] Nec prius universi iram, quam in eum conceperant, deposuerunt, quam eum pecunia mulctarunt.

[4] Rursus tamen non multo post, id quod vulgus facere solet, belli ducem eum elegerunt, eique rerum omnium admiuislrationem commiserunt, quod quae in privatis rebus eos dolore afficiebant, eorum jam hebetior sensas erat, quae vero universae civitati opus erant, in iis illum plurimi faciendum judicabant.

[5] Quamdiu enim reipublicae praefuerat in pace, eam moderate regebat, atque constanter lutatas est, ejasque snb imperio ad maximam potentiam evecta est; et postquam bellum susceptum est, illum apparet etiam in hoc reipublicae vires praevidisse.

[6] Vixit autem postea duos annos et sex menses; et postquam obiit, magis etiam cognita est ejos in bello providentia.

[7] Hic enim dicebat victores evasuros, si quiesccreut, rebusque nauticis operam darent, neque novum imperium quaererent in hoc bello, neque rempublicam in discrimen vocarent; illi vero et Iure omnia contra egerunt, et alia, quae ad hoc bellum perlinere non videbantur, ob privatam ambitionem et privatos quaestus iti suam sociorumque perniciem administrarunt, quae si feliciter succedebant, honor et fructus ad privatos potius redibat , si vero infeliciter succedebant, reipublicae detrimentum in hoc bello aflereliant.

[8] Hujus autem rei haec erat causa, quod quum ille et dignitate et consilio polleret, et manifeste adversus divitiarum dona integerrimus esset, plebem in oflicio liberaliler continebat, nec magis regebatur ab ea, quam ipse regebat, propterea quod non malis artibus potentiam quaerendo ad multitudinis libidinem diceret, sed dignitatem luendo etiam ad ejus iram obloqueretur.

[9] Quoties igitur animadverteret eos in aliqua re intempestive per fastum audaces esse, dicendo iis incutiebat metum, et contra metuentes temere erigebat rursus ad fiduciam. Quare verbo quidem erat imperium populare, sed re ipsa penes primarium virum principatus erat.

[10] Qui vero eum sunt sequuti,quum potius inter se dignitate pares essent, et eorum singuli principem in republica locum aiTectarent, eo conversi sunt, ut ad populi libidines res transmitterent.

[11] Unde cum multa alia, ut in ampla civitate et principatum obtinente, peccata sunt, tum etiam expeditio in Siciliam facta [quae] non tam judicii error erat de iis, contra quos proficiscerentur, quam eorum culpa, qui, quum copias misissent, non cognoscebant, quae porro suis profectis conducerent, sed propter privatas simultates de populi principatu et res, quae militiae gerebantur, debiliores reddebant, et de rebus domesticis primum inter se turbis agitati sunt.

[12] Quamvis autem in Sicilia rem infeliciter gessissent, et cum alium apparatum, tum etiam majorem classis partem amisissent, et in ipsa urbe seditione jam laborarent, tamen tres annos sustinebant et priores hostes, et Siculos, qui se illis adjunxerant, et praeterea etiam sociorum plerosque, qui defecerant, et, qui postea hostis accesserat, Cyrum, regis Persarum filium, qui pecunias Peloponnesiis ad classem praebebat, nec prius cesserunt, quam ipsi mutuis discordiis collisi conciderunt.

[13] Tanta erant quae tunc Pericli adhuc superabant, et quorum ope ipse providebat se vel facili opera posse superiorem esse Peloponnesiis ipsis eo bello.

[1] So biete ich denn, obschon ich, wie anfangs gesagt, den mächtigsten Staat vertrete, der eher zum Angriff als zur Abwehr berufen erscheint, in Erwägung der Folgen die Hand zum Nachgeben. Warum auch in thörichter Rachsucht sich selber den grössten Schaden zufügen oder in der Verblendung der Leidenschaft hinsichtlich des Schicksals, dem man nicht gebieten kann, sich ebenso als eigenen Herren dünken, wie in seinen eigenen Entschliessungen, und nicht lieber der Billigkeit sich fügen? Folget nun auch ihr meinem Beispiel, eh' ihr euch dazu vor dem Feinde, nicht mehr vor Landsleuten bequemen müsst. Denn das ist keine Schande, dem eigenen Volksgenossen sich zu fügen, nicht blos der Dorier dem Dorier, oder der Chalcidenser seinem Stammverwandten, sondern wir alle als Nachbarn, als Bewohner der einen, von der Natur umgrenzten Heimat, als Träger des gemeinsamen Namens Sikelioten. Unsere Kriege, wenn es sein soll, müssen wir fortan für uns allein führen, oder auch sie beilegen, wie es uns gemeinsam recht dünkt, wider den Fremdling aber, wenn er kommt, in vernünftiger Eintracht zusammenhalten, so gewiss die Niederlage der Einzelnen dem Ganzen Gefahr bringt; Bundesgenossen aber oder Schiedsrichter sollen nie mehr ins Land gerufen werden. Bei diesem Verfahren werden wir für jetzt Sicilien der frohen Aussicht nicht berauben, der Athener und des Bürgerkrieges mit einemmale los zu werden, und in Zukunft in unabhängiger Freiheit und vom Ausland weniger behelligt darin wohnen.

Con tal ragionamento cercava Pericle di rimuovere da sè la collera degli Ateniesi, e divertirne la mente dalle presenti calamità : essi quanto alle cose importanti al pubblico concorrevano nella sentenza di lui ; non più spedivano legati ai Lacedemoni, e con più ardore inchinavano alla guerra, benché afflitti in privato pei mali che soffrivano. Querelavansi i poveri in vedendosi spogliati anche di quel poco avevano al cominciamento della guerra ; i ricchi avendo perdute le belle possessioni di campagna ed i preziosi mobili, e soprattutto perchè avevano guerra in cambio di pace. Nondimeno lo sdegno universale contro Pericle non si calmò, sinché non lo ebbero condannato ad una multa pecuniaria : ma poco dopo, al solito del popolo , Io elessero nuovamente generale , ed a lui commisero gli affari della Repubblica. Erano già divenuti più insen^ sibili pei privati disastri, e d’altronde avevano di lui gran concetto pei bisogni dello stato : poiché mentre in pace ebbe il governo della Repubblica, la reggeva con moderanza, la conservava sicura, e sotto lui ella pervenne all’auge della potenza : e quando poi insorse la guerra , fu palese anche in questa come egli ne avesse preconosciute le forze. Sopravvisse trenta mesi, e dopo la sua morte fu anche meglio riconosciuto il suo antivedimento in fatto di guerra. Ed invero egli prediceva vittoria, solo che standosi quieti attendessero alla marina , senza mettere a repentaglio la città stessa col cercare d’ampliarne il dominio durante la guerra ; laddove essi fecer tutto il contrario non solamente in questo , ma anche nelle cose che parevano impertinenti alla guerra ; perchè guidati ognuno da privata ambizione e dal proprio guadagno, regolarono malamente per aè e per gli alleati le faccende politiche. Se alcuna cosa a vea buon successo, l’onore ed il vantaggio era tutto pei privati; se andava in sinistro, ne pativa la Repubblica rispetto alla guerra che sosteneva. Ciò procedeva da questo, che , Pericle potente per dignità e per senno e manifestamente incorruttibile d’animo , conteneva con liberali modi la moltitudine, guidandola più presta che esser guidato da lei ; perciocché non avendo acquistato autorità con pratiche indecenti, non era mai che parlasse per andarle a compiacenza; anzi godeva egli tal reputazione da contradirla animosamente. Di che se vedesse i cittadini imbaldanzire intempestivamente per checché fosse, sapeva colla parola attutarne l’orgoglio e ridurli a temenza ; se per contrario inviliti senza ragione, rilevarli al coraggio : cosicché il governo era in apparenza democratico , ma in sostanza reggimento di un personaggio primario. Ma i posteriori a lui, essendo più alla pari tra loro , ed aspirando ciascuno al primato , si volsero a secondare il popolo , e a rallentare il governo dello stato. Questi disordini (com’era da aspettarsi in città grande e dominante) oltre molti altri errori, partorirono anche quello della spedizione navale in Sicilia ; il quale non vuoisi tanto attribuire al difetto di cognizione delle forze dei popoli contro cui s\ andava, quanto a colpa dei magistrati che tale spe dizione ordinarono ; i quali non che brigarsi di conoscere ciò che potesse esser utile alla gente che vi andava f per le loro gare di primeggiare nel popolo, non solo infievolirono le operazioni di quell’armata, ma ancora causarono che lo stato della Repubblica, diviso in varie fazioni, andasse per la prima voiUi in iscompiglio. Pure nonostante la rotta avuta in Sicilia (ove oltre agli altri apparecchi di guerra, perderono la maggior parte della flotta) ; nonostante le parti che già regnavano in città , gli Ateniesi resisterono tre anni ai I^acedemoni loro primi nemici, a quei di Sicilia che si unirono con essi, di più agli alleati che si erano per la maggior parte ribellati, e finalmente a Ciro figliolo del re di Persia, venuto in rinforzo dei Peloponnesi, ai quali sommiuistrava il denaro per la flotta. Nè si diedero per vinti sinché inviluppati tra loro nelle private contese, non ebbero avuto l’ultimo tracollo. Tanto allora ricrebbe a favore di Pericle l’opinione d’aver egli preconosciuto i modi per cui la città d’Atene, senza difficoltà alcuna, avrebbe in questa guerra riportato vittoria su gli stessi Peloponnesi.