Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Élie-Ami Bétant (Translator), 2.18

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Pendant ces préparatifs, l’armée des Péloponésiens, continuant sa marche, arriva devant OEnoé, première ville de l’Attique du côté où ils voulaient opérer l’invasion. Après avoir assis leur camp, ils se disposèrent à attaquer la muraille avec des machines ¹ et par d’autres moyens. OEnoé, située sur les confins de l’Attique et de la Béotie, était fortifiée et servait aux Athéniens de place d’armes en temps de guerre. Les Péloponésiens firent le siège de cette ville et y perdirent beaucoup de temps. L’armée en prit occasion de murmurer contre Archi damos. On lui reprochait son irrésolution, toute en faveur des. Athéniens, lorsqu’on avait agité la question de la guerre, son séjour prolongé à l'Isthme, la lenteur de sa marche, enfin sa temporisation devant OEnoé. Les Athéniens, disait-on, en avaient profité pour retirer leurs effets dans la ville, au lieu que, par un mouvement rapide, les Péloponésiens auraient tout surpris hors des murs. Sans s’émouvoir de ce mécontentement, Archi-damos patientait, dans l’espoir que les Athéniens seraient plus traitables, leur territoire étant encore intact, et qu’ils ne se résigneraient pas à en contempler froidement le ravage.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Élie-Ami Bétant (Translator). Paris. 1863.

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Current edition First1KGreek

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése (French) (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 2.18.1 focus

[1] ὁ δὲ στρατὸς τῶν Πελοποννησίων προϊὼν ἀφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Οἰνόην πρῶτον, ᾗπερ ἔμελλον ἐσβαλεῖν. καὶ ὡς ἐκαθέζοντο, προσβολὰς παρεσκευάζοντο τῷ τείχει ποιησόμενοι μηχαναῖς τε καὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ·

[2] ἡ γὰρ Οἰνόη οὖσα ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ Βοιωτίας ἐτετείχιστο, καὶ αὐτῷ φρουρίῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐχρῶντο ὁπότε πόλεμος καταλάβοι. τάς τε οὖν προσβολὰς ηὐτρεπίζοντο καὶ ἄλλως ἐνδιέτριψαν χρόνον περὶ αὐτήν.

[3] αἰτίαν τε οὐκ ἐλαχίστην Ἀρχίδαμος ἔλαβεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, δοκῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου μαλακὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτήδειος, οὐ παραινῶν προθύμως πολεμεῖν· ἐπειδή τε ξυνελέγετο ὁ στρατός, ἥ τε ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐπιμονὴ γενομένη καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην πορείαν ἡ σχολαιότης διέβαλεν αὐτόν, μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐν τῇ Οἰνόῃ ἐπίσχεσις.

[4] οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, καὶ ἐδόκουν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπελθόντες ἂν διὰ τάχους πάντα ἔτι ἔξω καταλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου μέλλησιν.

[5] ἐν τοιαύτῃ μὲν ὀργῇ ὁ στρατὸς τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἐν τῇ καθέδρᾳ εἶχεν. ὁ δὲ προσδεχόμενος, ὡς λέγεται, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς γῆς ἔτι ἀκεραίου οὔσης ἐνδώσειν τι καὶ κατοκνήσειν περιιδεῖν αὐτὴν τμηθεῖσαν, ἀνεῖχεν.

Translations (10)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 2.18.1 focus

[1] The army of the Peloponnesians marching forward came first to Oenoe, a town of Attica, the place where they intended to break in, and encamping before it, prepared with engines and by other means to assault the wall.

[2] For Oenoe, lying on the confines between Attica and Boeotia, was walled about; and the Athenians kept a garrison in it for defence of the country when at any time there should be war.

[3] For which cause they made preparation for the assault of it, and also spent much time about it otherwise. And Archidamus for this was not a little taxed as thought to have been both slow in gathering together the forces for the war and also to have favoured the Athenians in that he encouraged not the army to a forwardness in it. And afterwards likewise his stay in the isthmus and his slowness in the whole journey was laid to his charge, but especially his delay at Oenoe.

[4] For in this time the Athenians retired into the city: whereas it was thought that the Peloponnesians, marching speedily, might but for this delay have taken them all without.

[5] So passionate was the army of Archidamus for his stay before Oenoe. But expecting that the Athenians, whilst their territory was yet unhurt, would relent and not endure to see it wasted, for that cause (as it is reported) he held his hand.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 2.18.1 focus

[1] Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first town they came to in Attica was Oenoe, where they were to enter the country. Sitting down before it, they prepared to assault the wall with engines and otherwise.

[2] Oenoe, standing upon the Athenian and Boeotian border, was of course a walled town, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians in time of war. So the Peloponnesians prepared for their assault, and wasted some valuable time before the place.

[3] This delay brought the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during the levying of the war he had gained credit for weakness and Athenian sympathies by the half measures he had advocated; and after the army had assembled he had further injured himself in public estimation by his loitering at the Isthmus and the slowness with which the rest of the march had been conducted. But all this was as nothing to the delay at Oenoe.

[4] During this interval the Athenians were carrying in their property; and it was the belief of the Peloponnesians that a quick advance would have found everything still out, had it not been for his procrastination.

[5] Such was the feeling of the army towards Archidamus during the siege. But he, it is said, expected that the Athenians would shrink from letting their land be wasted, and would make their submission while it was still uninjured; and this was why he waited.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 2.18 focus

Das Heer der Peloponnesier rückte auf seinem Marsche in
Attika zuerst vor Oenoe, in welcher Gegend sie den Einfall machen
wollten. Dort lagerten sie und trafen Vorbereitungen, um mit
Sturmmaschinen und in anderer Art gegen die Befestigungen vorzugehen;
denn das auf der Gränze zwischen Attika und Böotien gelegene Oenoe
hatte Mauern, und die Athener hielten zu Kriegszeiten dort eine
Besatzung. Die Vorbereitungen zum Sturm wurden langsam betrieben,
und auch sonst ging die Zeit unbenutzt hin, und hieraus entstand gegen
den Archidamos kein geringer Verdachtgrund, denn schien er schon in
den Zurüstungen zum Kriege unentschlossen und den Athenern
förderlich zu sein, indem er nicht entschieden für den Krieg stimmte, so
schadete ihm jetzt, als das Heer beisammen war, die auf dem Jsthmos
eingetretene Verzögerung und die Langsamkeit im weiteren Vorgehen
noch mehr, vorzüglich aber der Aufenthalt vor Oenoe, denn unterdessen
brachten die Athener Alles ein, und es schien, als ob die
Peloponnesier bei schnellem Vor-dringen noch Alles hätten außerhalb
überraschen können, hätte nicht des Archidamos Zögerung dies verhindert.
Deshalb zürnte ihm das Heer wegen dieses Aufenthaltes. Er aber
hielt zurück, wie man sagt, in der Meinung, daß die Athener doch in
etwas nachgeben und sich besinnen würden, ihr Land der Plünderung
preiszugeben.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 2.18 focus

Inzwischen gelangte das Heer der Peloponnesier auf seinem
Marsche zunächst nach Oinoe, wo der Einfall erfolgen sollte.
Hier machte es halt und schickte sich an, die Festung mit Sturm
zu nehmen. Denn Oinoe, an der Grenze von Attika und Böotien,
war Festung und diente als solche den Athenern, die, wenn
es nach Krieg aussah, eine Besatzung hineinlegten. Man kam
jedoch über die Vorbereitungen nicht hinaus und verlor hier
unnütz seine Zeit. Dadurch aber zog Archidamos sich arge
Nackenschläge zu. Meinte man, daß er sich schon vor Beginn
des Krieges schwach und als Athenerfreund gezeigt habe, so
wollte man ihm jetzt, nachdem das Heer beisammen, sein Zaudern
auf dem Isthmus und die Langsamkeit des weiteren Vormarsches,
namentlich aber den langen Aufenthalt bei Oinoe, erst recht
nicht verzeihen. Denn unterdessen hatten die Athener alles in
Sicherheit gebracht, während es, wenn er sich nicht so viel Zeit
gelassen und seinen Marsch beschleunigt hätte, den Peloponne
siern wahrscheinlich noch in die Hände gefallen wäre. So war
man wegen dieses Aufenthalts im Heere auf Archidamos schlecht
zu sprechen. Er aber hielt sich, wie es heißt, deshalb so lange
dort aus, weit er immer noch darauf rechnete, die Athener
würden nachgeben und es nicht auf die Verwüstung ihres Landes
ankommen lassen.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 2.18 focus

XVIII. L’armée des Péloponnésiens s’avançait ; la première ville de l’Attique qu’ils rencontrèrent fut oenoé¹, qui devait servir de base à l’armée d’invasion. Après avoir assis leur camp, ils se disposèrent à battre les remparts avec des machines et à faire un siége en règle. Car oenoé, située sur les confins de l’Attique et de la Béotie, était fortifiée et servait de place forte en temps de guerre. Les Lacédémoniens préparèrent donc leurs moyens d’attaque et perdirent ainsi un temps précieux autour de cette place. Ce ne fut pas là un des moindres griefs contre Archidamus ; on trouvait qu’il avait montré de la mollesse à réunir les alliés, lorsqu’il s’agissait de décider la guerre et qu’il s’était montré favorable aux Athéniens en ne conseillant pas de la commencer incontinent. Depuis le rassemblement des troupes, son séjour prolongé sur l’isthme, la lenteur de la marche, et surtout le temps perdu devant oenoé, excitaient les rumeurs. Car les Athéniens avaient profité de ce délai pour tout rentrer dans la ville ; et il était présumable au contraire que, sans ces temporisations, les Lacédémoniens, en s’avançant vivement, auraient trouvé tout dehors. Tel était le mécontentement de l’armée, pendant qu’Archidamus séjournait devant oenoé. Quant à lui, il temporisait dans l’espoir, disait-on, que les Athéniens pourraient faire quelques concessions tant que leur territoire ne serait pas entamé et qu’ils redouteraient d’y voir, sous leurs yeux, porter le ravage.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 2.18.1 focus

[1] Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing and the first point it reached in Attica was Oenoe, where they intended to begin the invasion. And while they were establishing their camp there, they prepared to assault the wall with engines and otherwise;

[2] for Oenoe, which was on the border between Attica and Boeotia, was a walled town, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians whenever war broke out. So the Lacedaemonians went on with their preparations to assault the place, and in this and other ways wasted time.

[3] And it was for his conduct here that Archidamus was most severely censured, though it was thought that in the levying of the war, too, he had been slack and had played into the hands of the Athenians when he did not advise the Peloponnesians to make war with vigour. Again, when the army was being collected, he was criticized for the delay which occurred at the Isthmus, and afterwards for the leisurely way in which the march was made, but most of all for the halt at Oenoe.

[4] For in the interval the Athenians continued to bring their property into the city and the Peloponnesians believed that but for his procrastination they could have advanced quickly and found everything still outside.

[5] Such was the resentment felt by the army toward Archidamus while they were sitting still. But the reason, it is said, whiy he kept holding back was that he expected the Athenians would make some concession while their territory was still unravaged and would be loath to see it laid waste.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.) — 2.18.1 focus

[1] As for the army of the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, the first town it came to in Attica was Oenoe, at which point they intended to make their inroad.

[2] And having sat down before it, they prepared to make assaults on the wall, both with engines and in every other way. For Oenoe, as lying on the frontiers of Attica and Boeotia, had been surrounded with a wall, and the Athenians used it as a garrisoned fort, whenever any war befell them.

[3] They prepared then for assaulting it, and wasted their time about it to no purpose. And from this delay, Archidamus incurred the greatest censure: though he had, even ¹ while the war was gathering, been thought to show a want of spirit, and to favour the Athenians, by not heartily recommending hostilities. And again, after the army was mustered, the stay that was made at the Isthmus, and his slowness on the rest of the march, gave occasion for charges against him, but most of all his stopping at Oenoe.

[4] For the Athenians during this time were carrying in their property, and the Peloponnesians thought that by advancing against them quickly they would have found every thing still out, but for his dilatoriness.

[5] Such resentment did the army feel towards Archidamus during the siege. But he, it is said, was waiting in expectation that the Athenians would give in, while their land was still unravaged, and would shrink from enduring to see it wasted.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 2.18.1 focus

[1] Exercitus vero Peloponnesiorum procedens tetigit Atticam primum ad CEnoen, qua erant irrupturi. Et ut considebant, ad oppugnandos sese parabant muros machinis, et alio modo.

[2] Nam CEnoe, quae est in Atticae et Bmotiae finibus, muris erat cincta, et Athenienses hoc propugnaculo utebantur, quoties bellum incidisset. Hujus igitur et oppugnationem parabant et alioqui circum ipsam tempus triverunt.

[3] Et invidiam haud minimam Archidamus sibi conilavit ex hac re, quod videbatur et in movendo bello mollis esse et Atheniensium studiosus, qui ad bellum alacriter gerendum non adhortaretur; ac postquam copiae in unum coactae sunt, commoratio, qua ad Isthmum erat usus et in reliquo itinere faciendo tarditas in suspicionem adduxit eum, maxime vero ad CEnoen cunctatio.

[4] Atlie · nienses enim hoc temporis spatio res suas in urbem importabant, et Peloponnesii, si celeriter eo ivissent, res omnes adhuc extra urbem deprehendere potuisse videbantur, si non per illius cunctationem stetisset.

[5] Tali modo igitur exercitus Archidamo in illa mora succensebat. Ille vero, quum speraret, ut fertur, Athenienses, agro adhuc intacto, aliquid de pertinacia remissuros, ejusque vastationem tergiversanter passuros, inhibebat bellum.

Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides First1KGreek (Thucydides. Vier Staatsreden aus Thucydides. Gürsching, Heinrich, translator. Augsburg: Wirth, 1856.) — 2.35.1 focus

[1] Wenn es bisher bei den Rednern an dieser Stätte fast allgemeiner Brauch geworden, den Mann zu rühmen, der mit der Bestattung diese Rede verband, weil an dem Grabe gefallener Krieger ein ehrendes Wort sich zieme, so würde ich es für hinreichend gehalten haben, dass man Helden der That mit einer festlichen Handlung ehre, — wie das denn der Staat durch die Bestattung gethan hat, deren Zeugen ihr so eben gewesen — und würde die Verherrlichung so vieler Männer nicht einem Einzelnen und der zufälligen Wirkung seines Vortrags anheimgegeben haben.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 2.18 focus

Ma l9 esercito dei Peloponnesi proseguendo il cammino, arrivò primieramente sotto Enoa dell’Àttica, per dove volevano aprirsi, armata mano, la strada : e fatto alto si preparavano ad assaltare con macchine e con altre maniere le mura, onde era stata cinta Enoa situata sulla frontiera dell’Attica e della Beozia ; e di essa usavano gli Ateniesi come di un propugnacolo quando insorgesse la guerra. Disponevano adunque l’oppugnazione di quella terra , ma si trattennero qualche tempo senza prò intorno ad essa ; di che era principalmente accagionato Archidamo , che anche quando si trattava di riunirsi per la guerra si era mostrato poco sollecito e mal disposto a consigliarla , ed affezionato per gli Ateniesi. Inoltre, posciachè l’esercito si fu riunito, l’averlo trattenuto sull’ istmo ed il lento marciare nel resto del cammino , lo avevano messo in discredito. Ma soprattutto nocque alla reputazione d’Archidamo la fermata sotto Enoa: conciossiachè in questo stante gli Ateniesi introducevano in città le cose loro ; onde pareva che se i Peloponnesi, tolto di mezzo questo indugio, si fossero spinti innanzi sollecitamente, avrebbodo trovato tutto ancor fuori di città : tale era il inai talento dell' esercito contro Archidamo per questa sua fermata. Egli però soprassedeva aspettandosi, come si dice, die gli Ateniesi, essendo tuttora intatte le loro campagne, cederebbero in qualche cosa, mossi dal rincrescimento di vederle disertare,

Notes on the current edition

History of the Peloponnesian War

Des béliers. Les autres machines de siège, telles que catapultes, balistes ou oxybêles, sont d’un usage plus récent, et qui date de l’époque de l’ancien Denys, tyran de Syracuse. (Voyez Diodore de Sicile, XIV, xliu.)

Commentary

Commentary on Thucydides Book 2 (Thucydides, Book II. Marchant, Edgar C., editor. London: Macmillan and Company, 1891.) focus

Ἔχει — = παρέχει: ‘does not support a conclusion which can justly cause you alarm.’ [ τὸ] ἐκφοβῆσαι— omitting τὸ take ἐκφοβῆσαι with δικαίαν, as in IV. 17 δίκαιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀπιστότατοι εἶναι. The conclusion they drew from the preceding battle was that they would be defeated in the coming battle: and this conclusion caused them φοβεῖσθαι τὴν μέλλουσαν. But the battle, they are told, does not afford the τεκμήρια for such a conclusion. ( τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι cannot be accus. of respect, as in c. 53 τὸ προταλαιπωρεῖν, because such an accus. would here certainly contain a reference to the expected issue of the coming fight. The usual translation ‘ground for fear’ gives a wrong sense to every one of the three words. If πεφοβῆσθαι were read, the construction would be δικαίαν πεφοβῆσθαι, = ‘which it is right to fear,’ ἡ τέκμαρσις δικαία ἐστι —πεφοβῆσθαι being equivalent to δἰκαιόν ἐστι τὴν τέκμαρσιν πεφοβῆσθαι, infin. of purpose.)

Ἐπὶ στρατείαν —c. 83, 3.

τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τ —the wind and sea, c. 84, 3.

καὶ πού τι καὶ —the expression barely does more than suggest the possibility of what was certain. The object is to blame τύχη and excuse γνώμη.

Κατὰ —‘owing to.’

προσεγένετο —much like ἐπι‐ γίγνεσθαι, c. 4, 2, but the defeat is regarded as an unavoidable occurrence added to their other disad vantages ( τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης). Cf. Vergil's ‘nec Teucris addita Juno | usquam aberit, Aen. VI. 90.

τῆς γνώμης τὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικηθέν —= ἡ γνώμη μὴ νικηθεῖσα. Cf. c. 59 τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης. Militibus fortuna victis invictus ipsorum animus opponitur. Hache. ‘It is not right that our minds, which we feel ( μή, not οὐ) were not conquered by force but have still some answer to give, should be depressed by the result of mere accident.’

κατὰ κράτος — vi, as in κατὰ κ. αἱρεῖν. ἀντιλογίαν —sc. πρὸς τὸ κατὰ κράτος νικηθῆναι , viz. the answer that the disaster was due to ἀπειρία, τύχη, want of παρασκευή. A familiar word in Plato.

ξυμφορᾶς —opposed to γνώμης above.

νομίσαι —sc. δίκαιον. ἀνδρείους ὀρθῶς—‘really brave,’ ὀρθῶς as in Aristoph. Eq. 1085 .

ἀπειρίαν ... προβαλλομένους —‘make in experience an excuse.’

τοῦ ἀνδρείου π. —‘while courage remains.’

ἔν τινι —neut.

Ὑμῶν δὲ —topic τὸ δυνατόν. Index, s.v. τόποι. λείπεται —sc. τῆς ἐκείνων ἐμπειρίας. μνήμην—‘presence of mind.’

ἄνευ εὐψυχίας —the insinuation that the Athenians lacked courage is wholly unsupported by argument.

ἄνευ ἀλκῆς —‘without boldness,’ as in c. 84, 3 robur; it is the result of εὐψυχία.

Ἀπαράσκευοι τυχεῖν —for the omission of ὄντες, cf. c. 39, 4.

Πλῆθος —c. 11, 3.

τὰ δὲ πολλὰ —adverbial accus. For the γνώμη, cf. c. 13, 2.

Προσγενόμενα —here of additional advantages; con- trast 3 above.

διδασκαλίαν —cf. Aesch. Ag. 185 Ζῆνα τὸν πάθη μάθος | θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν. Arn.

Τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν —cf. c. 11, 3.

τις προσταχθῇ —the change from the plur. to the indef. sing. is due to the intervention of ἕκαστος. On the juxtaposition of 2nd and 3rd pers., ἑαυτὸν . . ἕπεσθε etc. see c. 11, 1, 44, 1.

Πρότερον —Cnemus, Machaon, Isocrates and Aga- tharchidas.

οὐ χεῖρον — meiosis, not to offend the others.

ἐνδώσομεν —as in c. 49, 4.

ἢν δέ τις —this vague threat shows that the officers suspected there had been cowardice in the former battle. Cf. c. 85, 2.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 2.18

Élie-Ami Bétant (Translator)

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