Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Henry Dale (Translator), 7.18

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[1] The Lacedaemonians prepared, too, for their invasion of Attica, both in accordance with their own previous resolution, and at the instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, since they had heard of the reinforcements about to be sent from Athens to Sicily; that they might be stopped by an incursion being made into the country. Alcibiades also kept urgently advising them to fortify Decelea, and not to let the war rest.

[2] But most of all had they gained confidence, because they thought that the Athenians, being engaged in a two-fold war with both themselves and the Siceliots, would be more easily subdued; and also because they considered them to have first broken the truce. For in the former course of hostilities they thought the guilt lay more on their own side, both because the Thebans had entered Plataea during a time of truce; and because, when it had been specified in the former treaty, that none should take up arms against others, if they were willing to submit to a judicial decision, they themselves had not listened to the Athenians when appealing to such a decision. On which account they considered that they were justly unsuccessful, and made both their misfortune at Pylus, and whatever other might have befallen them, a subject of ¹ serious reflection.

[3] But when the Athenians had set out from Argos with those thirty ships, and ravaged a part of Epidaurus, Prasiae, and some other places, at the same time that they were also ² spreading devastation from Pylus; and when they refused to intrust the matter to arbitration, though the Lacedaemonians. as often as differences had arisen concerning any of the debatable points in the treaty, appealed to a judicial decision; then, indeed, the Lacedaemonians thought that the violation of the law, which in the former instance had been committed by themselves, had now, again, come in the same way to attach to the Athenians, and they were, therefore, eager for hostilities.

[4] Accordingly, during this winter they sent round to their allies orders for iron, and were getting all the tools ready for building their fort. At the same time they were themselves raising supplies, and compelling the rest of the Peloponnesians to do so, with a view to despatching in the merchantmen succours to those in Sicily. And so the winter ended, and the eighteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides. Henry Dale (Translator). London. 1851.

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Current edition First1KGreek

History of the Peloponnesian War (English) (Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.)

Editions (1)

Ἱστορίαι Perseus (Thucydides. Historiae, Vol 1-2. Jones, Henry Stuart, editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910. (1942 printing).) — 7.18 focus

[1] παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τε προυδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐναγόντων, ἐπειδὴ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὅπως δὴ ἐσβολῆς γενομένης διακωλυθῇ. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης προσκείμενος ἐδίδασκε τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχίζειν καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι τὸν πόλεμον.

[2] μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐνόμιζον διπλοῦν τὸν πόλεμον ἔχοντας, πρός τε σφᾶς καὶ Σικελιώτας, εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰς σπονδὰς προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς· ἐν γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἢν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, καὶ ἐνεθυμοῦντο τήν τε περὶ Πύλον ξυμφορὰν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο.

[3] ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἄργους ὁρμώμενοι Ἐπιδαύρου τέ τι καὶ Πρασιῶν καὶ ἄλλα ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐκ Πύλου ἅμα ἐλῃστεύοντο, καὶ ὁσάκις περί του διαφοραὶ γένοιντο τῶν κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἀμφισβητουμένων, ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκ ἤθελον ἐπιτρέπειν, τότε δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι νομίσαντες τὸ παρανόμημα, ὅπερ καὶ σφίσι πρότερον ἡμάρτητο, αὖθις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ αὐτὸ περιεστάναι, πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον.

[4] καὶ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ σίδηρόν τε περιήγγελλον κατὰ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ τἆλλα ἐργαλεῖα ἡτοίμαζον ἐς τὸν ἐπιτειχισμόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ἅμα ὡς ἀποπέμψοντες ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἐπικουρίαν αὐτοί τε ἐπόριζον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Πελοποννησίους προσηνάγκαζον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ὄγδοον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

Translations (9)

The History of the Grecian War Perseus (Thucydides. The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Hobbes, Thomas. translator. London: John Bohn, 1843.) — 7.18 focus

[1] The Lacedaemonians, as they intended before, and being also instigated to it by the Syracusians and Corinthians, upon advertisement now of the Athenians' new supply for Sicily, prepared likewise to invade Attica, thereby to divert them. And Alcibiades also importunately urged the fortifying of Deceleia, and by no means to war remissly.

[2] But the Lacedaemonians were heartened thereunto principally because they thought the Athenians having in hand a double war, one against them and another against the Sicilians, would be the easier pulled down, and because they conceived the breach of the last peace was in themselves. For in the former war, the injury proceeded from their own side, in that the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of peace; and because also, whereas it was inserted in the former articles that arms should not be carried against such as would stand to trial of judgment, they had refused such trial when the Athenians offered it. And they thought all their misfortunes had deservedly befallen them for that cause, remembering amongst others, the calamity at Pylus.

[3] But when the Athenians with a fleet of thirty sail had spoiled part of the territory of Epidaurus and of Prasiae and other places, and their soldiers that lay in garrison in Pylus had taken booty in the country about, and seeing that as often as there arose any controversy touching any doubtful point of the articles, the Lacedaemonians offering trial by judgment, they refused it, then indeed, the Lacedaemonians, conceiving the Athenians to be in the same fault that themselves had been in before, betook themselves earnestly to the war.

[4] And this winter, they sent about unto their confederates to make ready iron, and all instruments of fortification. And for the aid they were to transport in ships to the Sicilians, they both made provision amongst themselves and compelled the rest of Peloponnesus to do the like. So ended this winter, and the eighteenth year of the war written by Thucydides.

History of the Peloponnesian War Perseus (Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Crawley, Richard, translator. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1914.) — 7.18 focus

[1] In the meantime the Lacedaemonians prepared for their invasion of Attica , in accordance with their own previous resolve, and at the instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, who wished for an invasion to arrest the reinforcements which they heard that Athens was about to send to Sicily . Alcibiades also urgently advised the fortification of Decelea, and a vigorous prosecution of the war.

[2] But the Lacedaemonians derived most encouragement from the belief that Athens , with two wars on her hands, against themselves and against the Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction that she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former war, they considered, the offence had been more on their own side, both on account of the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of peace, and also of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer of arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty that where arbitration should be offered there should be no appeal to arms. For this reason they thought that they deserved their misfortunes, and took to heart seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had befallen them.

[3] But when, besides the ravages from Pylos , which went on without any intermission, the thirty Athenian ships came out from Argos and wasted part of Epidaurus , Prasiae, and other places; when upon every dispute that arose as to the interpretation of any doubtful point in the treaty, their own offers of arbitration were always rejected by the Athenians,—the Lacedaemonians at length decided that Athens had now committed the very same offence as they had before done, and had become the guilty party; and they began to be full of ardor for the war.

[4] They spent this winter in sending round to their allies for iron, and in getting ready the other implements for building their fort; and meanwhile began raising at home, and also by forced requisitions in the rest of Peloponnese , a force to be sent out in the merchantmen to their allies in Sicily . Winter thus ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Wahrmund, Adolf, translator. Stuttgart: Krais and Hoffmann, 1864.) — 7.18 focus

Es rüsteten aber die Lakedämonier auch einen Einfall nach
Attika, den sie selbst bereits früher beschlossen hatten, und wozu
Syrakusaner und Korinther, als sie von dem HülfSzug der Athener
gegen Sieilien erfuhren, dringend aufforderten, in der Meinung
nämlich, daß dieser durch jenen Einfall verhindert werden könne. Und
auch Alkibiades trat dem bei und gab ihnen an die Hand, sie sollten
Dekeleia befestigen und nicht ablassen vom Krieg. Am meisten
Zuverficht aber erwuchs den Lakedämoniern aus.der Meinung, daß die
Athener, von zwiefachem Kriege bedrängt, dem gegen sie selbst und
dem gegen die Sieilianer, leichter zu bewältigen sein würden, und
dann auch weil sie meinten, daß die Athener dießmal zuerst die
Verträge gebrochen hätten; denn in dem früheren Kriege sei die Schuld
eher auf ihrer Seite gewesen, weil die Thebaner noch während des
Waffenstillstandes in Platäa eingefallen seien, und weil in den
früheren Verträgen 8) ausgemacht war, nicht zu den Waffen zu greifen,
wenn die eine Partei ein Schiedsgericht anbiete, welches letztere eben
die Athener damals gethan hatten, ohne daß sie darauf hören
wollten; und deßhalb, glaubten sie, habe sie das Mißgeschick mit Recht
betroffen, denn das Unglück bei Pylos und was ihnen sonst
dergleichen begegnet war, hatten sie sich sehr zu Gemüth genommen. Da
aber dießmal die Athener mit dreißig Schiffen von Argos aus ¹²³⁴
einen Theil deS Gebiets von Epidauros und Prasiä, sowie auch
andere Gegenden'verwüstet hatten und zugleich von Pylos aus
Raubzüge unternahmen, und da auch, so oft wegen irgend eines nach den
Verträgen streitigen Punktes ein Zwiespalt entstand und die
Lakedämonier Schiedsgerichte vorschlugen, die Athener aus dieselben nicht
eingehen wollten, so glaubten die Lakedämonier, wie früher die
Schuld auf ihrer Seite gewesen, ebenso sei dieselbe jetzt auf
Seiten der Athener, und so waren sie denn zu der Kriegführung um so
eifriger. Und im Verlaufe dieses Winters noch schrieben sie unter
den Bundesgenossen Lieferungen von Eisen aus und rüsteten auch
sonst alles Geräthe zum Festungsbau. Und auch um denen in
Sicilien auf Lastschiffen Unterstützung zuzusenden, schafften sie selber das
Nöthige herbei und nöthigten zu Gleichem auch die andern
Pelovonnesier.

⁵ So ging der Winter zu Ende und mit ihm endete das
achtzehnte Jahr dieses Krieges, den Thukydides beschrieben hat.

Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs First1KGreek (Thucydides. Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Kriegs. Braun, Theodor, translator. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag, 1917.) — 7.18 focus

Nun aber rüsteten sich auch die Lakedämonier zum Einfall
nach Attika, wozu sie sich vorher schon entschlossen hatten und
jetzt auch von den Syrakusern und Korinthern gedrängt wurden,
da sie erfahren, daß die Athener Verstärkungen nach Sizilien
schickten, und sie dieS durch den Einfall verhindern wollten.
Auch Alkibiades empfahl ihnen dringend, Dekeleia zu befestigen
und den Krieg auf der Stelle zu beginnen. Die Lakedämonier
aber entschlossen sich dazu um so unbedenklicher, weil sie
glaubten, die Athener, welche den doppelten Krieg gegen sie
und die sizilischen Griechen führen mußten, jetzt leichter be
siegen zu können, und überzeugt waren, daß die Athener den
Frieden zuerst gebrochen hätten, während sie in dem vorigen
Kriege eigentlich selbst im Unrecht gewesen seien. Hatten doch
damals die Thebaner Platää mitten im Frieden überfallen
und sie sich auf die von den Athenern verlangte richterliche
Entscheidung nicht eingelassen, obgleich nach den früheren Ver
trägen niemand mit Krieg überzogen werden durfte, der sich
richterlicher Entscheidung unterwerfen wollte. Dadurch meinten
sie, ihr damaliges Mißgeschick verdient zu haben, und dachten
dabei an die bei Pylos und anderswo erlittenen Niederlagen.
Nachdem jedoch die Athener auf den dreißig Schiffen aus
Argos bei Epidauros, Prasiai und an anderen Orten gelandet
waren, dort gebrandschatzt und von Pylos Streifzüge unter
nommen, auch sich auf die von ihnen verlangte richterliche Ent
scheidung einer über die Auslegung des Vertrags entstandenen
Meinungsverschiedenheit niemals eingelassen hatten, glaubten
die Lakedämonier, wenn das Unrecht früher auch auf ihrer
Seite gewesen, so sei es jetzt auf Seite der Athener, und
gingen deshalb um so zuversichtlicher in den Krieg. In diesem
Winter ließen sie sich von ihren Bundesgenossen Eisen kommen
und versahen sich auch sonst mit Gerätschaften für den Festungs
ban. Zugleich richteten sie sich darauf ein, selbst Truppen auf
Lastschiffen nach Sizilien zu schicken, und hielten auch die
übrigen Peloponnesier dazu an. Damit endete der Winter
und das achtzehnte Jahr des Krieges, den Thukydides be
schrieben hat.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponèse First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése, Vol. 1-2. Zévort, Marie Charles, translator. Paris: Charpentier, 1852.) — 7.18 focus

XVIII. Les Lacédémoniens préparaient aussi une invasion dans l’Attique. C’était chose précédemment résolue par eux, mais ils y étaient surtout poussés par les Syracusains et les Corinthiens : ceux-ci, informés qu’Athènes envoyait des renforts en Sicile, voulaient y mettre obstacle par cette invasion. Alcibiade, les pressant de son côté, les exhortait à fortifier Décélieet à ne pas laisser languir les opérations. Mais ce qui contribuait surtout à stimuler un peu les Lacédémoniens, c’était d’une part la pensée que les Athéniens, avec une double guerre à soutenir contre eux et contre les Siciliens, seraient plus faciles àabattre, et de l’autre la conviction que les Athéniens avaient les premiers rompu la trêve. Dans la guerre précédente, c’était surtout sur eux-mêmes, ils le savaient, que retombait la violation des traités : les Thébains avaient envahi le territoire de Platée en temps de paix; et, quoiqu’il fût stipulé dans les traités précédents qu’on n’en viendrait pas aux armes si l’une des parties offrait l’arbitrage, ils avaient eux-mêmes repoussé les propositions d’accommodement amiable que leur firent les Athéniens. Ils voyaient dans leurs malheurs la juste conséquence de cette faute, et ne pouvaient détacher leur pensée du désastre de Pylos et de tout ce qui avait pu leur arriver de funeste. Mais lorsqu’ils eurent vu les Athéniens aller, à la tête de trente vaisseaux, ravager une partie du territoire d’Épidaure, de Prasies et d’autres lieux, faire en même temps de Pylos un centre de brigandage, refuser l’arbitrage, malgré l’invitation des Lacédémoniens, toutes les fois qu’il s’élevait des difficultés sur les points litigieux du traité, alors, persuadés que les Athéniens se plaçaient à leur tour sous le coup de la faute qu’euxmêmes avaient commise contre la foi publique, ils inclinèrent résolûment à la guerre. Dans le cours de cet hiver, ils firent circuler chez leurs alliés l’ordre de fournir du fer, et disposèrent tous les instruments nécessaires à la construction des forts. En même temps ils se préparèrent à expédier en Sicile des secours sur des bâtiments de charge, et obligèrent les autres peuples du Péloponnèse à les imiter. L’hiver finit, ainsi que la dix-huitième année de cette guerre, dont Thucydide a écrit l’histoire.

Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése First1KGreek (Thucydides. Histoire de la Guerre du Péloponnése. Bétant, Élie-Ami, translator. Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette, 1863.) — 7.18 focus

Les Lacédémoniens préparaient aussi leur invasion en Attique. Ce projet n’était pas nouveau; mais l’exécution en fut accélérée par les instances des Syracusains et des Corinthiens, qui espéraient, par cette diversion, arrêter l’envoi des secours dirigés par les Athéniens sur la Sicile. Alcibiade à son tour pressait pour qu’on fortifiât Décélie et qu’on poussât la guerrè avçp vigueur. Ce qui acheva de déterminer les Lacédémoniens, ce fut l’espoir d’en finir avec Athènes, qui aurait sur les bras une double guerre, contre eux et contre la Sicile; ce fut aussi la pensée que les Athéniens avaient les premiers foulé la trêve aux pieds. Dans la guerre précédente, la rupture avait été leur propre ouvrage ; car les Thébains étaient entrés dans Platée en pleine paix, et, bien que le traité portât qu’on n’aurait pas recours aux armes contre ceux qui se soumettraient à un arbitrage, ils avaient eux-mêmes repoussé les offres de médiation faites par les Athéniens. Aussi regardaient-ils leurs revers, et en particulier le désastre de Pylos, comme le juste châtiment de cette faute. Mais, lorsqu’ils virent les Athéniens ravager, avec leurs trente vaisseaux ¹, les territoires d’Ëpidaure, de Prasies et d’autres villes, faire de Pylos un foyer de brigandages, enfin, à chaque contestation sur quelque article du traité, refuser l’arbitrage qui leur était offert, alors, persuadés que les Athéniens à leur tour s’exposaient à la peine d’une violation semblable à celle dont eux-mêmes s’étaient naguère rendus coupables, ils se décidèrent avec ardeur à la guerre. Pendant l’hiver, ordre fut donné aux alliés de s’approvisionner de fer et de tous les outils destinés à la construction des forts. En même temps ils se tinrent prêts à envoyer des secours en Sicile sur des bâtiments de charge, et astreignirent le reste des Péloponésiens à en faire autant. Là-dessus l’hiver finit, ainsi que la dix-huitième année de la guerre que Thucydide a a-contée.

History of the Peloponnesian War First1KGreek (Thucydides, Vol. 1-4. Smith, Charles Foster, translator. London and Cambridge, MA: Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1919-1923.) — 7.18 focus

[1] The Lacedaemonians were also making ready for their invasion of Attica, both in accordance with their previous resolution and because the Syracusans and Corinthians urged it, when they heard of the reinforcements to be sent from the Athenians to Sicily, so that, as they said, these might be wholly prevented by the invasion. And Alcibiades was likewise insistently telling them that they should fortify Deceleia and not relax their efforts in the war.

[2] But most important of all was the fact that a degree of confidence had come to the Lacedaemonians, because they believed that the Athenians, once they had on their hands a twofold war—with themselves and with the Siceliots—would be more easily overthrown, and because they regarded the Athenians as having been the first to break the treaty. In the former war¹ they felt that the transgression had been rather on their own part; for the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of truce,² and, although it had been stipulated in the former agreements³ that neither party was to resort to arms if the other were willing to submit the question to arbitration, yet they themselves refused to respond to the summons when the Athenians invited them to arbitrate. On this account they considered that they deserved their misfortune, having in mind both the disaster at Pylos⁴ and any other that had befallen them.

[3] But now the Athenians, setting out from Argos with thirty ships,⁵ had ravaged a part of Epidaurus and Prasiae and other places, and at the same time were making predatory excursions from Pylos; and as often as differences arose about any of the points of dispute in the treaty and the Lacedaemonians proposed arbitration, they were unwilling to resort to it; at this time, therefore, the Lacedaemonians, considering that the unlawful conduct, of which they had themselves formerly been guilty, had shifted round and now rested upon the Athenians, were zealous for the war.

[4] And during this winter they sent out requisitions for iron to their allies, and in general were making ready the tools needed in the fortification of Deceleia. And at the same time they were not only devising on their own part ways and means for sending reinforcements in merchant-ships to the army in Sicily, but were also compelling the rest of the Peloponnesians to do likewise. So the winter ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci First1KGreek (Historia Belli Peloponnesiaci. Haase, Friedrich, translator. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1869.) — 7.18 focus

[1] Apparabant vero etiam expeditionem in Atticam Lacedaemonii, ut et ante placuerat iis, et Syracusanorum atque Corinthiorum instinctu, postquam audierunt, auxilium ab Atheniensibus in Siciliam mitti, ut irruptione facta impediretur. Et Alcibiades instabat, docens Deceleam muniendam esse nec bellum remittendum.

[2] Praecipue vero quoddam animi robur Lacedaemoniis ex eo accesserat, quod existimabant, Athenienses, dum duplex bellum gererent, contra se et Sicilienses, a se facilius debellatum iri, et quod eos foedera priores fregisse ducebant; nam in superiore bello suum potius peccatum fuisse, quod Thebani foederum tempore Plataeam invasissent, et, quum in prioribus pactionibus cautum esset, ne arma inferrentur, si judicium subire vellent, ipsi ad judicium ab Atheniensibus provocati venire noluissent. Et propterea se merito adversa fortuna usos existimabant et quum illam cladem, quam ad Pylum acceperant, tum etiam, si qua alia iis contigerat, animo volutantes religioni vertebant.

[3] At postquam Athenienses cum triginta navibus Argis profecti agri Epidaurii partem et Prasiarum et alia loca vastarunt, et simul etiam Pylo prodeuntes latrocinia exercebant, et quotiens orta esset controversia de aliqua conditionum, quae in foederibus erant dubiae, ad judicium a Lacedaemoniis provocati rem eis permittere nolebant, tunc vero Lacedaemonii, existimantes, peccatum illud, quod ipsi quoque prius commisissent , idem in Athenienses recidisse, ad bellum animis erant propensi.

[4] Atque nuntiis ad socios hac hieme circummissis ferrum imperabdnt, et cetera instrumenta ad murorum exstructionem praeparabant, et simul etiam et ipsi parabant et ceteros Peloponnesios adigebant, ut illis, qui erant in Sicilia, auxilium in onerariis navibus mitterent. Atque haec hiems finiebatur, et hujus belli, quod Thucydides conscripsit, duodevigesimus annus finiebatur.

La storia di Tucidide First1KGreek (Thucydides. Della storia di Tucidide volgarizzata libri otto. Anonymous translator. Florence: Tipografia Galileiana, 1835.) — 7.18 focus

Ed i Lacedemoni, siccome innanzi avevano risoluto , si preparavano ad invader l’Attica, confortati a ciò da’Siracusani e da’Corintii fin da quando ebbero nuova del soccorso ateniese per la Sicilia , perchè appunto venisse frastornato da quella invasione. Medesimamente Alcibiade anch’egli insisteva e gli avvertiva che munissero Decelia, e non rallentassero la guerra. Ma principalmente si rinvigorirono i Lacedemoni riflettendo che gli Ateniesi inquietati da doppia guerra contro loro e contro i Siciliani, più fàcilmente potrebbero opprimersi, e stimando che fossero essi stati i primi a rompere la tregua. Laddove nella precedente guerra la trasgressione era stata piuttosto di Sparta, essendoché i Tebani erano andati contro Platea stante la tregua : e sebbene nelle prime convenzioni fosse detto che non si portassero le armi contro chi volesse starsene al giudizio, essi non avean dato retta agli Ateniesi che a quell’articolo li richiamavano. E per questo pensavano dii? meritamente avessero avuta contraria la fortuna, e si recavano a coscienza la disgrazia di Pilo e tutte le altre che erano loro incontrate. Da che però gli Ateniesi fatlo vela con trenta navi aveano dato il guasto ad alcune terre di Epidauro e di Prasia e ad altri luoghi, ed uscendo da Pilo praticavano il ladroneccio; e da che, ogni qualvolta sorgevano delle differenze sopra alcuni articoli controversi nelle tregue, non avean voluto rimettersi nel giudizio a che i Lacedemoni li invitavano, allora questi stimando esser al contrario ricaduta negli Ateniesi la trasgressione onde prima erano essi rei, si inanimirono per la guerra. E in quest’inverno richiedevano ferramenti a tutti gli alleati, ed apparecchiavano gli altri strumenti per munire Decelia , ed insieme procacciavano da sè stessi soccorsi da mandarsi in Sicilia sulle navi da carico , ed astringevano gli altri Peloponnesi a fare altrettanto. Cosi finiva l’inverno e l’anno diciottesimo di questa guerra descritta da Tucidide.

Notes on the current edition

History of the Peloponnesian War

1. Or,

of religious scruple,

as in some other passages.

2. ἐλῃστεύοντο.] Or, as Arnold renders it,

they, the Lacedaemonians. were continually being plundered;

referring to V. 14. 2, ληστευομένης τῆς χώρας ἐκ τῆς πύλου. Poppo prefers the active sense, and is inclined to admit ἐλήστευον as Becker has done on the authority of one MS., the middle form not being used elsewhere. As both the preceding and following verbs refer to the Athenians, the change of subject is certainly very harsh, if ἐληστεύοντο be referred to the Lacedaemonians; even more so, I think, than in that remarkable instance which occurs II. ZZZ. 3.

Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War 7.18

Henry Dale (Translator)

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